University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations

Dissertations and Theses

October 2018

CHINA’s EXPANDING CULTURAL INFLUENCE IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE CHINESE MEDIA IN
KENYA
Hui-Ping Tao
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2
Part of the Mass Communication Commons

Recommended Citation
Tao, Hui-Ping, "CHINA’s EXPANDING CULTURAL INFLUENCE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: A CASE
STUDY OF THE CHINESE MEDIA IN KENYA" (2018). Doctoral Dissertations. 1410.
https://doi.org/10.7275/12667556 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2/1410

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

CHINA’S EXPANDING CULTURAL INFLUENCE IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE CHINESE MEDIA IN KENYA

A Dissertation Presented
by
HUI-PING TAO

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
September 2018

Department of Communication

© Copyright by Hui-Ping Tao 2018
All Rights Reserved

CHINA’S EXPANDING CULTURAL INFLUENCE IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE CHINESE MEDIA IN KENYA

A
Dissertation Presented
by
HUI-PING TAO

Approved as to style and content by:
_________________________________________________
Briankle G. Chang, Chair
_________________________________________________
Henry Geddes, Member
_________________________________________________
Enhua Zhang, Member

____________________________
Mari Castañeda, Department Head
Communication

DEDICATION
To my loving parents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This dissertation would not be complete without the significant supports of many
people and organizations. I owe a great deal of gratitude for their help during this
journey.
I would like to express my deepest and sincere appreciation to my advisor and
committee chair, Dr. Briankle G. Chang, for his great support, guidance, inspiration, and
patience through my doctoral student years. Briankle, your encouragement is one of the
most important sources that have motivated me to finish.
I would also like to extend gratitude to the members of my dissertation
committee- Dr. Henry Geddes and Dr. Enhua Zhang, for their assistance and support on
this dissertation. Dr. Henry Geddes has generously shared his knowledge with me. His
suggestions helped me crystalize my ideas. Dr. Enhua Zhang is appreciated for her
comments. I am very grateful for Dr. Zhang’s suggestion about the data selection. Her
thoughts on the new media in China illuminate me on my continued study. The words
and time they have given me have been invaluable in helping me see beyond my
dissertation.
I would also like to give my most whole-hearted thanks to Dr. Peter Kareithi for
his unending support and advice throughout the often-stressful process of dissertation
writing, as well as his support in helping me through graduate school. Peter, I can’t thank
you enough for guiding me through this entire process. I am so very grateful for you
taking me under your wing and teaching me what I needed to know when I needed to
know it.
My sincere appreciation also goes to the Department of Communication at The

v

University of Massachusetts, for giving me this great opportunity to pursue my studies.
During the years I studied in the Communication Department, I met so many kind and
knowledgeable professors, who led me here, graduating with a doctoral degree. Special
thank goes to Kathleen Ready, the most wonderful Graduate Program Secretary I have
ever met. She consistently goes above and beyond to help her students and it is greatly
appreciated.
My family has given me a tremendous amount of support on this journey. My
sisters, brother-in-laws, nephew, and nieces, provided me with a home and financial
support while I was studying in the U.S.A. My parents and my siblings always provided
endless encouragement, support, and a strong belief in me. Without their unconditional
love, this study would not have been possible. To them I dedicate this dissertation.

vi

ABSTRACT
CHINA’s EXPANDING CULTURAL INFLUENCE IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE CHINESE MEDIA IN KENYA
SEPTEMBER 2018
HUI-PING TAO, B.A., PENN STATE UNIVERSITY
M.A., PENN STATE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Briankle G. Chang

This dissertation seeks to demonstrate China’s growing cultural influence in
African countries and illustrates how China attempts to use its economic power and
cultural influences to shape African countries’ foreign policies towards China by using
the Chinese media and cultural expansion in Kenya as a case study. In order to achieve
this objective, this study examines the internal and external economic and political forces
in both China and Kenya that have helped to establish the current pattern of China’s
media involvement and other cultural engagements in Kenya. This study also explores
the extent and nature of China’s cultural and media involvement in Africa with a specific
focus on Kenya; penetration of Chinese news and other cultural productions in Kenya
was examined. This study analyzed the response of Kenyan media to China’s recent
engagement with the country, especially China’s increasingly involvement in media and
other cultural production in the country.
China’s growing presence in Africa has provoked a heated debate about the nature
of Chinese engagement and its implication for the African continent. Critics argue that
China is using its power to develop a neo-colonial system in Africa. Rather than direct
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political control of African countries, China operates behind closed doors to influence
African countries’ foreign policies toward China. Despite criticism of colonialism, some
observers perceive current Sino-African relations as a partnership for development. Both
China and African countries are gaining significant benefits from this relationship. After
analyzed two leading Kenyan newspapers’ coverage of China’s involvement in Kenya,
this study found that both newspapers’ representations of China are natural; unlike
Western media’s negative views of Chinese presence or China’s positive self portrait.
However, Kenyan media’s framing of China’s engagement in the country should not be
viewed as stagnant because China-Kenya interactions are rapidly evolving.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Introduction
When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, Mao
Zedong, the eventual chairman of the Party, adopted the Marxist-Leninist theories of
communist ideology. The objective of Marxist-Leninism theories is to create a social
structure that is classless, that has a centrally planned economy, and that operates by
collective economic production (Andrain, 1994). During the Mao era, the Chinese
economy was relatively stagnant and inefficient. China was isolated and had little
interaction with the Western world.
After the death of Chairman Mao in 1976, Deng Xiaoping became the new
leader of the Chinese Communist Party. Instead of following Mao’s central economic
planning and public ownership, Deng initiated a series of economic reform programs
and the Open-Door policy of 1978, for the purpose of modernizing China (Brautigam,
2009). China’s economy has grown rapidly since the reforms. In order to sustain rapid
economic growth and political stability, China sought to secure energy resources,
broaden their investment activities, and search for new markets for their manufactured
goods. These objectives led China to the African continent (Alden, Large & de
Oliveira, 2008).
In addition to China’s rapid economic growth, African countries’ economic
performance has also improved over the past decade. As its economy continues to
grow, Africa has become a huge consumer market with strong commercial potential.
As a result, Chinese companies have been able establish and expand their business
ventures into the global arena (Leak, Lund, Roxburgh & Wamelen, 2010). Low-
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priced, Chinese manufactured goods have emerged as popular trade items among
African countries; almost all African countries are flooded with low-cost Chinese
merchandise (Leak, Lund, Roxburgh & Wamelen, 2010).
China's growing economic interest in, and engagements with, Africa has
received considerable attention over the past years. However, there is no united
perception regarding China's active engagement with Africa. The proponents of
China's engagement are optimistic about the increased Chinese presence in Africa,
while the critics are concerned about the negative impacts that might be caused by a
large Chinese presence. Optimists suggest that the African economy is benefiting
from China's recent investment. The Chinese government's aid, as well as monetary
investments has helped African countries improve their infrastructure and stimulate
their economies (Kurlantzick, 2009; Suzuki, 2009; Jakobson, 2009). Unlike the
positive perspective, opponents are skeptical about China's real interest. They argue;
that China is a resource extractor and only cares about its own interests and the
exploitation of African resources rather than benefiting the host nations, and thereby,
this type of interactions is a threat to African interests (Zweig & Bi, 2005; Frynas &
Paulo, 2006; Taylor, 2006; Melber, 2007; Herman, 2007; Rich & Recker, 2013).

Research Objectives
Over the past two decades, the Chinese economy has grown rapidly. In order
to meet domestic demand, and to stay competitive in the global market, the Chinese
government and private sectors are expanding their economic investment around the
world. The search for natural resources and consumer markets for its growing
economy drives the intensity and diversity of China’s recent engagement with the
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African continent. For China, Africa is not just a political object for countering the
United States and Soviet Union’s hegemony; instead, it is a source of natural
resources, energy, consumer markets and investment opportunities for the Chinese
government and its private sectors (Lampton, 2008).
China’s engagement with Africa is not effortless. China and its private
companies are facing many challenges in Africa; one of them is a cultural
misunderstanding between the Chinese and the African people. Such
misunderstandings often lead to social tensions and, consequently, difficulties for the
Chinese government and private sector entities to conduct business in Africa
(Ighobor, 2013). In order to minimize such social tensions, China is using its
economic and political power to bridge the cultural gap within African countries and
to assure other nations that China is Africa’s new development partner (Naidu, 2010),
and is not a threat or “neocolonialist” (Kurlantzick, 2007). The Chinese government
promises that the purpose of its engagement with Africa is nothing more than
promoting both stronger trade and investment relations between China and African
nations (Mbaye, 2010).
To enhance its relationship with African countries, China has acknowledged
that it needs to win the hearts and minds of the African people. In doing so, it altered
its national image management strategies and is employing new approaches to
introduce an unbiased image of China to the outside world. As part of this imagerebranding effort, the Chinese government has invested numerous resources to expand
its cultural and media operations in other countries, with the goal of improving
China’s image. Billions of dollars are being invested in China’s state-owned seeks to
establish its own global media empire and to break the Western media monopoly
(Shambaugh, 2015).
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This study used Kenya as a case study to examine the expanding operations of
Chinese media in the country and the growing Chinese presence in Kenyan media.
Kenya was chosen as a case study for this project due to its economic and political
importance in the African continent. On economic front, when China increased its
economic activities in Africa, Kenya became an important hub for the Chinese
government and private sectors. In recent years, China has increased their investments
in Kenya’s local infrastructure, manufacturing, technology and media sectors
(Patroba, 2012).
In addition to the economic significance of Kenya, it is also an important
cultural hub for China. By the end of 2016, the Chinese government has established
forty-eight Confucius Institutes in more than thirty-three African countries; four of
them are in Kenya. China has also awarded a large number of scholarships to Kenyan
students, and Nairobi has become the home of China’s state-run media headquarters
in Africa. Examining the Chinese media’s expansion in Kenya as a study case, this
study seeks to demonstrate that China has a growing cultural influence in African
countries, and to illustrate how China uses its economic power and cultural influences
to shape African countries’ foreign policies. In order to achieve this objective, this
study attempts to accomplish the following:
1.

Examine the internal and external economic, political and

technological forces in both China and Kenya that have helped to establish the current
pattern of China’s media involvement and other cultural engagements in Kenya:
i.

Political and economic developments in China that have led to its

growing presence on the global stage.
ii.

Global political and economic developments that have facilitated

China's growing presence on the global stage.
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iii.

Political and economic developments in Kenya that have led to China's

growing presence on the global stage
iv.

The shift in international alliances and political, economic and

technological developments in Kenya as well as in Africa in general that have
facilitated increasing economic and political ties to China.
2.

Examine the extent of China’s cultural and media involvements in

Africa with a specific focus on Kenya:
i.

Penetration of Chinese news and other cultural productions in Kenyan

media including newspapers, television, film, etc.
ii.

Financial, technological and other material support such as personnel

training by China for Kenyan media and other cultural production enterprises.
iii.

Cultural exchange programs through government agencies and non-

state actors.
3.

Analyze the response of the Kenyan media to China’s recent

engagements in the country, especially China’s increasing involvement in media and
other cultural productions.

Methodological Framework
China has made great economic achievements since initiating the economic
reform and the Open Door policies in 1978 (Barboza, 2010). However, China's
economic success does not guarantee a positive national image or reputation that
favors China in many parts of the world. Since the 1990s, the term “the rise of China”
is often countered by the phrase of “China threat” (Roy, 1994). The national image
refers to the way a nation is viewed by other countries. In recent years, China has
acknowledged huge conceptual differences between its self-perception and the way
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other countries perceive China. To narrow this gap, the Chinese government took a
more active approach to improving its international image with the ultimate goal of
shaping national policies in other countries, especially those in Africa, towards China.
Media has the power to construct appropriate and inappropriate views and to
determine what events or information are important and unimportant for the public
(Hall, 1997). The media is a critical instrument in building a positive national image
or a means to criticize any event, issue, and country. China’s rapid economic growth
has drawn increased attention around the world, especially in the Western media.
However, the images represented in most of the western media are not completely
real; they are biased and sometimes deliberately demonized (Liss, 2003). Such
inaccurate portrait in foreign media motivated China to defend itself and speak to the
world in its own ways. Since 2009, the Chinese government has invested billions of
dollars in its media’s global expansion. The goals of Chinese media’s international
expansion are to build a positive national image and provide an accurate reflection of
a modern China to foreign audiences.
This research seeks to analyze the response of Kenyan media to China’s recent
engagements with Kenya, especially on China’s increasing involvement in media and
other cultural productions in the country. By analyzing some of Kenya’s leading
newspapers, this study seeks to obtain a better understanding of Kenyans’ perception
of Chinese presence in the country and how China was presented in the mainstream
Kenyan media. Framing analysis was employed to examine the Kenyan media’s
coverage of China’s engagement in Kenya to see how Chinese presence and China
were framed in the Kenyan newspapers.
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Framing is defined as the way in which events and issues are organized by the
media to help their audiences understand the content (Reese, 2003). Framing theory
was first developed in 1974 to explain how the information senders construct a piece
of information to the public in the communication process (Goffman, 1974). It is
often uses to analyze how a certain issue, event, and phenomenon is constructed and
confined by the media (Gamson, 1992; Reese, 2001). According to Entman, “to frame
is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in
communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition,
causal interpretation, moral evaluation and treatment recommendation for the item
described” (Entman, 1993:53). In other words, frames are functioning as an
instrument to “define problems, make moral judgments and suggest remedies” (Ibid)
and help the media to shape the public’s perceptions of the event, issue, and world
(Bryman, 1998).
Media frame is an effective tool for producing and maintaining the hegemony
of a preferred frame. Using framing analysis will allow a greater understanding of
how different media frames produce power and create knowledge to favor certain
groups. The purpose of analyzing Kenyan media's response to China's involvement in
the country is to obtain a better understanding of how Chinese presences and China is
framed in the leading Kenyan newspapers after China intensified its cultural and
media investment in the country.

Selection of Media Texts
National newspapers can be used as a powerful communication system in any
given country because of their power to constitute the perceptions that shape and
change people's views of certain events and nations. In this way, the national
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newspapers circulate "definition and of the situation" that have great impacts on the
formation, maintenance, and reproduction of a dominant consensus (van Dijk, 1993).
Knowledge of any type news "is never neutral or an objective phenomenon but a
matter of place from which one speaks, to whom, and for what purpose". Therefore,
the national newspapers' discourse is a form of ideological representations of events
(Barker & Galaninski, 2001:22).
This study used the leading Kenyan newspapers to unpack the ways Kenyan
newspaper represented China engagement in the country, especially its increasing
involvements in media and other cultural productions. Using framing analysis as a
methodological tool enables the researcher to obtain a better understanding of the
ways media texts are encoded the potential forces that are influencing such media
frames.
This study will analyze media frames of the Daly Nation and The Standard.
Both the Daily Nation and The Standard are respected publications in Kenya.
According to K.J. Ho, a prestigious newspaper should include two standards: quality
of news reports, and its influence on other media organizations and political elites
(1962). Following Ho’s standards, both newspapers were selected as the
representative of Kenyan newspapers because of its quality of journalism and political
influences. The Daily Nation is viewed as the most influential of all the newspaper in
Kenya (BBC). Together with other sister publications such as Sunday Nation, the
Nation media group is the largest newspaper group in Eastern Africa (Nation, 2013).
The Standard is the oldest newspaper in Kenya. It was established in 1902 as The
African Standard. It is owned by the Standard Group Limited, whose primary
shareholder is SNG Holding Limited, the Standard Group also owned the Kenya
Television Network (KTN) (Onyebadi & Oyedeji, 2011). The time frame of news
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articles selected for analyzing is between January 1, 2016, and December 31, 2016.
The reason for selecting this time period was due to the limited newspaper data
access.

Related Literature
Over the past years, China’s presence in Africa has triggered conflicting
reactions and assessments. The debate on the impact of China’s contemporary
engagement in Africa has been divided between those optimists who believe China’s
intention is to promote mutual benefit and that African states are benefiting from
Chinese trade, investment, and aids. They argue that China is making a real positive
difference in African countries’ economic development, and that recent African
nations’ economic growth is an evidence of such engagement. While many Western
and African critics view Chinese presence in Africa with suspicion, considering
China’s political rhetoric and generous aid packages to be a means to achieve its
exploitative agendas. They perceive China as a neo-colonial power in Africa (E.
Cheng, 2007); the real intention of China’s current engagement in Africa is to exploit
Africa’s natural resources and raw materials (Taylor, 2009).
Western often views China and African critics as a neo-colonial power that “is
capable of the same exploitative practices as the old colonial powers” (Flynn, 2013).
Robert Rotberg depicted China as an “extractive and exploitive” economic power
with neo-colonialist tendencies in his book China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and
Influence. He argues, like old colonial powers, China's engagement damages African
nations' development, delays industrialization, and ruins the local industry. China also
risks good governance in Africa by supporting dictatorships and corrupt African
governments who violated human rights (as in Sudan & Zimbabwe). China is only
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interested in Africa's natural resources, not in the long-term development of the
African countries (Rotberg, 2008).
In his book, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the
World, Joshua Kurlantzick details a critical view of China's recent approach to global
politics. Kurlantzick suggests this approach is a dangerous form of "imperialism." He
argues that, instead of using military power, China is using its economic and cultural
power to achieve its goal to be a major player in the international community. He
warns the rest of the world to be skeptical of Chinese intentions and motivations and
uses African countries as the primary example of this dangerous manipulation
(Kurlantzick, 2007).
Some African officials also voice their concerns. For instance, the Nigerian
Central Bank Governor, Lamido Sanusi, published an article in the Financial Times
that warned African nations to “get rid of its romantic view of China and accept
Beijing is a competitor as much as a partner and capable of the same exploitative
practices as the old colonial powers." He believes African countries are opening
themselves up to a “new form of imperialism”, in which China extracts Africa's
natural resources and selling back the manufactured goods to African markets. He
worries low-cost Chinese manufactured goods imported to Africa will hurt the local
economy (Flynn, 2013).
In “Special Report: China Storms Africa” Richard Behar makes the
connection of China's current investment in Africa with Africa's painful history with
colonization. In this article, China was portrayed as an emerging hegemonic power
that is using its dominant power to exploit a vulnerable continent. He suggests that
China’s current presence in Africa is a second "scramble for Africa", and the current
one is harsher because it is more rapid and spread-out (2008).
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Some Sino-Africa scholars found both the silences on the role of the West and
flawed understanding of the West's ongoing neo-colonial relationship with Africa
characteristic approaches are problematic. Kwesi Kwaa Prah contended, it is
hypocritical of Western nations to bring up concerns about China's engagement in
Africa, given the fact of the West’s long history of colonial relations with the Africa,
which continues to the present day (2007). Garth Le Pere also suggests, the perception
of China as a “neo-colonialist” power in Africa is a product of Western motivated
misrepresentations that aims to contrast self-representation of the West in Africa,
which is altruistic or beneficent, to the opportunistic, exploitative and damaging role
of the emerging powers, like China (2008). For these scholars, the purpose of the
West to label China’s engagement in Africa as a form of “neo-colonialism” or China
as an “economic colonizer” is to warn African countries to back away from China’s
investments. However, they believe this objective is neither realistic nor supportive of
the African countries to participate in global economics or to benefit from China’s
engagement with African countries.
Unlike critics that criticized China’s presence in Africa as a form of “neocolonialism”, some observers perceive China’s engagement with Africa as being
based on “profound friendship” to promote mutual benefit (Shinn & Eisenman,
2012:13). In China in Africa: An African Argument, Chris Alden presents a balanced
and comprehensive exploration of China's involvement. In this study, Alden not only
discusses the opportunistic nature of China's involvement in Africa but also praises
China's contributions on the continent. For him, China has undoubtedly done more
good than bad in Africa. China’s engagement with Africa is “part of a long-term
strategic commitment to the continent,” and is motivated by economic demands and
to “build effective cooperative partnerships across the developing world” (2007:5).
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He suggests that the narrative of Sino-African relation is still in the making. It is
impossible to determine the role that China plays in Africa in such a short period of
time. However, the impact of China’s engagement with Africa will be determined in
the upcoming decades. Alden concludes his study with a suggestion to African leaders
to take an active role in determining the parameters for China involvement (2007).
This mutual benefit perspective is strongly promoted by Chinese officials. The
Chinese officials constantly remind the international community China’s engagement
with Africa is mutually beneficial because they are constructed on a basis of equal
partnerships, mutual interest, and reciprocal respect (G. Sun, 2004; Hu, 2006). Some
Western officials also shared this mutual benefit perspective. For example, former
President of the World Bank, Robert Zoellic mentioned on several occasions that
China’s investment in Africa’s infrastructure is good for the African countries. He
even suggested that the World Bank would like to partner with China as a joint effort
to ease poverty in Africa (Beijing Review, 2008). Former Zambia’s Minister of
Finance Felix Mutati also claimed, “there is no doubt China has been good to
Zambia…They are bringing investment, world-class technology, jobs, and value
addition. What more can you ask for” (Polgreen & French, 2007)?
In short, optimists who view China as a positive force for African countries’
development believe that China’s presence in Africa is a win-win situation, benefiting
both China and Africa. African countries receive, aids, technological expertise,
human resources, and industrial production know-how from China. For China, Africa
provides energy resources, new consumer markets and investment opportunities
China needs to sustain its economic growth. Both Africa and China meet their
economic needs (G. Sun, 2004; King, 2010).
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Other than perceive positive or negative perspectives of the impacts of China’s
current engagement with Africa, there are also a group of commentators who try to
characterize China’ growing presence in Africa as part of the trend in globalization: a
global quest for resources and development. For instance, Luk Tak Chuen argues,
China is operating within a larger system of neoliberal globalization and following the
Western neoliberal economic policy (Chuen, 2008; Manji, 2008). The main argument
of Chuen’s article is that China’s engagement with Africa is operating within a large
system of neoliberalism, China is not the only global power player that is extracting
natural resources and raw materials from Africa; indeed, many developed countries
are doing precisely the same thing. Therefore, it is the responsibility of every country
that has a stake in Africa’s development, including China, to make every effort to
limit the negative impacts caused by their practices in Africa (Chuen, 2008).
It is problematic for any narratives that only offer a one-dimensional
interpretation of Chinese involvements in Africa. For studies only focusing on the
negative aspects of Chinese involvements in Africa, they often fail to acknowledge
the positive contributions and the possibility that ordinary African citizens may
benefit from the Chinese presence. On the contrary, for those studies that fail to
acknowledge the negative impact of Sino-African relations, they are ignoring the pain
and suffering that is caused by Chinese business practices in many African countries.
Maybe the truth lies somewhere between these positions. It all depends on how
individual African government manages to enhance benefits and reduce harmful
effects of Chinese influence.

Significance of the Study
This study examines China’s expanding cultural in the age of globalization. It
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is a case study of Chinese media and cultural expansion in Kenya. This study unpacks
the political, technological, and economic forces, internal and external, in China and
Kenya that have helped to establish the current pattern of China’s media involvement
and other cultural engagements in Kenya. Moreover, this study examines the extent
and nature of China’s cultural and media involvements in Kenya in particular; and in
Africa in general. It is grounded in the political economy perspective of
communication, focusing on the expansion of Chinese media and other cultural
engagement in Kenya.
In recent years, the growth of Chinese influence and companies across Africa
has brought about a heated debate. Both economic and political implications
emerging at the global level raise concerns within the academic world and media.
Most of the recent Sino-Africa studies are focused on the debate of China's military,
political, and economic presence in Africa, very little literature examines China's
growing presence in Africa from a cultural perspective. This research tries to shed
light on the growing Chinese cultural influence in Africa. In doing so, this research
uncovered the internal and external factors, both in China and Kenya, intensified
China’s engagement in Africa.

Plan of the Study
This study comprised of six chapters. Chapter One includes a brief review of
China’s contemporary engagement with Africa, the objectives of the study,
methodology, Sino-African relation literature, theoretic framework, and the plan of
study sections. Chapter two looks at the transformation of Chinese media from a
political economic perspective. Chapter three provides a detailed account of China’s
political, economic and cultural cooperation with African countries. Chapter four
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focuses on the Chinese culture and media involvement in Kenya. The chapter offers a
detailed discussion of current Chinese media and other cultural expansion in Kenya.
The chapter also uncovers China's technological support to Kenyan media and other
cultural production enterprises. In addition, the chapter also addressed various
Chinese cultural exchange programs, either provided by government agencies or nonstate actors. Chapter five provides an analysis of the leading Kenyan newspapers’
response to Chinese presence. The chapter introduces the theory of framing analysis
that was employed to analyze data from the Daily Nation and The Standard, for the
present project. Chapter six presents a summary of all the findings, contributions, and
limitation of the study.
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CHAPTER 2
TRANSFORMATION OF THE CHINESE MEDIA

In order to gain a better understanding of the current Chinese media’s global
expansion, it is important to review the important stages of Chinese media
transformation. In doing so, this chapter begins with a brief review of the Chinese
media system since Mao’s era through Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms and opendoor policy in 1978, which was the driving force for the dynamic transformation of
contemporary Chinese media. The review of the media system during the Mao era
helps to understand how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) employs the media as
propaganda apparatus to propagate the CCP’s policies, to instruct the public, to unite
the public, and to mobilize the Chinese people (Bishop, 1989). Followed is a section
that examines the Chinese media development after Deng Xiaoping initiated
economic reform and open-door policy in 1978. The internal and external social,
political, and economic factors would be discussed in this section to gain an
understanding of how the Chinese media outlets transformed from pure propaganda
instruments to business enterprises, and how market competition has undermined the
influence of state-owned media and assisted market-oriented media to gain more
autonomy. The next section is a brief review of the process of Chinese media
internationalization. It discusses the impacts of globalization on the Chinese media.

Chairman Mao Era
According to the traditional Marxist principle, the mass media is a powerful
instrument of a government’s propaganda machine. To propagate its ideology, to
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rationalize its authority, and to prevent conflict, the ruling party should hold a total
control over media content (Hong, 1998; C. Huang, 2006). For the leaders of the
communist country, the control of intellectual production, such as mass media, is an
important element of controlling the society. As Marx and Engels pointed out, "The
ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas . . . The class which has
the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the
means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those
who lack the means of mental production are subject to it" (1970:64). When the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) defeated the Kuomintang and became the sole
ruling party in Mainland China in 1949, the CCP took over all newspapers,
magazines, and radio stations that were established during the Republican period
(1911-1949) and structured its media system based on Marxist-Leninist
communication philosophy. Under the Marxist-Leninist media model, media
functioned as a tool of the Communist Party to achieve its objectives (Chang, 1989).
One of the basic functions of the Marxist-Leninist media was to “control, limit, and
restrict information, as well as to diffuse new ideas and values” (Barnett, 1979:391).
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 until the
death of Chairman Mao in 1976, China was a fundamentalist communist society;
every aspect of people's life was strictly under the CCP control. During this period of
time, the economic development was sidetracked from the CCP’s political agenda and
media functioned as the ideological state apparatus to serve the CCP’s political needs
and social control (Chu, 1986; He, 2003; Wu, 1994).
During the Mao era, media’s operations were guided by the “Party’s
principle”. They adopted the CCP’s ideology as their own and propagated “the Party’s
programs, policies, and directives; and that they must propagate the Party’s leadership
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and stick to the Party’s organization principles and press policies” (Tong & Cheng,
1993:148, cited in Zhao, 1998). Moreover, media not only needed to propagate
Party’s policies, they were also required to play “the role of leading social opinion,
helping political stability and resolving various social problems” (Li, 1991:355).
Under such circumstances, the communication between the Party and the public was
basically a top-down process, as information flowed from the Party to the public by
the media (Zhao, 1998). In short, the objectives of the mass media during the Mao’s
ear were to strengthen Party power and to maintain the Party’s leadership status
among the masses (Ibid).
Prior to the inception of Deng’s economic reforms in 1978, the government
subsidized all media in China (Akhavan-Majid, 2004). The government is the owner,
the manager and the practitioner of the media (Chu, 1994). After the death of
Chairman Mao in 1976, his successor Deng Xiaoping took over the leadership of the
country and began a process of decentralization, commercialization, and
internationalization that transformed the Chinese media system dramatically.

The Chinese Media Under the Reforms
The structure of the Chinese media experienced tremendous change after the
introduction of economic reforms in 1978. When Mao died in 1976, the Chinese
economy totally collapsed. China was on the edge of famine and faced not only
serious economic crisis, but also a high level of social and political insatiability.
Against this background, Deng used economic reform as a means to reconstruct
China’s economic system and to restore Chinese people’s faith in the Party (Chan,
1993; Gordon, 1997; Keller, 2003). Under Deng’s leadership, the CCP abandoned its
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ideological orthodoxy in favor of a pragmatic approach to economic development
(Gordon, 1997). Economic development and the replacement of Maoist political
struggles became the country’s top priority (Naughton, 1993).
Deng realized that the challenges Chinese society faced at the time were the
increasing demands of people’s material and cultural needs and the backwardness of
production. Deng acknowledged, his legitimacy and success were dependent on his
ability to improve the economic situation and to raise people’s living standard (Kuan,
1991; Rowen, 1996; Wang & Chang, 1996). The economic prosperity market
economy brought to the Western countries helped Deng to convince other CCP
leaders to embrace the market economy. For Deng, the building of socialism could
not skip the period of the market economy; regardless if it was viewed as capitalism
(Bettelheim, 1988; Qian & Wu, 2000; Xiao, 1993).
As a result of the economic reforms, the average Chinese citizen living
standard improved significantly and their agricultural production increased. After its
successes in agriculture, the reform expanded to other sectors and industries. Under
the planned economy, the government allocated the raw materials to factories and
distributed their products. The situation changed during the reforms because marketoriented economy required the companies to adjust their production to meet the needs
of both domestic and international markets, rather than rely on the central government
instructions (Bettelheim, 1988; Qian & Wu, 2000).
The shift from a planned economy to a market economy was a long process
and required various practices. The economic reform was initially introduced at the
CCP’s Eleventh Central Committee in 1978, suggested that the class struggle must
stop, and economic development should be the top priority of the country. During his
speech at the twelfth national congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1982,
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Deng acknowledged the importance of the market economy and suggested the party
changed its goals and methods of operations (Dittmer, 1983; Kuan, 1991). He
declared that the aims of the reforms were to end China’s isolation from the world and
to encourage foreign investment, “science, technology, and management systems, and
to new ideas from anywhere in the world, regardless of the country’s political system”
(Vogel, 2011:58). After the Fourth Plenary session in 1991, the Chinese government
announced that in order to accelerate the development of a socialist planned
commodity economy China should create an economic system that combined
planning with the use of market forces. As a result, the Chinese economy has shifted
from a planned economy to market economy, adopted some market economy
functions, and promoted market economy as the core of its economic policy
(Bettelheim, 1988; Qian & Wu, 2000; Shirk, 1993). The transformation from a
planned economy to a market economy has not only altered production approaches
and the Chinese people’s economic and social life; it also had a great impact on the
Chinese media (Lull, 1991).

Media Development Between 1978 and 1989
Under the planned economy, the Party took full responsibility for the media’s
financial management; no matter if it was a profit or loss. No need for media
organizations and media practitioners to worry about the financial condition of their
organizations (Y. Zhao, 1998; Akhavan-Majid, 2004). As time went by, media
operation's financial support became a burden to the government and the state was
unable to meet the increased funds required by the media. The situation forced the
Chinese government to withdraw its subsidies and gradually required all the media to
be financially self-sufficient by 1994 (Zhao, 2000). Media organizations, like other
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State-owned Enterprises (SOEs), began to take responsibilities for the revenue and
financial performance. Although the concept of commercialization was new, it did not
take too long for media organizations to understand and adopt the market principles
(Lynch, 1999).
For the Chinese government, the main objective of the media reform was to
reduce media's financial dependency on the government through the process of
commercialization (White, 1990). Being a financially independent organization, mass
media had to place profit making on the top of their business objective list, to make
money by themselves, rather than on their connections with the government (Wu,
1994). In other words, to be financially self-sufficient, "mass media have had to
reorient themselves to the needs of the market and to increase their financial assets by
all legitimate means" (Chan, 1993:6).
Media reform was also designed to increase the media’s ability to help the
government communicate with the public. Stimulated by China’s modernization and
economic growth, it did not need government support and did not increase the
government’s financial burdens (Lynch, 1999). The Chinese government’s goal was
to turn “media outlets into public units under business management”, and media
organizations would get a “limited amount of state support for infrastructural
investment” and be “responsible for additional financial resources needed for their
normal operations” (Pan, 2000).
Another important media reform policy during this period was the Chinese
government giving the media permission to receive advertising in 1979 (He & Chen,
1998; C. Huang, 2000). This policy was designed to increase the media’s ability to be
financially independent, and to boost the country’s modernization process and
economic growth without the need for increasing media subsidies (Lynch, 1999).
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During the Cultural Revolution, advertising was labeled as a capitalist evil and was
prohibited in China for decades (J. Wang, 1997). When China launched the economic
reforms and reopened its doors to the West, the government’s negative view against
advertising was radically revised. The Chinese government’s justification for
readopting advertising was “advertising transmitted important economic information
that helped link producers and consumers” (Stross, 1990:488). The government
claimed that advertising is a tool to introduce products to potential customers; it is no
different than what factory sale representatives already did in China (J. Hong, 1994).
Since advertising was reintroduced and endorsed by the Chinese government
it has gradually become the primary source of revenues for media organizations.
Competition for advertising revenues between different media organizations was very
intense and most of the Chinese media outlets became more entertainment-oriented
for the purpose of attracting more audience. The commercialization of media sectors
has transformed the Chinese media from the party masses model in Mao's era to the
market audience model in Deng’s reform era (Y. Zhang, 2000).
Deng’s economic reforms and the Open-Door policy have greatly improved
the living standard of ordinary people. With more money and free time, people’s
lifestyle changed; they began to pay more attention to the outside world and tend to
consume more entertainment. In order to meet readers/audiences’ demands, media
organizations reduced the proportion of the government propaganda materials and
expanded the entertainment section. Diversified entertainment information has gained
increasing popularity among the Chinese households, to some extent; it has become
an important aspect of people’s lives (Y. Huang, 1994; Lee, 1994; Zhao, 1998).
The Chinese media content has changed dramatically since the reforms, the
commercial and entertainment content increased significantly, even though the Party
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still tightly controls ideology. For the print media, the number of soft stories was
increased to gain more readerships. Two types of journalistic content became more
prominent than before, one is societal news that covers human-interest stories, news
of crime, and breaking news of accidents or natural disasters, the other one is
criticism reporting, ranging from coverage of everyday problems faced by ordinary
people to investigative exposes of corruption (Pan, 2000). In addition to increasing
soft news stories, the front page of the Party newspapers was no longer just published
top Chinese leader’s speeches, Party’s policies, government documents and other
national affairs, instead, important domestic and international news were routinely
reported on the front page of these Party organizations (Y. Zhao, 1998). The
increasingly diversified newspaper content offered the readers with more alternatives
and changed people's perceptions of the world (Chang, 1989).
Despite the content changes, the print media also moved toward a direction to
expand its pages to make more room for commercial advertising since the early
1990s. One of the examples is Wenhui Daily, a Shanghai-based newspaper published
a four-page newspaper for 53 years, has expanded its paper to eight pages in 1992.
There was a combination of factors driven this page expansion trend. People's need
for different types of information, especially economic news and information is one
important factor contributed to the newspaper's page expansion (Cao, 1999).
Increasing profits from advertising is another important factor. Since the media
reform, advertising industry grew rapidly; there was not enough room for most of the
newspapers to accommodate all the advertising. Advertising clients must wait for
several months to put their advertisements on the major newspapers. To resolve such
market demand, most of the print media expanded their pages (Cao, 1999).
In order to survive the intense market competition, the news media employed
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another strategy to boost the revenue: publishing evening newspapers, lucrative
tabloid and weekend edition newspapers. As a supplement of morning newspapers,
evening newspapers are mainly feature human-interest news, cultural news, sports,
and community news. Their focuses are on readability and popular appear. The
portions on economic and world news were also increasing in the evening newspapers
(Chu, 1994; Lynch, 1999).
Changes not only occurred in the content of the media, the style of media
reporting changed as well. Chinese journalists began to alter their reporting style and
incorporated elements of Western-style news reporting in their reports (Huang, 2003;
Pan & Chan, 2000). Their study examined the change of journalistic paradigms, Pan
and Chan discovered that a number of Chinese journalists were keen to embrace
western news values and norms although they were still playing the role as an
ideological apparatus of the Party (Pan & Chan, 2000).
Like newspapers, similar changes also occurred in the broadcasting sector. For
instance, domestic and foreign news coverage was expanded. Entertainment programs
such as soap opera, traditional opera, and foreign feature films became routine. All
the content changes were brought by the market economy for the purpose of
increasing advertising revenue. The quality of live news presentation and
commentaries also improved. Both the numbers of daily news bulletin airings and the
quantity of investigative news programs increased dramatically (Zhao, 2000; Yin,
2006).
Decentralization policy was introduced to decentralize media ownership and
to expand a national-provincial media system into a national, provincial, municipal,
and county media system in order to increase the flow of information for economic
development and to enhance the power of the propaganda (Lieberthal, 1995). It also
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encouraged lower levels of the state apparatus to set up and operate their own media
organizations to increase production and profits, unlike centralized system, in which
all media were owned and operated by the state (Zhang, 2011).
Since the initiation of the policy, the central government started to grant more
autonomy in production and marketing to lower level governments (Chan & Qiu,
2003). The process of decentralizing media ownership led to several important
changes in the Chinese media. In print media, the circulation in the newspapers
located in the national center declined; circulation in the provincial media and subprovincial levels media grew rapidly in the early the 1980s (Wu, 2000). A similar
result of structural decentralization also occurred in the broadcasting sector. In the late
1970s, all television stations belonged to the central, provincial, and some
metropolitan governments.
Because of an important decision made by the All-China Radio at the
Television Conference in 1983, China's broadcasting system was decentralized to four
levels scheme-center, province, city, and county. Consequently, only the CCTV and
its affiliated stations remained supervised by central party, all other stations were
reported to lower-level authorities (Y. Huang, 1994). The number of television
stations increased rapidly in the early the 1980s (Polumbaum, 1992). By the end of
the 1990s, only one-third of stations were national television stations, the rest were
sponsored by lower-level local governments (Wu, 2000).
Prior to the decentralization process initiation; local television stations were
allowed to air only the programs that already broadcasted on CCTV. Under such
constraint, local television station’s development was limited. However, the
circumstance changed after the initiation of the decentralization of ownership and
operation rights over media to lower levels of the government, the local media
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organizations were given more autonomy over financial, production, and marketing
decision (Cho, 2007).
Newspapers also granted journalistic autonomy in deciding the content of their
newspapers in the late 1980s. It was in this relaxed environment that journalists were
able to play a role in educating the public and in promoting the liberal ideals in the
late 1980s before the student’s protest took place at the Tiananmen Square (Goldman,
1994). Moreover, bad news and critical (negative) news reports, which had not been
seen under Mao’s rules, began to resurface in the media in the late 1980s
(Polumbaum, 1990). News media began to publish the perspectives that embraced
concepts such as freedom of the press, democracy, political reform and media reform
(He, 2006).
There were several positive outcomes of this decentralization policy.
Politically speaking, the newly established lower level new media organizations
provided an excellent chance for local leaders to express their concerns as well to
spread central party propaganda. From the economic perspective, increasing number
of media outlets means the revenue of advertisements also increased, those newly
founded state media organizations became profit-making enterprises and contributed a
greater number of advertising profits to the central government (Esarey, 2005).
Even though China’s media environment became more diverse and
increasingly commercialized in the 1980s, the mass media still needed to play their
role as the state’s propagandists (Brady, 2006; Thierstein & Kamalipour, 2000). Also,
the reforms in the 1980s were not designed to change the political structure or the
Party ideologies; the CCP’s ideology towards the media has remained unchanged.
Freedom of the press was still a taboo in Deng’s regime. In Deng’s view, the media is
valuable ideological instrument for the Party to use to unit and stabilize the country
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(Chan, 1994). Thus, the Chinese media continued playing the role of the propaganda
instrument of the Party, while they practiced under a market economy and a loosened
ideological atmosphere. In other words, the CCP still holds dominant power over the
media (Zhao, 1998). In the competitive market environment, Chinese media needed to
serve two masters, the Party and the market, they are no longer regarded as pure tools
of Party’s mouthpieces like their role before the reforms (Chang, Wang & Chen,
2002; Luther & Zhou, 2005; Zhao, 1998).
Under strict media control, there was no way the media could host any debate
on policy issue until the introduction of economic reforms. During the 1980s, policy
debates became an important part of politics in China. The exchanges exposed many
social issues that the state had tried to neglect. The CCP was too afraid to endure
more challenges; therefore it demanded the media to reserve 80 percent of their
coverage for positive reporting or reporting a favorable image of the Party (Y. Hu,
1986). Despite the government's intervention, journalists started to urge the
government to reform media policies. They demanded the government grant more
autonomy to news organizations and keep the state's intervention to a minimum (Pu,
1986). Moreover, the print media continued to publish Chinese intellectuals' critical
opinions that called for a new ownership structure and political liberalization. During
this period, journalists tried to show they supported the general direction of the
reforms, and they were loyal to certain pro-reform power groups (X. Zhang, 1993).
In the spring of 1989, student-led protests against official corruption because
of the lack of political democratization exploded in Beijing and other cities across
China (Fathers & Higgins, 1989). In response to a massive protest, the Chinese
government shut down the World Economic Herald, a regular forum of its critics. The
government's action triggered journalists and people to join the protests. More than
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1,000 journalists signed a petition demanding more freedom of press. Freedom of the
press became a catchphrase of this movement (Jernow, 1993).
The Chinese government then imposed martial law in Beijing. Escorted by
tanks, the troops imposing martial law blasted their way into Tiananmen Square and
killed more than 1,000 civilians. In the following months, thousands of people were
arrested because of their connections to the protest movements (Brook, 1992). This
student-led pro-democracy movement has a serious impact on the history of politics
and media development in China in different ways to different degrees (Hazelbarth,
1997).
After the Tiananmen crackdown, the media was negatively affected because
during the student protests, a great number of media workers, even those who worked
for the Party’s organization, joined the protests in Beijing, openly discussed the
movement and called for democracy. Since the Tiananmen crackdown, the Chinese
government reimposed constricted media control by issuing more restrictions on
reporters and editors (Wong, 2005). The government silenced independent and liberal
voices; thousands of journalists were persecuted and dismissed from their positions or
forced into exile. Between 1989-1992, more Chinese journalists were jailed. Any
potential risk for the media to threaten the Party’s political and ideological authority
was carefully monitored (Y. Zhao, & Z.Z. Guo, 2005).
After the Tiananmen crackdown, the CCP has put social stability back on the
top of its priority list over any other issues in development (Naughton, 1993). The
media sector was one of the fields that was seriously affected by this new priority
because they were labeled by the government as one of the "hardest hit disaster
zones" of the creation of liberal ideas and protest activities; journalists were accused
of having "turned their backs" on the country (X. Zhang, 1993). The short-term
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experiment with better autonomy for the media from 1986 to 1988 was perceived by
the CCP as an “editor-in-chief doing whatever-he-wants-to-do system” and declared
unacceptable (Q. Yu, 1989:4).

Media Development between 1992 and 2000s
For three years after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, the process of
commercializing media sector was harshly stunted. The process of commercialization
regained momentum in 1992 when the Party initiated another reform of programs and
called for faster economic growth (Pei, 1994). New market forces started to have a
profound impact on the media sector, even though media was still tightly controlled
by the government (Brady, 2007).
After the Tiananmen crackdown, the majority of Western nations imposed
economic sanctions against China and condemned Chinese government's violent
actions against the student's protests. Such economic sanctions led to the deterioration
of China's international relations and the decline of foreign investment. China’s
economy was stagnated for three years (1989-1991). In 1992, Deng traveled to the
southern cities of China and gave a series of important speeches to reaffirm the
importance of the free market, opening up to other countries, and economic
development (Pei, 1994). After Deng’s southern tours, the 14th Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party introduced a new economic development model named the
“Socialist Market Economy”. Economic reconstruction was once again the top
priority of the national development and the market was a driving force for economic
change and development (Zhao, 1998). The purposes of the 1990s economic reforms
were to re-centralize, emphasize market integration, support reforms of ownership,
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and improve regulation, unlike the reforms in the 1980s, which objective was
decentralization (Naughton, 2009).
The process of commercialization and privatization of state-owned enterprises
was accelerated in the 1990s. In 1993, the Chinese government carefully started the
process of privatization and gradually let uncompetitive companies collapsed. As
commercialization process progressed, most Party organs gained some financial
autonomy from the state and became profit-making organizations in 2000 (Zhao,
2000). This kind of new independence in media financial structures brought the
changes on media content, media functions, and the relationship between media
organizations and government (Winfield & Peng, 2005). The incentive to attract more
readers and audience has transferred media's priority from propagating government's
policies to meeting the public's demands (Lynch, 1999; Lai, 2005). In order to satisfy
the general public’s demand, many party newspapers extended their reporting from
pure political propaganda to a broader coverage in the economy, technology, culture,
entertainment, sports and other social issues (Lee, 2000). Newspapers also employed
methods such as customer survey, letters to the editor, and reader’s feedback to
engage and interact with their readers (Chang et al, 1994).
Unlike their role under Mao’s planned economy, the Chinese media became
important social agents actively constructing people’s understanding of social reality
through the discourse of news content. As China accelerated the speed of its
economic reforms in the 1990s, the aim of the Chinese media shifted from promoting
the CCP’s ideologies to constructing the people’s perceptions of the world based on
the values and national agenda constructed by the Party (Chang et al, 1994).
The political atmosphere during the 1990s, especially after the 14th Party
Congress, was relaxed. Operated under such political environment, media became
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more decentralized and autonomous. Investigative reporting increased in the media
content to reveal the public opinions and examine the efficiency of the government
officials’ performances. Under the decentralization policy, “the central press was no
longer the sole authority on many subject areas, and new opportunities emerged for
provincial media to examine governance issues at a distance from higher authorities”
(Repnikova, 2015). This function is known as “yulun jiandu” (與論監督) literally
translated as “supervision by public opinion”, meaning the media acted like a
watchdog to watch the government officials’ performances. This is one of the
important elements of the media development in this era (de Burgh, 2003).
During the process of commercialization, the Chinese media was encouraged
to establish market-oriented publications to increase their profits (Zhao, 1998). A
small number of publications emerged. Most of them were technically connected to
quasi-official institutions with only indirect ties to the Party-state and not under
propaganda department supervision (Wu, 2000). For instance, Economic Observer, a
Beijing-based weekly paper that focuses on in-depth economic news, is owned by a
commercial enterprise with links to the Shandong Province government (Liebman,
2005).
Another important media development during the 1990s was the rise of nonParty newspapers by different social and scientific institutions and mass media. The
rapid growth of the non-party papers has led to a new stage of Chinese media's
structural change. The growth of such non-party indicates the Chinese government's
determination to push the reform further (C. Huang, 2000; He, 2000; Y. Zhao, 2000).
One of the important influences of the rise of not-party commercial papers was the
decline of the party organs' circulation (C. Huang, 2001).
As the 1992 policy required all party organs to become financially self-
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sufficient by 1994, the party organs began to publish the subsidiary weekend editions
and mass appeal newspapers and magazines to maximize their profits. The situation
was intensified more in July 2003, after the Chinese government abolished the policy
that required party and state offices to subscribe the party newspapers (Roberts,
2003). In addition, the major party-owned media, including People’s Daily, have
begun to expand their business activities in non-media sectors. These include
investments in some of the most profitable business in China, such as real estate,
hotels, tourism and telecommunication (He, 2000; Lynch, 1999).
Since the late 1990s, the process of marketization of Chinese media has
begun. Broadcasting industry followed by print media could be traded on the stock
market. Since early 2002, nonmedia state companies were allowed to invest in media
sector (Y. Zhao, 2005). Even though there still were restrictions that prohibited
nonstate investors to hold more than 49 percent share of media organizations, the
government has partly shifted media from the public toward private ownership. The
combination of changes in management, financing, and ownership resulted in the
media marketization (Hu, 2003).
The emergence of large media conglomerates in the late 1990s was the
product of the government orders, not driven by market forces. Media conglomeration
lead to the concentration of power in the hands of a small group of elite individuals
who would continue to dominate the Chinese media industry (Sparks, 2008). The
process of media conglomeration began in 1996 with an objective to build stronger
media team to compete with transnational media corporations (TNMCs) in the
process of globalization (Z. Hu, 2003). In early 1996, the Guangzhou Daily, China’s
most financially success party organ, was selected by the central government as
China's first newspaper group. This press group operates, as a conglomerate owns six
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publications and a wide range of business sectors in various areas. In 1998, the
Guangzhou Daily Group became an important economic powerhouse in Guangzhou
(Lynch, 1999). The central government approved seven major party organs to be
transformed into media conglomerates between 1996 and 1998 (Y. Zhao, 2000). For
the Chinese government, media conglomeration was China’s the first move to “link
up the international track” and an important plan to strengthen the competitive
position of the domestic media in the global market (Y. Zhao, 2000:17; Z. Hu, 2003).
Two decades after the reform, Chinese media has become more marketdependent rather than market-oriented (Sparks, 2008). Both big advertising and
circulation revenue providers have increasingly interfered with media practices (Tong
& Sparks, 2009). An example of advertising buyer interfering with media practice
was the China Eastern airline pilots’ protest over working conditions and salary. Four
local newspapers’ coverage of the event was similar: two did not report it; one
newspaper did report the protest but did not mention the name of the airline, and the
fourth one simply used the press release supplied by China Eastern. China Eastern
airline’s power to control the narrative of these newspapers was based on its huge
contributions to the newspapers’ advertising and circulation revenues (I. Wang,
2008).
Since the early 1990s, China has actively participated in the process of
globalization and the best example is its endless efforts to join the World Trade
Organization (WTO). After more than thirteen years of negotiations, China finally
became a member of the WTO in December 2001. The Chinese government is fully
aware of the benefits and possible risks of China’s accession to the WTO’s
membership. On the one hand, China hopes the international media corporations will
offer China’s media industry advanced technology, management, professional
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training, and foreign capital to help China’s media renovate their infrastructure. On
the other hand, the government is not sure about the ability of Chinese media to
compete with international media players. As Ding Guangen, the Minister of China's
Department of Propaganda warned the Chinese media that, “their good days will be
over when China joins the WTO” (Z. He, 2003:209).
What concerns the Chinese government most is the political-ideological threat
posed by the western media. Through media content, western hegemony can promote
its ideology effectively. To prevent such political-ideological threat, the Chinese
government approves only foreign investors to invest in the production and
distribution of cultural products and some entertainment services at the beginning of
its WTO accession. The Chinese government insisted that for the time being, the
media content should still produce by the domestic media (Chin, 2003).
Despite the concerns and challenges, WTO accession led some significant
changes in China’s media industries. In the film industry, the Chinese government
placed a strict ban on any foreign involvement in film distribution, claimed it is
critical to autonomy. The reasons behind this decision were to avoid Hollywood’s
control of film distribution and to give the domestic media sectors more time to
become a competitive competitor (Brent, 2000). In addition, China promised to
import 40 films per year the number will increase to 50 films by 2005. The Chinese
government also allowed foreign investors to keep up to a 49% share of media
corporations that build, own, and operate cinemas in China (Y. Zhao, 2008).
While China’s motivation was to learn know-how of modern media
management, producing and marketing from global media groups, the Western
transnational media companies were motivated by China’s huge market potential.
International media conglomerates were eager to enter the Chinese media market to
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share huge advertising markets (Hughes, 2002). Since the 1990s, TNMCs have been
actively expanding their business in China through different means to explore the
market potential. Speed increased in the 2000s after China’s accession to WTO (Wei,
2000; R. Tang, 2005). After years of resistance, the Chinese government granted
broadcasting permissions to “government friendly” TNMCs allowing them to
broadcast non-news programs to cable television audiences in the southeastern
province of Guangdong (C. Huang, 2004), even though the WTO agreement does not
require the Chinese government to open up its broadcasting market to foreign
investors (Dudek & Xu, 2002; Hughes, 2002).
In China, the mass media industry was the most profitable industry with the
high investment return rate of 17-30 percent between 1988 and 1998 (Dong, 2000).
This suggests China’s mass media industry “might be the last industry with staggering
profits in the world” (Tao, 2001: 2). Many observers believe that as long as China's
economy continues growing, the advertising business “will continue to boom as
China heads towards an advertising bonanza with the 2008 Olympics in Beijing”
(Hughes, 2002). It is based on this belief that major international media players
desired a share of the Chinese market even they were losing money in China. The
needs to maximize profit and know-how are the foundation of the collaboration
between Chinese media industries and foreign media companies (Leow, 2004).
There is a common hope that increasing economic liberation of the media and
the presence of TNMCs in China will accelerate the country’s political
democratization process (Kan, 2003). Unfortunately, this does not result in political
liberalization (Hackett and Y. Zhao, 2005). In order to control an increasingly
internationalized media, the Chinese government tightened its policy on foreign
media entering China in 2005, as part of plans to control the domestic cultural
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industry; the situation remains the same at present time.

Global Expansion
As discussed above, the major factors that motivated the Chinese government
to open its domestic media market was its needs for media management and
marketing know-how, the advanced technologies to produce and distribute media
content, and foreign capitals to compete with international media companies.
However, the information flow is not limited to inward flow from overseas, the
Chinese government also realized the importance of expanding its cultural influence
around the globe. The “going out” policy was first introduced in 1999 for the purpose
of promoting Chinese economic interests abroad. In 2001, a new “going out”
campaign was initiated with two major objectives: to improve China’s international
image and communicate its perspectives with the world through its own media (Lu,
2006). It is estimated that China has invested more than 60 billion RMB in four stateowned media organizations: Xinhua News Agency, Central China Television
(CCTV), China Radio International (CRI) and the China Daily in 2009 (X. Zhang,
2009).
After the Beijing Olympic Games in the summer of 2008, the “going out”
campaign has been put in full speed because of the growing concern of Chinese
media’s weak international influence. The western media’s negative news coverage of
the Tibet crisis and the protests during the Beijing Olympics torch relay in 2008
reinforced the Chinese authority’s concerns (Xin, 2009). As part of the Chinese
media’s global expansion, Xinhua’s African News Service was launched in 2008
(Xin, 2009). Its multimedia service in the English language was launched July 2009.
In 2010, Xinhua also launched its own television network, China Xinhua Network
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Corporation (CNC) broadcasting via satellite, cable, mobile phone, and the Internet
(Barboza, 2010). According to Xinhua’s President Li Congjun, “the launch of CNC
(was) an important move for Xinhua to enrich the agency’s business sectors, and
embrace the multimedia world” (Xinhua, 2010). At the beginning, CNC World News
Channel was only broadcasted in Chinese, and only aired news events and special
news bulletins. A 24/7 English news service was offered a few months later, covering
breaking news and major international political, economic, and cultural news. When
CNC launched in early 2009, its programs only broadcasted to the Asia-Pacific
countries and to a couple of European nations. In January 2011, its English offering
expanded its broadcasting service to all of Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa
(Cao & Liang, 2011). In 2010, Xinhua relocated its North American headquarters
from Queens to the middle of Time Square in New York City. This move shows
Xinhua’s ambition in international operations. It was designed to persuade the world
that Xinhua is more than a propaganda instrument of the Chinese government (Peters,
2010). In 2011, Xinhua teamed up with the Kenyan telecommunication company
Safaricom to start a mobile newspaper in Kenya (McKenzie, 2012).
According to David Shambaugh, professor of the George Washington
University and an expert on China foreign policy, Xinhua’s international expansion
was driven by several factors, and making money is the first incentive that motivated
Xinhua’s global expansion. For Xinhua, “going out” is an opportunity to compete
with its western counterparts such as AP, Thomson Reuter, and Bloomberg and to
become a “real” international news agency. The business strategy Xinhua uses to
achieve this objective is to lower its product price so that it is cheaper than other big
Western news agencies (Shambaugh, 2013). The second factor is "to report the ‘real
China’ to the world” through its own media (Q. Zhou, 2009). For the Chinese
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government, the media becomes vital to building positive international image and
eliminates misunderstandings of China. Finally, Xinhua’s global expansion is a move
to transform Xinhua into a modern multimedia organization to challenge transnational
news media such as CNN and Al Jazeera (Shambaugh, 2013).
Central China Television (CCTV), originally Beijing Television, was
established in 1958 and renamed China Central Television in 1978; the same year
Deng initiated economic reforms and an Open-door policy. The State Administration
of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) (Propaganda Department) strictly control
CCTV’s contents and daily administrative operations. Like other media organizations
in China, CCTV had to serve two masters: The Party and the Market. It must function
as the government’s mouthpiece and also be commercially successful. CCTV
represents an excellent example of how the media can operate as a propaganda
instrument for the government and as a commercial enterprise that makes huge
profits. Its viewership is greater than any other major television network worldwide
(Si, 2014).
As previously discussed, the aims of the CCTV’s global expansion are to
enhance China's international image and increase its influences, especially in the
countries China has great political and economic interests. CCTV's first overseas
operation was opened in 1990 with an attempt to reach out to Taiwanese and overseas
Chinese audiences. In the 1990s, president Yan Weiguang transformed CCTV from
state-funded media organization to commercial broadcaster. When the new "going
out" policy initiated, CCTV was aimed to transform itself to become China's CNN
(Zhu, 2012). In 2000, the twenty-four-hour English Channel, CCTV International
(CCTV-9) was launched. CCTV-9 entered the American cable market in 2002 as part
of a deal that allowed AOL-Time Warner and News Corp access to cable systems in
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Southern China (X. Zhang, 2011).
CCTV and other eight provincial Chinese television stations launched Dish
Network Great Wall Platform in 2005 targeted the Asian Community outside China
(Si, 2014). In January 2012, CCTV opened a broadcasting hub in the Kenyan capital
of Nairobi. This was China’s first news production center in the continent. The major
tasks of CCTV-Africa are to "change the narrative about Africa” (McKenzie, 2012),
to build the positive image of China, and share China's viewpoints on international
affairs with the Africans (Gorfinkel et al., 2014).
China Radio International (CRI) is another State-owned media company that
expanded its operations to foreign countries as part of new "going out" campaign.
CRI was founded in 1941 as wartime propaganda instrument against Japanese
invasion. During the Mao era, CRI functioned as the CCP’s ideological apparatus to
propagate Party ideologies and policies. Like other media, CRI began its reform in the
late 1970s when Deng’s economic reforms started. The process of economic reforms
has transformed this state-funded radio to be a market-oriented media (Sun, 2010).
Like BBC and Voice of America (VOA), CRI also used different platforms
and new technologies to communicate with its listeners. For example, CRI established
a multi-language website to report political, economic and cultural information about
China (C.C. Chen et al., 2010). CRI also collaborated with other international media
organizations to produce and share program contents. Thus far, CRI’s cooperation
with the NHK (Japan's national public broadcasting organization) is the most
successful collaboration with other international media. China believes this kind of
partnership will enhance China’s international image and increase its influence
overseas (C.C. Chen et al., 2010).
China Daily, an English-language newspaper founded in 1981, also selected
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by the Chinese government to “go global”. In February 2009, China Daily launched
its U.S. edition in New York. The content of the U.S. edition focuses on the United
States and Canada’s business news and China’s economic, political, and cultural
development (Shambaugh, 2013). In December 2012, an African edition of China
Daily was launched in Nairobi. The emphasis of China Daily Africa is on SinoAfrican relations because “the relationship between China and the African continent
is one of the most significant relationships in the world today…it is growing and
complex and not always understood-- not just by those in other parts of the world but
Africans and Chinese, too” (Green, 2012). For the Chinese government, China Daily
is an important medium allows China to communicate its own stories to the world and
for the foreigners to understand China (Shambaugh, 2013).
As discussed above, the reasons behind China’s state-owned media’s global
expansion are to improve China’s international image and to promote a mutual
understanding between China and the rest of the world (Si, 2014). Currently, the
media’s “going out” strategy is still supported and promoted by President Xi Jinping.
In his inaugural speech, Xi emphasized the importance of media’s role is to serve the
state’s interests. He explicitly demands all journalists, at home and abroad, must
introduce positive national image to foreign audiences to confront the Western
media’s biased representations of China and to promote a mutual understanding
between China and the rest of the world (Xi, 2012).
In the past few decades, mass media in China have undergone dramatic
changes. The media industry has transformed from a purely political instrument to
one of the most profitable industries in China. This chapter offered a brief overview
of the important stages of Chinese media development. It examined the impacts of the
political and economic factors, both internal and external, affected the transformation
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China's media. It first discussed the media system under the leadership of Chairman
Mao. During the Mao era, all the media was subsidized by the state. As the stateowned and party-controlled organs, mass media only functioned as a political tool to
transmit the CCP's ideologies, to confront western imperialists, and to mobilize the
public.
Then it examined media development during Deng’s economic reforms period
from 1978-1989. The transformation of the Chinese media took place when Deng
Xiaoping decided to introduce the economic reforms and open to the West in 1978.
From 1978 to the crackdown on the student pro-democracy movement in the spring of
1989, the Chinese government reduced it subsidies, most of the media organizations
were forced to be financially self-sufficient. In order to survive, mass media turned to
advertising for the profits. As a result, advertising became the major source of funding
for the media. The decentralization of the government control over media ownership
also led to dramatic changes in Chinese media. Regardless of the reduction of the
government subsidies or the decentralization of media ownership; the policy was part
of the Chinese government’s economic development drive to modernize China.
There was a setback between 1989 and 1991 right after the Tiananmen
crackdown. During the student protest, the majority of news media such as the
People’s Daily and CCTV were sympathetic to the protesters. After the Tiananmen
crackdown, the Party tightened its control over the mass media because of the
potential threat to political stability. The crackdown also caused a significant impact
on the Chinese economy and China’s international image (Y. Zhao & Z.Z. Guo,
2005).
After two decades of reform, the structure of the news media was changed.
For instance, the number of newspapers increased. Print media’s sponsorship became
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more diverse and decentralized. The number of publicly circulated newspapers grew
rapidly, with more than 1,600 circulating in 1988 while there was only 200 ten years
earlier (Polaumbaum, 1991). The second structural change during this period involved
the emergence of a media market. When the number of the media companies
increased, information market emerged. The state-owned media and the local media
began to compete for audiences. The growing advertising business also offered the
potential for the media’s financial autonomy. The final structural change was the
personnel structure of the print media. The reason for this change was due to the need
to hire the millions of rehabilitated intellectuals who had been victims of persecution.
In 1985, the number of the journalist was 70,000; in 1988, the total number of
employees in the press and publishing industry had increased to about 600,000 (X.
Zhang, 1993).
The process of marketization and commercialization of Chinese media sped
up during the 1990s and had profound impacts on the media structure and practice
(Wei, 2000). For instance, the Chinese government consolidated different newspapers
and other periodicals into media groups and closed down a huge number of
unprofitable party newspapers to enhance state organs’ capacity to compete with
international media outlets. In 1998, six national and regional newspapers were
consolidated by the state (Y. Zhao, 2000; Kuhn, 2001). In addition to media
consolidation, the Chinese government also initiated a policy to conglomerate
domestic media industries to strengthen its political control and capital accumulation.
To compete with global counterparts, the Chinese government combined social
resources and invested resources into major state-owned media organizations to
strengthen their ability (Nolan, 2001; Moore, 2002). The processes of conglomeration
and consolidation had turned the state-owned media organizations into a profit-driven
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enterprise. Operating under such environment, media conglomerates are given more
operational autonomy to foster the commercial potential of advertising and
distribution services and investing in other business sectors (Y. Zhao, 2000; Ma,
2000).
The Chinese government views its WTO accession in 2001 as an indication of
integrating into the global economy. Under the WTO agreement, China opened up its
domestic market to foreign capital with an attempt to learn the know-how of modern
media management, marketing mechanism, and advanced technologies. With China’s
economic growth and a huge consumer population, transnational media corporations
such as Time-Warner's and News Corp. entered China with the hopes of expanding
their revenues.
China realized its rise on the global stage as an economic and political power
player does not automatically bring a more favorable perception of China in the
international community. China is constantly depicted by the Western media as a
rogue and human rights abusing regime that does not play by the international rules
(Sun, 2010). To counter such hostile media representation, China decided to expand
its state-owned media overseas to improve China’s national image, to communicate
its viewpoint to the international community, and to expand its global influence
(Nelson, 2013).
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CHAPTER 3
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINA’s ENGAGEMENTS IN AFRICA

The present research seeks to explore China’s expanding cultural influence in
the age of globalization, particularly in media and communication industries in
African countries, a continent China has significant investments in. To understand
how the political and economic factors contributed to current China’s media and
cultural engagement in Africa; knowledge of its past is essential. The objective of this
chapter is to provide a historical background of China's contemporary engagement
with Africa. It will begin with a brief review of Sino-African relations. The purpose
of this review is to illuminate how Sino-African relation has transformed in the past
decades from ideology to pragmatic policies (Moumouni, 2006); how the internal
economic and political forces in both China and Africa contributed to the current
pattern of China's media involvement and other cultural engagements in Africa.

Early Sino-African Encounters
China’s involvement in African countries is not a new phenomenon as some
people perceived. Historical evidence shows that Sino-African relations dated back to
China’s Tang Dynasty (Northrup, 2002). The economic relationship between China
and African countries began with the exchange of goods and services, and was
facilitated by Muslim traders, who transported merchandises such as silk, pottery and
bronze utensils from China. By that time, the travelers already had knowledge of
Africa from Muslim merchants (Dathorne, 1996; Snow, 1988).
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The cultural encounters between China and African countries began
sometimes around 206BC because of trade brought by the Silk Road. Chinese made
pottery objects were discovered on the east coast of Africa and the northern part of
South Africa. Ivory, frankincense, tortoiseshell, and spices were the goods the African
merchants transported to China. There was no evidence of human contact between
Africans and Chinese during this time period. In the Tang Dynasty (168-907 AD),
Chinese porcelain and currency from this period were found in East Africa (A. Li,
2005; Snow, 1988).
In 1346, Ibn Battuta, an African explorer who traveled to China, published his
experiences and introduced Chinese customs, architecture, the legal system, currency
and politics to Africans (A. Li, 2005). Between 1417 and 1419, Chinese explorer and
admiral Zheng He took his expedition to Africa and reached the eastern coast of
Africa, Swahili coast, and Somalia centuries before the Europeans arrival. When the
Europeans arrived in Africa, Sino-African contact had ceased (Snow, 1988; Shinn &
Eisenman, 2012). After Zheng He expeditions, China turned inward and the
Portuguese-mediated the official Sino-African contacts during the mid-1600s.
During the 1700s, a small number of Chinese people lived in South Africa.
During the Imperial period, the Chinese who lived in South Africa were treated as
slaves, same as Africans, by European colonial governments. During the period of
European colonialism, China and Africa did not have direct contact; their relation was
facilitated by the colonial powers. Around 60,000 Chinese were sent to work in South
African mines by the British between 1904 and 1906. By 1910, they were all deported
due to the European settlers’ resentment and racial intolerance (ibid).
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Sino -Africa Relationship between 1949 and 1978
Over the past decades, Chinese and African relations have grown
dramatically. The expansion of Sino-African relations was the result of a combination
of major world issues, to which the scale of contemporary China's engagement with
African states is unprecedented. China's Africa policy has shifted from completely
political and ideological in the 1950s and 1960s to an emphasis on economic and
pragmatic today (Liang, 2012).
Throughout the first half of the 20th century, China was not concerned about
its relations with African countries. It was until the second half of the 20th century
when the Chinese Communist Party became the dominant party in China, and China
needed African countries to support its position in the World War II, China and
African countries became allies to fight for common causes (Shinn & Eisenman,
2012).
Modern Sino-African relations began with the Bandung Conference of 1955
when twenty-nine countries joined together to promote economic and cultural
cooperation between Asian and African countries and to fight for their independence
from oppressing western superpowers. This conference was commonly viewed as a
landmark in Sino-African history (Muekalia, 2004:6). During the conference, China’s
former Premier Zhou Enlai addressed the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”
that “covered mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual nonaggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual
benefit; and peaceful coexistence” (Looy, 2006:2). Since then, the five principles
have become the foundations of Sino-African relations.
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and until the
death of Chairman Mao in 1976, China relied on a central plan economy and was
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isolated from the international community. During the Mao era, China received little
international support, and its relations with both the US and the Soviet Union were
tense due to its separation with the Soviet Union. In addition to its tense relations with
the two superpowers, China also faced serious security threats from other
international events: the Korean War in 1950, Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958 and the
Vietnam War in 1961. As a result, China’s international diplomatic influence was
limited during the 1950s and 1960s (Snow, 1988).
In order to break through this diplomatic isolation, Chairman Mao turned to
the Third World countries and asked them to join China’s fight against imperialism
and colonialism. To advance Mao’s anti-imperial agenda, China provided economic,
technological, and military support to African countries to help them battle European
colonialists and imperialists despite urgent development demands and economic
difficulties at home. Through aid and military supports, China was able to establish its
diplomatic relations with newly independent African nations (Moumouni, 2006;
Muekalia, 2004; Shimazu, 2014).
During the Mao era the Sino-African relations were driven by ideology and
political interests (Alden et al. 2008). Two main purposes of China’s African foreign
policy during the 1950s and 1960s were to isolate Taiwan diplomatically, and to
counter the West’s and the Soviet Union influence on the African continent (A. Li,
2008). With African countries supported, China has successfully replaced Taiwan as a
member of the United Nations in 1971, and able to break "imperialism's strategy of
isolating China" and gained international recognition (X. Yan, 1997).
Although the Chinese government was facing a very difficult economic
situation during the Mao era, it still managed to offer substantial resources to assist
African countries development. From the mid-1950s to mid-1970s, the Chinese
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government gave about $2.5 billion to 36 African states in aid (Le Pere & Shelton,
2007). One of the highest-profile examples of China’s assistance to Africa was the
TaZara railway; a railway that connects Tanzania and Zambia. TaZara railway allows
Zambia to export copper without having the export to pass through South Africa in
the years of Apartheid (Antwi-Dans, 2011). In the early period of Sino-African
relations, China financed projects not only improved industrial development in the
host countries but also reinforced China’s diplomatic power in Africa (Tu, 2008).
However, China’s ideology-driven relations with Africa were not without
conflict. When China broke ties with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, China accused
the pro-Soviet communist parties in African countries as “revisionists” and treated
them as ideological opponents. Such political difference intensified China’s
relationship with these pro-Soviet political regimes. In contrast, many African
regimes viewed China’s “export revolution” campaign as a threat to their political
stability; only small group African countries continued their relations with China. It
wasn’t until China abandoned its "exporting revolution" strategy at the end of the
1960s that it regained its good relations with African countries (A. Li, 2007).

Sino-African Relationship between 1978 and 1989
Under Mao’s leadership, China’s economy was stagnant, and its economic
policies were inefficient. In addition to economic stagnation, there was chaos in cities
and rural areas because of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Chinese people were
suffering; they blamed the government and the CCP leaders for allowing such a
disaster to happen. People were praying for changes to occur in the present system of
government (Goldman, & Goldman, 1987-8).
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In the early 1970s, the Chinese government began to design a reform plan to
modernize the country and integrate its economy into the global economy. It wasn’t
until the death of Chairman Mao in 1976, Deng Xiaoping, a long-time advocate of
policy change, assumed control of the party in late 1978. Deng initiated economic
reforms and opened the country to outside world. As the Party leader, Deng
understood that for China's economy to improve, and thereby maintain the status of
the CCP, economic and social reforms were inevitable. China needed to transform its
economic system, replacing the centrally planned economy with a market-oriented
economy. The ultimate objective of Deng's economic reforms was to modernize
China, to strengthen the fields of agricultural, industry, defense, and science and
technology, known as "the Four Modernizations" in China as first introduced by
former Premier Zhou Enlai in 1964 (M.H. Chang, 1996; Chow, 2004; Tisdell, 2009).
The successful economic performances of other market-oriented economies, in
comparison with the centrally planned economies, such as South Korea Vs. North
Korea, reinforced Deng and other CCP leaders to reform China’s economic system.
The huge gap in the economic performance between East and West Germany also
strengthened Deng’s viewpoint (Chow, 2004). In addition to the reasons stated above,
the public's hunger for a market-oriented reform also supported Deng's reform plans.
Since the founding of the PRC, the Chinese people have experienced the negative
economic results of central planning, including the shortage of consumer products,
limited selection, and the lack of improvement in quality (Chow, 2004). With the
stagnation economy and the public’s support, Deng Xiaoping launched economic
reforms and adopted an Open-Door Policy at the end of 1978 to increase productivity
and improve the standard of living after three decades of political unrest (Tung,
2005).
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Under Deng’s new economic plans, China began to adopt some of the marketbased principles with its distinct ideological characteristics (So, 2011). Unlike Mao
who perceived the world negatively, Deng had a more positive reading of the world;
his economic reforms opened China to the outside world for trade and technology
advancement (Baum, 2010; Moumouni, 2006). One of the major components of
economic reform was to privatize and commercialize state-owned enterprises. In
doing so, the Chinese central government gave state enterprises some autonomy in
production, marketing, and investment decision making to make them financially
independent (M. Chang, 1996). The core principle of the open-Door policy was to
relax the government’s control on both foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade to
attract foreign investment and increase foreign trade.
Prior to Deng’s economic reforms, China’s economy was basically a closed
economy. After it witnessed other Asian countries’ success with “export process
zones” in the 1960s and 1970s, China launched four special economic zones (SEZs)
on the coast of northern Guangdong. The functions of the SEZs were “to import high
technology, increase exports, earn foreign exchange, create jobs, assimilate foreign
managerial and entrepreneurial skills, and attract foreign investment” (Tung, 2005:4).
These SEZs were designed to increase foreign investment. SEZs promote
international trade and foreign corporations are granted easy access to China and
Chinese businesses due to more flexible policies in SEZs. After the successful
experience of the first four SEZs, China gradually opened all of China to advance its
economy (Park, 1997; Tung, 2005). As a result, China's trade volume increased
rapidly year after year (Smart & Hus, 2004).
After the launch of the economic reforms and the Open-Door policy in 1978,
the focus of China's foreign policy was shifted from ideological pursuit to trade and
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economic development (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012). The aims of China’s foreign
policies were to develop its economic capability and expand trade relations with
developed countries. The Chinese government knew that for the economic reform to
succeed, China needed developed countries’ technical support and commercial
connections (Onderco, 2007). By the end of the 1970s, China’s relationship with the
US was improved and both nations were united against the Soviet Union (Naughton,
2007).
The economic reforms changed the priority of foreign policy; the Chinese
government’s focus had gradually shifted from ideology to economics with a more
pragmatic approach. As China's economy progressively became market-oriented, it
needed to attract foreign investment, and China's foreign policy became increasingly
West-oriented. China turned to the West for advanced technology, know-how, and
capital. Not surprisingly, China’s political interest in Africa faded during the mid-80s
(Muekalia, 2004; Snow, 1989).
Despite China’s political and economic changes at home, the African
governments faced governmental challenge, instability, economic chaos, and other
developmental problems during this period. Africa was perceived “as economically
deficient and technologically ineffective to its domestic policy aims” (Mawdsley,
2007: 445). The combination of the political and economic factors mentioned above
led to decreased Sino-African relations.
When African countries encountered the “lost decade” of the 1980s, China’s
foreign policy was focused on its cooperation with Japan and the U.S. During this
period, China’s relationships with African countries declined (Taylor, 1998).
However, following the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989, the U.S. and other
Western governments strongly condemned China’s violent actions against peaceful
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protestors and placed an embargo on weapon sales to China. When the West isolated
China, African countries, and other Third World nations quietly provided their
support to China (McGurn, 1990; Taylor, 1998).
The success of Deng’s economic reforms improved Chinese people’s
economic conditions. Subsequently, the Chinese public demanded greater political
freedom. During the 1980s, students and the intelligentsia in China were granted more
intellectual freedom; this situation stimulated requests for continued political reform.
In 1989, thousands of students took their demands for democratic reform to
Tiananmen Square. The CCP was unwilling to negotiate with protestors; the central
government imposed martial law and ordered military force to solve the crisis. When
the military forces moved in, student’s demonstrations continued, and violence among
both the army and protesters caused hundreds of deaths. The Chinese government's
violent actions led to widespread international condemnation, a package of economic
and political sanctions were imposed on China. The fragile relations with the West
forced the Chinese government to reevaluate its relationship with the Third World
countries, especially African nations. Since then, China focused efforts to develop
relations with its old African friends. Some of the African countries were perceived as
China’s important partners against the West (Naughton, 2007; Taylor, 1998).
Unlike western countries’ harsh sanctions, African countries were silent on
China’s military actions for several reasons. First, the main issue surrounded
Tiananmen crackdown was the Chinese government's human rights violation, which
was the same issue that concerns most African leaders. Therefore, to those African
leaders, the Tiananmen incident represented a dangerous effect that might also
endanger their power base (Naidu, 2008). Secondly, African leaders believed Western
countries’ condemnation over China’s Tiananmen crackdown had less to do with
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human rights issues and was more focused on weakening China’s rapid economic
growth (Snow, 1995, cited in Taylor, 1998). The third reason was an economic
calculation. As the Cold War was nearly ended, Africa’s status in the international
community was becoming increasingly uncertain. African leaders were forced to
reconsider their relations with traditional development partners. African leaders also
did not want to jeopardize the aid and the assistance they have been receiving from
China although it has declined during the early 1980s. African leaders were afraid that
if they condemned Chinese government's violent action, China would stop providing
aid for them. These were the reasons why the African governments were hesitant to
join the Western nations condemnation of the Chinese government's military
crackdown at the Tiananmen Square (Konings, 2007; Naidu, 2008).

Post-Cold War Sino-African Relations
During the Cold War, Africa was a battleground of superpower competition;
both the United States and the Soviet Union used economic assistance and military
aid to safeguard African countries' loyalty. China's influence in Africa during this
period was limited. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early the 1990s,
Africa lost its geopolitical importance and was marginalized in the diplomatic
strategies of various superpowers. The West's engagement in African countries had
declined (Taylor, 1998; Renou, 2012). The Chinese government took this opportunity
to strengthen its political and economic connections with Africa and renew its interest
in Africa at end of the 1980s. It launched an intensive campaign to expand its
interactions with the developing countries to counter and challenge the U.S.
hegemony and enhance its international position (Payne & Veney, 1998). Between
1989 and 1992, Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen visited fourteen African

53

countries and sixteen African top leaders of the state or government have been invited
to visit China. The political relations between China and African countries deepened.
China and Africa continued to support each other in international affairs and worked
on establishing a fair and reasonable new international order (Taylor, 2004).
During the 1980s, China's economic relationship with African countries was
relatively slow. However, after the Tiananmen crackdown China promised to increase
its aid and development assistance as a reward for African countries’ support. Before
the Tiananmen crackdown, only US$60.4 million was distributed by China to
approximately 13 African nations in 1988, but by 1990s the amount of aid increased
to US$374 million a year to 43 recipient African countries (T. Lin, 1996, cited in
Taylor, 2004).
Like many countries, China’s foreign policy objectives are designed to
achieve its political and economic agenda. Followed by the introduction of economic
reforms in 1978, the focus of China’s foreign policy has shifted from Cold War
ideology to a pursuit of economic self-interest. Four factors motivated China’s
engagement in Africa during this post-Cold War era. First, China needed raw
materials and natural resources to fuel its economy. The search for reliable suppliers
of raw materials and energy resources led China to Africa, a continent rich in the
natural resources. Secondly, Africa’s huge population represented a huge potential
consumer market for China’s manufactured goods. Thirdly, many African countries’
economic reform accelerated China’s economic collaboration with Africa. Finally,
resource-rich African states were targeted by China for profitable investments
(Konings, 2007). In short, the demands for energy resources, consumer markets, and
investment opportunities were the major factors contributing the rapid expansion of
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Sino-African relations over the past decades (Alden, Large & Soares de Oliveria,
2008).
There were also economic and political factors that motivated the African
countries to strengthen their ties with China. First, African governments and business
elites sought new opportunities in China to increase their trade and investment
opportunities. Collaborating with China in various fields to help stimulate African
countries’ socio-economic development. Second, African countries were faced with a
steady decline of foreign assistance after the end of the Cold War. Thus, China’s “no
strings attached” aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) were warmly welcomed by
African states. Third, China’s large population, the growth in Chinese per capita
incomes, and increased spending power, African governments forecasted that Chinese
tourism would grow as time progressed. China’s outbound tourism market is
perceived as a valuable asset to many African economies. The Chinese government
often used its policy to endorse “official approval travel destinations” to the Chinese
public as a means of rewarding African governments’ friendship. Finally, with
traditional Western donors interfering in domestic affairs, particularly in the countries
that violated principles of good governance, Africa leaders were looking for an
alternative source of foreign support. Unlike Western donors’ “demands for minimum
standards of governance,” China’s “no strings attached” and “non-interference”
principles were appealing to African governments (Alden, 2005). These political and
economic efforts enabled China and African countries to broaden their relations since
the 1990s (Taylor, 1998).
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Sino-African Relations in the 21st Century
At the beginning of the new century, domestic and international circumstances
brought Sino-African relations to a new stage. For China, after more than two decades
of rapid economic growth, it needed an international policy to reinforce its status as a
peaceful rising power. As the largest developing country, China sought to collaborate
with the continent with most developing countries for mutual development in a world
controlled by developed countries. As for African countries, since the beginning of
the 21st century, their national agenda was to achieve stability and promote socioeconomic development. To achieve such objectives, African governments knew that
they needed to control their fate and to make their own choices; China has become the
primary choice for them for collaboration. On the international front, as African
countries sustained their economic growth in the mid-1990s, Western powers started
to sense their strategic importance. Since the turn of the 21st century, those Western
power players were constantly modifying their policies toward Africa. As a result,
African countries regained their strategic importance and moved from the periphery to
the center of the world stage, becoming the focus of intense strategic debate. Under
these new circumstances, the Chinese government acknowledged that it needed a new
operating mechanism to expand Sino-African relations in the new century (Qiang,
2010).
It was against this background that the China-Africa Cooperation Forum
(FOCAC) was established in 2000. The FOCAC is a platform that provides the
integrated framework for Chinese and African governments to promote a new type of
strategic partnership. It is based on the principles of political equality, mutual trust,
economic positive-sum game cooperation, and cultural exchange. Since its
establishment in 2000, FOCAC has become the official channel for China and African
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states to discuss and collaborate in economic, political, technical and cultural areas.
With the mechanism operated by FOCAC, China’s engagement with African
countries has entered a new period of development and produced better outcomes
(Hanauer & Morris, 2014; Qiang, 2010).
In addition to the Chinese government's economic interest, the FOCAC also
aimed to weaken the US hegemony in the African countries. It operated as an
instrument for China to disseminate its non-interference approach to counter Western
moral absolutism. Moreover, the conditionality of Western aid was perceived by
African countries as an effort to recolonize Africa. Aid was employed by Western
donors as a political instrument to improve recipient the countries’ governance
(Condon, 2012; Taylor, 2009).
The first FOCAC conference was held in Beijing in October 2000. Over 80
ministers from more than 40 African countries attended the meeting. The goal of the
first summit was to create and promote a fair international political and economic
order (a response to the failure of globalization), to promote equal international
relations, and to strengthen economic, education, and cultural cooperation between
China and African countries (Cisse, 2012; Peiliang, 2005; Shelton & Paruk, 2008).
During the conference, the issue of debt relief was proposed by South Africa
representative, but rejected by China. Three years later, China announced that it
would provide a total of $1.27 billion USD in debt relief and aid packages to African
countries (Alden, 2005a).
The second FOCAC meeting took place in December 2003 in Addis Abba,
Ethiopia with the goal to enhance political and socio-economic cooperation between
China and African nations (Shelton & Paruk, 2008; Cisse, 2012). During the meeting,
China’s Prime Minister Wen Jiabao promised to open China’s market and granted
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preferential market access for African products to export to China. The Chinese
government also promised to finance infrastructure projects to help African countries
boost their economic development (Cisse, 2012). The importance of cultural
exchanges was emphasized at the second FOCAC meeting (Shelton & Paruk, 2008).
The year of 2006 was an important year in the Sino-African relations. It was
the 50th anniversary of formal Sino-African relations; the Chinese government
declared 2006 as the “Year of Africa”. In 2006, China released an important white
paper, China's African Policy that covered a comprehensive plan to broaden SinoAfrican relations and reemphasized African countries’ strategic importance to China.
The focuses of China’s African Policy paper were on political equality and mutual
trust, positive-sum game economic cooperation, cultural exchange, and cooperation in
international affairs. The aim of China’s African policy paper is to foster a different
kind of strategic partnership with African countries for the purpose of enhancing the
interests of both parties. Those principals have become the new foundation of China’s
policy towards Africa (A. Li, 2007a).
The third FOCAC summit in Beijing was convened in November 2006. The
Beijing summit in 2006 enhanced Sino-African collaboration even further, as China
and African countries decided to accelerate cooperation, especially in joint resources
exploration and exploitation. At this summit, China committed to provide African
countries a multi-billion-dollar aid package. President Hu also pledged to enhance
Sino-Africa cooperation in the area of human resources to help African countries to
train professionals in different fields. China also agreed to open more markets to
Africa's commodities, expand tourism cooperation with African countries, and to
increase people-to-people exchange with Africa (Shelton & Paruk, 2008). This
summit served as an example of how the Chinese government uses public diplomacy
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to secure a long-term relationship with the African countries. The African
governments got more than they requested, and in return China secures the natural
resources and raw materials it needs from Africa. China refers it as a “win-win”
relationship (Naidu, 2007).
Since the formation of the FOCAC in 2000, China has honored its promises to
assist African countries’ development through its aid, reduced or removed African
countries' debts, expanded its trade and increased investment in Africa. However, the
global financial crisis in 2007 slowed down China’s investment in Africa because
China faced great financial pressure at home. It needed to devote most of its financial
resources in its domestic economy instead of to Africa or other countries. This global
financial crisis put huge pressure on the Chinese government to fulfill its old promises
and to start new ones (Brown & Chun, 2009).
The fourth FOCAC conference took place at the peak of the global recession
in November 2009. At the opening ceremony, China’s Premier Wen Jiabao
announced eight new plans to reinforce Sino-African cooperation. The plans
comprised of financial assistance in African countries to increase their financing
capacity, offering $10 billion USD concessional loans to help African countries
develop their imports, build schools and hospitals, and train African professionals
(Lucien, 2011).
The 5th FOCAC conference took place in Beijing in 2012. In his keynote
speech, President Hu pledges, “In the next three years, the Chinese government will
take measures in the following five priority areas to support the cause of peace and
development in Africa and boost a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership”
(Hu, 2012). Environmental challenges were discussed in this conference. China and
African countries are increasingly aware of the tensions between industrial
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development and environmental protection. Both parties agreed to collaborate to build
a greener and sustainable environment. The two objectives of this sustainable
development plan are to help China achieve its agenda as a leader in green technology
and to improve its national image in Africa (Chun, 2013; A. Li et al., 2012).
Before the 6th FOCAC conference held in 2015, many Chinese observers were
worried about the impact that China’s economic slowdown would have on Africa’s
economy because of China’s financial commitments to Africa. As Africa’s largest
trading partner and major investor, a slowing Chinese economy means China’s
demands for African natural resources might decline. If Chinese demand declines,
then Chinese investments in African states’ infrastructure projects might decline as
well. Consequently, it will affect African countries’ economic development (Rotberg,
2015).
China has constantly doubled its financing commitment to African countries
from $5 billion in 2006 to $10 billion in 2009 and $20 billion in 2012. During the 6th
FOCAC meeting in 2015, China tripled its financial commitment and promised a $60
billion USD loan to African countries for infrastructure projects and human resource
development. The $60 billion aid package is an indication of China’s strong support
of African countries’ quest for independent development (Guest, 2015). In addition to
China’s financing assistance, the Chinese government also proposed a ten-point plan
for Africa’s development that included almost every aspect of Sino-African economic
relations. China's ten-point plan reflects its new policy of “Industrial capacity
cooperation” and “strategic complementarity.” The Chinese government’s new
strategy intentionally downplayed its demands for Africa's natural resources. Rather,
China focused on the overreaching ten-point plan for Sino-Africa cooperation,
although statistics show that most of the African exports to China remain were natural
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resources during the first three-quarters of 2015. The reason that China intentionally
deemphasized the importance of Africa’s natural resources during the 6th FOCAC
summit was to the negative national image associated with the role played by African
natural resources in China’s recent engagement with Africa (Y. Sun, 2015).
Through the FOCAC mechanism, China-African economic and trade relations
have evolved from a singular pattern of aid between the governments to a diversified
cooperation method based on the principle of mutual benefit. Over the past 15 years,
trade between China and Africa has increased from $10.5 billion in 2000 to over $220
billion in 2014. China has surpassed the U.S. as Africa’s largest trading partner since
2009 (Y. Sun, 2015). China’s development assistance also played an important role in
enhancing China’s cooperation with African countries (W. He, 2013).
China’s African policy is also motivated by political reasons such as isolating
Taiwan from the international community and fostering a favorable political
environment for its strategic agenda. In order to achieve the political agendas, China
proposed an international political and economic order at the first FOCAC meeting in
2000. In the second FOCAC meeting, Premier Wen claimed that it is essential for
developing countries to work together to challenge Western hegemony and to protect
their own interests in international matters. The regular FOCAC meetings and
frequent visits from high-level officials articulated a loyal political partnership
between China and African countries (W. He, 2013).
Following the principle of non-interference, the Chinese government brings
aid, trade, and investment opportunities to Africa without interfering the internal
affairs of African states. Many African states embraced this policy and viewed it as an
alternative to the West. The policy has been employed selectively to serve Chinese
interests at different times, starting in its earliest days of implementation in the 1960s
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and 1970s when China supported Africa’s revolutionary movements. Although China
insists on non-interference, there is one precondition, the “One China” principle to
marginalize Taiwan from the international community (Hanauer & Morris, 2014). As
Robert I. Rotberg, President emeritus of the World Peace Foundation, notes, “the
reason why China continuously emphasizes its non-interference principle is due to its
own worries over sovereignty issues relating Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan” (2008).

Cultural Cooperation
As Sino-African relations deepened, the CCP leadership acknowledged certain
aspects of its presence in Africa have produced negative perceptions of China among
Africans and that this situation needs to be changed. Instead of exercising hard power,
China uses culture is an instrument to enhance its national influence. As former
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao addressed in an article published by the People’s Daily,
China needs to expand its cultural collaboration with other nations because “cultural
exchanges are a bridge connecting the hearts and minds of people of all countries and
an important way to project a country’s image” (People’s Daily, 2007). General
Secretary Hu Jintao followed Wen's viewpoint and suggested, "culture has become a
more and more important source of national cohesion and creativity and a factor of
growing significance in the competition in overall national strength" (Xinhua, 2007).
Premier Wen acknowledges that in order to sustain its growth; China not only needs
to be "economically strong but more importantly, be cultural strong" (Xinhuanet,
2010). Based on these viewpoints, the foundation for China’s international influence
cannot solely depend on economic ability; it also will need a strong cultural force to
enhance it. Against this background, a variety of cultural exchange and educational
programs have been carried out to boost China’s international influence (J. Li, 2012).
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China’s rapidly expanding engagement in Africa has triggered a range of
reactions in the West and Africa. In order to show the world that China’s presence in
Africa is for mutual benefit, and not to extract natural resources for China’s own
economic interests, the Chinese government has invested a considerable amount of
time and money to foster a positive and favorable relationship with African countries
through the different kinds of cultural engagement. One of the important strategic
tools the Chinese government employs to achieve its objective is culture (Wei, 2012).
Since the first FOCAC meeting initiated in 2000, China has made great efforts
to broaden its cultural cooperation with African states. For example, culture was an
important feature of the Addis Ababa FOCAC meeting in 2003(Shelton & Paruk,
2008). At the Beijing FOCAC summit in 2006, China promised to establish a “new
type of Sino-African Strategic partnership” on the basis of “political equality, mutual
trust, economic cooperation, win-win, and cultural exchanges” (People Daily, 2006).
Since 2006, China has been utilizing its powerful cultural resources in Africa to win
hearts and minds of African people.
Education exchange is one important element of China's cultural cooperation
with African countries. Through short-term training programs offered by the Chinese
government, Africans have the opportunity to obtain an understanding of Chinese
culture and its modernization experiences. China has offered scholarships for African
university students to study in Chinese universities in the areas such as education,
science, technology, and economics to benefit Sino-African relations. By providing
training programs and scholarships to African students, China can increase its
influence and improves its image in Africa (King, 2013).

63

The Confucius Institutes in Africa
Another crucial component of Sino-African cultural cooperation is the
establishment of the Confucius Institutes (CIs) in Africa. Like many Western
countries that establish cultural institutes in foreign states to promote their own
culture, the Confucius Institute is a non-profit educational and cultural institution
governed by the Chinese Office of Language Council International and operated by
Hanban to promote Chinese language and culture to foreign audiences (Hartig, 2012).
In addition to exhibit the richness of Chinese culture around the world, CIs also
function as an instrument to present a “correct” understanding of China to a
“mainstream public that mostly does not have any special China-knowledge” (Hartig,
2012:63) and to develop “positive opinions of China within a global setting” (Siow,
2011:1).
In the past decades, China has been represented by Western powers and
media as “threat” because of its authoritarian political system, poor human rights
record, and the handling of Tibet. The western media’s narrative of the "Chinese
threat" not only damages China's international image but also forces China to "face a
tougher complex international environment and withstand more external pressure”
(People’s Daily, 2012). Facing such biased and negative representations, the leaders
of CCP realized that it is important for China to present the real China to the
international community to counter Western media's misrepresentation (Zhou & Luk,
2016). This is one of the reasons that the Chinese government was motivated to invest
a huge amount of resources to establish Confucius Institutes around the world. The
CCP leaders acknowledge, culture plays an important role in national power and “the
expression of Chinese culture through language will have a strong impact on
individual language learners and the host nation" (Wheeler, 2014:52). By engaging in
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Chinese culture, the Chinese government hopes CI students will foster affection
toward Chinese culture and people, and ease their concerns about China’s rise
(Schmidt, 2013). In addition to sharing Chinese culture with foreigners, another
important CI other objective is to cultivate a favorable image of China to counter
Western negative depiction of China’s rise (Hubbert, 2014; Hartig, 2014).
The establishment of CIs is affiliated with China’s foreign policy, with the
objective to influence foreign public opinion (Hoare-Vance, 2010). Thus, the location
of CIs often reflects China’s political and economic interests in the country. By the
end of 2011, China founded CIs in countries that it was major trading partners with,
such as the US and the UK. When China's economic engagement increased in Africa,
its cultural cooperation expanded as well. After the Beijing FOCAC Summit in 2006,
the number of CIs increased dramatically from one to ten within six months in
African countries (Lien, Chang, & Selmier, 2012). During the fifth FOCAC meeting
in Beijing, both Chinese and African governments promised they “will continue to
promote the establishment and development of the Confucius Institute and Confucius
Classrooms in Africa” (FOCAC Beijing Action Plan, 2012).
As part of FOCAC commitment, the first African Confucius Institute was
established in 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya affiliated with the University of Nairobi
(Procopio, 2015). By the end of 2016, China set up forty-eight Confucius Institutes
and Classrooms in thirty-three African countries with four Confucius Institutes and
one Confucius Classroom located in Kenya. Kenya has the second highest number of
CIs in Africa, behind South Africa with three Confucius Classroom and five institutes
(Hanban, 2016). As Sino-African relation grows, the number of CIs will continue to
increase in Africa.
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The objective of CIs is to promote cultural exchange between China and the
host country. In the case of Africa, CIs are functioning as platforms for the Chinese
government to create a favorable environment in Africa that enables China to achieve
its economic and political agenda (Hubbert, 2014). What motivated China to expand
its cultural influence in Africa its need to strengthen its economic engagement with
African countries so that it can pursue its economic interests. In this case, economic
and cultural powers are united as one important component of China's foreign policy
strategy (Wei, 2012; Wheeler, 2014).
From African government’s hope that educational and cultural cooperation
will strengthen their economic ties with China. African governments also know that
learning Mandarin is a way to make African students become more competitive in the
job market because China is a major player in the global economy (Wheeler, 2014).
Like professor Wu Qianlong, deputy director of the Confucius Institute at the
University of Cape Town, noted, "For those who are really committed to learning
Chinese, the reward is obvious: this can give them an edge when entering the world of
an economic powerhouse and exposing them to a mixture of West and East cultures"
(Makoni, 2010).
Over the past years, the Confucius Institutes have received criticism from their
host countries, especially in the West. Most of the criticism comes from the Confucius
Institute’s political connection with the CCP. Critics argue that the Chinese
government uses CIs as the propaganda instruments to propagate its policy and
expand its global influence. They also contend that the CI’s affiliation with foreign
universities could restrain academic freedom by excluding discussion of sensitive
topics such as Tibet and Falun Gong. To those critics, China is using Confucius
Institutes to present a non-threatening China through education on Chinese culture
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and language; the aim of CIs is to support China's peaceful rise narrative (Brady,
2008; Chey, 2008; Edney, 2012; Gill and Huang, 2006; Procopio, 2015; Starr, 2009;
Youngman, 2014).
While there are concerns over the Chinese government’s political influence on
the Confucius Institutes, a group of scholars who are involved in CIs operation found
little evidence of the Chinese government’s political interference on the Confucius
Institutes academic freedom (Hartig, 2012b; King, 2014; Paradise, 2009; Starr, 2009;
R. Yang, 2010). They claim that the CIs are the component of China’s strategy to
influence international public opinion and win hearts and minds of foreigners; their
objectives are similar to other Western countries that set up cultural institutes in
foreign countries to promote their own culture around the world. The Confucius
Institutes help to facilitate cultural cooperation and enhance academic exchange
between China and the host country (Hughes, 2014). Despite their cultural and
educational objectives, the Confucius Institutes also involve commercial concerns,
which is to boost business activities for both countries (Y. Zhou & Luk, 2016).
Unlike Western critics who are concerned about the Chinese government's
political influences on the Confucius Institutes, African commentators are concerned
about practical issues such as financial sustainability because China does not
guarantee long-term funding (R. Yang, 2010). Initially, the Chinese government or
Hanban will provide the host university between $100,000 and $200,000 to set up a
Confucius Institute and promised the same amount for next few years. Although the
Chinese government covers most of the cost of CIs operations, the host universities in
Africa worry about the issue of financial stability because of the uncertainty of
Chinese financial commitment. The issue of financial sustainability apparently
outweighs concern of losing academic freedom in Africa (Hartig, 2015).
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Another concern of the African Confucius Institutes operation, is the issue of
the quality of education provided. Teacher shortages and insufficient teaching
materials are two critical challenges the African Confucius Institutes are facing. Since
the establishment of CIs in African countries, recruiting qualified teachers to teach
Mandarin in Africa became a huge challenge for Hanban. Another practical concern is
the teaching materials prepared by the Chinese government in Beijing do not always
meet local demands; they do not reflect the needs of African students (Procopio,
2015).
In Addition to the practical worries about the financial sustainability and the
quality of teaching, there is a general ideological concern among the African
intellectuals. They claim that the establishment of the Confucius Institutes is a form of
cultural imperialism; the CIs are the tools the Chinese government and are used for its
international ascendancy. Affiliating with Africa's most prestigious national
universities enable China to spread Chinese culture into the minds of Africa's future
leaders in different fields. One possible consequence is that these future national
leaders “may increasingly look East, seeking to imitate the master” (Sishuwa, 2015).

Media Cooperation
In the past few years, China's media collaboration with African countries has
become an important component in Sino-African cooperation. Sino-African media
relation dates back to the early 1950s when China's state-owned news agency Xinhua
developed an African network and the Chinese government supported African
liberation movement radio in the 1960s (Xin, 2009). The aim of China’s media
engagement in Africa between the 1950s and 1970s was to assist China established
diplomatic relations with newly independent African countries. When China opened
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to the outside world in the late 1970s, repairing China’s international image and
reinforcing its political connections with developing countries became a major
priority for China’s media engagement in Africa (Y. Wu, 2012).
Since the first FOCAC meeting in 2000, media cooperation between China
and African countries progressed alongside the FOCAC platform. Between the launch
in 2000 and the Beijing Summit in 2006, the focus of the engagement was mainly on
China's media infrastructure assistance to African countries. For example, Xinhua
offered satellite equipment for a Uganda television station in 2000 (Y. Wu, 2014).
China's media engagement in Africa gained a huge momentum during the 2006
FOCAC Beijing Summit when the Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) identified media
cooperation as one of China's top priorities in constructing mutual relations.
Following the Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009), China will “continue to host
workshops or African correspondents and invite heads of press authorities and media
groups as well as correspondents from Africa to China to exchange views, cover news
and explore ways of conducting effective cooperation”. This plan also called for
Chinese and African “news media to play a positive role in enhancing mutual
understanding and friendship” (FOCAC, 2006: 12–13). After the FOCAC Beijing
Summit in 2006, the Chinese government increased funding to its state media’s
international expansion and provided huge loans to African governments for them to
develop media and telecommunication projects (Banda, 2009; Gagliardone,
Repnikova, & Stremlau, 2010; Nelson, 2013).
In recent history, China has been negatively portrayed in the Western media
from an unsophisticated and isolated country under the Mao's leadership, "dark
China" during the Tiananmen Square crackdown, to a threat to international security
over the past decades. When the Western media claim to be objective and balanced in
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their coverage of China, the Chinese government blamed them for their biased
reporting (Ding, 2011; Ke, 2009). The Chinese government officials strongly believe
that international media’s narratives are biased and ignored the positive aspects of
Chinese society. As China rises as an important global power, global media’s
negative portrayal of China has become one of the major concerns of the CCP leaders.
Such concerns motivated the Chinese government to support its media’s “going out”
campaign (Hu & Ji, 2012).
Most observers of China agree that the constant biased and negative Western
media towards China has motivated the recent Chinese media’s international
expansion. In order to contest negative representation of itself by Western media, the
Chinese leaders recognized the need to take control of their own voice (Jacobs, 2012;
McKenzie, 2012; Rhodes, 2012). The Chinese government used a variety of
strategies, including self-promotion through hosting mega-events likes the Olympics
and internationalization of Chinese state media to achieve the objectives
(Gagliardone, Repnikova, & Stremlau, 2010).
The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games was employed by the Chinese government
as a platform to showcase its rapid growth, its rise as an emerging global power and to
present a positive image to replace the defensive image of the Tiananmen Square
crackdown. It is China's "coming out party to signify the country's reinvention for
world recognition" (Price, 2007:6). Unfortunately, the reality turned out to be quite
different. During the build up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the Chinese government
was under extreme pressure from Western activists who condemned China for its
abuse of human rights, especially in its connection to Sudan and the genocide in
Darfur (Budabin, 2011; Cha, 2008; Economy & Segal, 2008). They used the Olympic
spotlight to put intense pressure on China to change undemocratic policies. For
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instance, Mia Farrow, the actress and UNICEF goodwill ambassador, and her son
Ronan Farrow, a former U.S. government advisor, published an op-ed article in The
Wall Street Journal condemning China for not doing enough to address the Darfur
conflict. They claimed that instead of “One World, One Dream”, the slogan of the
Beijing Olympics, it should be identified as “Genocide Olympics” (Farrow & Farrow,
2007). Moreover, eight Nobel Peace Prize laureates wrote an open letter to President
Hu Jintao demanding China to end its trade and aid to Khartoum regime (Leonard,
Spencer, & Moore, 2008). Under such massive pressure, the Chinese government was
forced to play a more active role in resolving the Darfur conflict. It helped the UN to
negotiate with the Sudanese government to agree to the deployment of UN
peacekeepers to protect civilians in Sudan (Budabin, 2011). Additionally, China
initiated correspondence with the international news media and hosted press
conferences to discuss the issues (Holslag, 2008).
At the same time, the Chinese government's crackdown in Tibet in March
2008 led to an international boycott of the Beijing Olympics. In March 2008, on the
eve of the Beijing Olympics, a group of Tibetan monks marched to the Tibetan capital
of Lhasa demanding more autonomy and the return of the Dalai Lama, their exiled
spiritual leader. In the following days, peaceful demonstrations turned to violent
protests. The Chinese government responded with armed policies squads and
controlled media reporting. The international community immediately condemned the
Chinese government's actions and demanded that China engage in direct talks with
the Dalai Lama. When the Olympic torch made its way across the globe, it
encountered anti-China protests along its path to Beijing. These wide-ranging
disruptions of Olympic tradition embarrassed the Chinese government and enraged
Chinese citizens, who believe that the Western media are biased toward Tibet and
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disrespectful of China (Economy & Segal, 2008; Grass, 2014).
China’s leaders recognized the that risks were great and understood that if the
Chinese government could not resolve these issues peacefully and successfully it
would jeopardize China’s “credibility as a global leader, its potential as a model for
the developing world, and its position as an emerging center of global business and
culture are all at risk” (Economy & Segal, 2008:49). Thereby, the Chinese
government decided to carry out its state media internationalization plan with an
effort to repair its public relations and re-brand China.
In 2009, the Chinese government launched a new round of the media "going
out" campaigns. The aim of the new media “going out” campaign is to counter biased
narratives by articulating China's own stories overseas. Another aim of this campaign
is to enhance China's international media conglomerates' abilities to compete with
their Western counterparts. A huge budget was committed to this effort, and a small
group of state-run media conglomerates were selected as forerunners to promote a
much friendlier environment, enabling China to achieve its agendas (Hu & Ji, 2012).
The media “going out” initiatives ranging from Xinhua news agency renting a huge
LED billboard on Time Square in New York City to the establishment of CCTV
Africa in Kenya (Grass, 2014).
Like the establishment of CIs, the focus of the internationalization of Chinese
state media is also focused on the developing countries where China maintains a
strong presence (E. Pan, 2006). Due to its increasing strategic and economic
importance for China, and the negative Western media coverage of China's presence
in Africa, the African continent becomes an important region for China's state media
global expansion (Mawdsley, 2008).
As mentioned earlier, China’s increasing presence in Africa has attracted

72

many criticisms within African states. The issues, such as China’s dealing with
corrupt African governments, imbalanced trade relations, the poor quality of Chinese
consumer goods, the practices of importing Chinese labors to African infrastructure
projects, and lack of social responsibility are the major concerns of these critics.
Facing such harsh criticism, the CCP leaders recognize that China needs to use its
own media to break the Western media’s domination in Africa and to counter biased
“China in Africa” narratives that depict China as a neo-colonialist whose presence in
Africa is to exploit its natural resource and raw materials (Grass, 2014; Nelson, 2013;
Y. Wu, 2012).

Chinese Media in Africa
Since the FOCAC Beijing Summit in 2006, the campaign to improve China’s
international communication capability, to articulate a favorable objective, and to
balance public opinion in Africa, the Chinese state media initiated a steady expansion
in African media markets. This expansion covered all forms of media from
newspapers, to radio stations, to satellite television. Over the past few years, China
has invested around $2 to $ 9 billion in its state media's global expansion
(Shambaugh, 2013). Among them, Xinhua, China's state-owned news agency
relocated its regional editorial office for Africa from Paris to Nairobi, Kenya in 2006.
This move signified the first symbolic phase of China’s “going out” campaign
(Gagliardone, 2013). In the same year, China Radio International (CRI) began to
request that its African partners transmit some CRI content and make it more
appealing to African audiences (Cooper, 2008). From 2006 onwards, China’s four
major state media players (Xinhua News Agency, CRI, CCTV, and China Daily)
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aggressively increased their overseas services to counterbalance increasing antiChinese sentiment (Xin, 2009).
Xinhua News Agency, a leading news agency in China, was first established
as an official Party mouthpiece in 1931. The establishment of Xinhua was politically
motivated. According to its former editors, the major responsibility of the Xinhua was
to oversee the newspaper Reference News (Cankao Xiaoxi) (Feng, 1991). Within the
newspaper, Xinhua aimed to legitimize its status and to promote political ideologies
of the CCP. Before the founding of the People’s Republic of China, it was Xinhua’s
responsibility to set up and manage the Party’s newspapers. During the anti-Japanese
War (1937-45) and the Civil War (1945-49) Xinhua established a number of local
offices to disseminate the CCP’s propaganda and report on local situations. Xinhua’s
early development in the 1930s and 1940s was generally connected with the
establishment of the Party’s newspaper (Xin, 2006). In 1944, Xinhua inaugurated
English-language broadcasts to reach foreign audience.
Xinhua’s development is parallel to China’s political and economic
development. In the early 1980s, Xinhua began to participate in diversified business
practices, partially encouraged by the tax-free policy and partially motivated by
financial needs (Cai, 1999). Xinhua’s economic information service began in the late
1980s. The newspapers provided Xinhua access to a huge amount of readership and
brought Xinhua massive advertising revenue. During this period, Xinhua developed
as a wholesaler and retailer of news, unlike its original roles as a news agency and
newspaper (Xin, 2006).
In the 1980s, Xinhua offered free news services to most of the domestic news
subscribers. It charged only its foreign clients a small fee. Without an economic
incentive, Xinhua did not have a specific department within the agency to handle
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newspapers and other media subscribers until 1994 when Xinhua set up news delivery
center. In the 1980s, Xinhua began to worry about its economic interests and political
impact. This business practice also prepared Xinhua for transition during the process
of marketization (Xin, 2009).
The media industry changed dramatically in the 1990s. While Western
scholars labeled the decade of the 1990s as a period of cultural globalization, Chinese
scholars considered it as a period of media reform (Chu, 1994; Lee, 1994; Pan, 2000).
In this period, China began to develop a market economy with Chinese characteristics
to boost economic and social development. After Deng’s famous speech in 1992,
commercialization and marketization became a predictable trend in China’s media
sector (Zhao, 2000). Against this background, Xinhua redefined its products as
“commodities” that could be sold for profits (Lu, 2002a).
Following the principles of Deng’s economic reforms, Xinhua was
encouraged to extend its global reach and to become a leading world news agency (J.
Hong, 2011). Two decades after the reform began, Xinhua stated that it had reached
its initial goal (D. Zheng, 2002). In 2008, Xinhua became one of the largest news
agencies in the world, with a total of 33 domestic offices and 123 overseas bureaus
across 190 nations. Xinhua launched its own international English television network,
“CNC World News”, on 31 December 2009. Xinhua planned to use the establishment
of China Xinhua News Network Corporation (CNC), to enhance its status in the
global television news market (J. Hong, 2011).
CNC is modeled on CNN and BBC as a 24-hour English-language channel
that aims to bring China's worldview to emerging markets (Xinhuanet, 2010). The
launch of CNC was a breakthrough in the history of world news agencies because it
was the first of the news agencies to have its own platform to broadcast its own
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stories and footage. In the past, both AP and Reuters have offered television news
stories and footage to their subscribers. However, they don’t have their own
broadcasting service. In this part of information war, Xinhua surpassed other leading
global news agencies and became the frontrunner in this contest (J. Hong, 2011). In
2011, Xinhua relocated its North America regional headquarters to New York's Times
Square with services provided in eight languages. These initiatives indicate Xinhua's
intention to become a powerful international media player (Wu, 2012).
Xinhua has held a presence in Africa since the 1950s. During the 1950s and
1960s, Xinhua's presence in Africa was "to help the Chinese government from
diplomatic relations with recently independent African states" (Wu, 2012:11) by
providing material aid and journalist exchanges for African liberation movement.
Xinhua was inactive in the following three decades due to social turmoil in China. In
1986, Xinhua opened its African regional bureau in Nairobi, Kenya. Since then,
Xinhua has made great progress in its news service to African countries. It
collaborated with the local state news agencies and signed cooperation agreements
with African national broadcasting companies on content sharing. To broaden its
influence, Xinhua continues to offer free newswires, technical assistance, and
equipment to local news organizations in Africa. Xinhua also launched its ChinaAfrican News Service in 2008 with an attempt to increase news coverage on issues of
mutual interest (Wu, 2012; Xin, 2009). Consequently, Xinhua became a cheaper
alternative to Western news agencies such as the Associated Press and other major
news providers of African news media. Currently, African newspapers adopt more
news from Xinhua than from other western sources. (Grass, 2014; Shambaugh, 2010;
Xin, 2009).
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Another important aspect of the media “going-out” campaign is the expansion
of China Central Television’s (CCTV) news broadcasting channels. In 2012, CCTV
launched its African broadcasting center, CCTV Africa, in East Africa with its
headquarters in Kenya's capital Nairobi, a city where other international news media
are present. CCTV Africa is the first Chinese media outlet to broadcast from a
production center outside China (Wekesa & Zhang, 2014). It has also been regarded
as the leader of the Chinese media expansion in Africa (Rönning, 2014). The function
of CCTV is to foster a positive image of China, to share "China's view" on the global
events with the world, and to offer "a real China to Africa and presenting a real Africa
to the world" (Gagliardone, 2013).
Motivated by both economic and political interests, the Chinese government
sensed a strong needs to strengthen its media activities abroad and to increase the
influence and the competitiveness of its media in an international environment (Wu,
2012). Within this context, CCTV was determined to win hearts and minds of
millions of viewers and compete with other media players in Africa. Competing with
other international media outlets such as the BBC, CNN, and Al-Jazeera for global
influence is part of media “going out” strategy (Sanchez, 2016). Initially, CCTV
Africa produced a one-hour daily news program that broadcasts in English. Six
months later, a program was developed including Africa News, Talk Africa, and
Faces of Africa. These programs covered political, economic, social, and cultural
issues across the African continent. Indeed, programs such as Faces of Africa, a
weekly feature program, and Talk Africa, a talk show that frequently invited African
elites to discuss current issues, initially formulated to contest BBC's Focus Africa and
Reuter’s African Journal. Hence, building on its substantial capital, CCTV Africa
turned out to be the only international news media that aired the one-hour daily news
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program, Africa Live, that was exclusively focused on Africa and covered a wide
range of issues (Wekesa, 2014).
Like Xinhua, CCTV also sought partnership with national broadcasting
stations in Africa. For instance, it signed an agreement with Kenya Broadcasting
Corporation (KBC) and authorized KBC to air programs from CCTV's channels.
According to the Kenyan minister for information, transport, and communication, this
media cooperation allowed Kenya to have more news sources instead of concentrating
on Western media (J. Wang, 2001). Additionally, CCTV also contributed a set of
equipment to KBC to receive satellite signals from CCTV (Chau, 2007).
China Radio International (CRI) was founded in 1941, as the only Chinese
state-owned radio station allowed to broadcast to overseas audiences. In the initial
stage, the sole function of CRI was to repeat the CCP leaders' statements
(Kurlantzick, 2007). CRI's first overseas broadcast was in 1941 and first English
broadcast was in 1947 (Kenichi, 2011). Since Deng's economic reforms began in the
late 1970s, CRI became a more profit-driven media outlet, like other state-owned
media in China. As the Chinese government replaced pure propaganda with a public
relation strategy, CRI became a vehicle to make Chinese culture more visible globally
(Cooper, 2008).
According to Chen et al, establishing partnership and collaborating with
overseas media organizations are two successful approaches that helped China to
enhance its international influence (2010). When CRI relocated its African
headquarters from Paris to Nairobi, it signed a cooperation agreement with the Kenya
Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) in 2006 to share its production content. At the same
time, an FM radio station was launched. It provided 19 hours of daily programing in
English, Mandarin, and Swahili to the Nairobi listeners (Xinhua, 2006). Since its
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partnership with the KBC, CRI programming gained a large listenership in Kenya in a
relatively short period as compared to other African countries and was an example of
a successful local partnership. Relocating its regional headquarter to Nairobi
demonstrated China's determination to enhance its influence in Africa (Cooper 2008).
China Daily, an English-language newspaper, was established in Beijing in
1981 to target foreigners in China. China Daily’s editorial control is less strict than
most Chinese language newspapers (Heuvel & Dennis, 1993). China Daily launched
its online edition in December 1995 and became one of the major online Chinese
newspapers. As part of “going out” media, China Daily has aggressively expanded its
foreign editions of the newspaper over the past years. It established a US edition in
February 2009 and European and Asian weekly editions in 2010 (d’Hooghe, 2015).
African weekly edition was inaugurated in December 2012 in Nairobi. It is available
on paper and the Internet as well as an application with video content (Rönning,
2014). The focus of China Daily is on Sino-African relations, to improve
communication and cooperation between China and African countries (R. Rotberg,
2013). As Zhu Ling, China Daily's editor-in-chief addressed at the launch of China
Daily Africa "the relationship between China and the African continent is one of the
most significant relationships in the world today. It is growing and complex and not
always understood not just by those in other parts of the world but Africans and
Chinese, too" (cited in Green, 2012). Thereby, the purpose of China Daily is to “set
that straight” (Ibid).

The Challenges of Chinese Media in Africa
Many Western media observers often perceive the growing Chinese media as
the rise of Chinese “propaganda”. They are also worried that the presence of Chinese
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media in Africa poses a threat to African journalism by forcing African journalist to
avoid controversial issues and only report favorable stories about China and China’s
involvement in Africa. They are concerned about the issue of censorship, whether the
Chinese government imposes it, or self-censorship practiced among Chinese media
professionals in Africa. For those critics, censorship has seriously compromised the
general public’s ability to access critical information (Wekesa, 2014; Y. Wu, 2012).
The fear is due to China’s poor record of freedom of the press at home, and its history
of imprisoning journalists and blocking controversial issues (Rhodes, 2012). In other
words, “With generally low official credibility, China’s state media have a hard time
winning over a skeptical audience” (X. Zheng, 2010: 49).
Zhang Yanqiu, director of the Africa Communication Research Centre at the
Communication University of China, argued “the generalization of Chinese state-run
media as a propagandist in Africa might be too reductive”. According to Zhang,
Chinese media is practicing "constructive journalism" in African countries (Y. Zhang,
2014). Unlike Western media's "watchdog" role, the purpose of constructive
journalism is to find solutions, "it can be both positive and negative" according to
Zhang. The ultimate goal of constructive journalism is to offer "a new kind of balance
and shine a new kind of light on the continent" (ibid). By practicing constructive
journalism, Chinese media operations in Africa often ask to offer a solution, not just
report the stories. The notion of constructive journalism is that providing solutions is
far more important than just objectively reporting the stories, because if reporting the
truth of conditions only getting worse, then foreigners will be afraid to travel to
Africa. Moreover, such coverage is only hurting African countries even more (Ibid).
Lacking credibility is another challenge Chinese state-owned media face when
they entered international media markets. Pressures have ascended in African
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countries where the Chinese government has heavy investments in local media
infrastructure. Since their inception, Chinese state-owned media organizations are
constantly accused of editorial bias, no matter how hard the Chinese officials and the
executives of major Chinese-African media outlets defend the legitimacy of their
organizations (Cusack, 2015). China recognizes that there is a credibility gap that
exists in its overseas media initiatives despite its efforts to improve its image. To
narrow credibility gap, Chinese media needs to develop credible information and
build media organizations that are “strong, influential and credible” (Xi, 2014 cited in
Cusack, 2015). Many believe that transparency would improve Chinese state-owned
media’s credibility globally (Y. Wu, 2012).

Chinese Telecommunication Sector in Africa
Like its state-run media international expansion, Chinese telecommunication
firms also expanded their operations in Africa and became key players in Africa's
telecommunication markets since 2006 (Beebe et al., 2006; Gagliardone, 2013).
Similar to Chinese state-owned media, the objectives of Chinese telecommunications
companies' engagement in African states are to enhance China's international
standing, to counter Western hegemony, and to expand business operations overseas
(Dumbaugh, 2008).
In Africa, the telecommunication sector was owned and controlled by the
States. The majority of African States started to reform their communication sectors,
through the process of deregulation and convergence in the late 1980s. Under pressure
from the World Bank and other international organizations, these developments led to
the privatization of state-owned telecom sectors in Africa and have a significant
impact on African telecommunication growth (Gilward, 2005; McCormick, 2003;
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Wallsten, 2001). The growing numbers of telecommunication players in the industry,
new services and products all have positive effects on the economic growth (Chavula,
2013).
Over the past years, telecommunication sectors have become increasingly
intertwined with the operations of the government departments and other
organizations (Adam, 1996). This has led to a growing belief within African
governments "that productivity of the entire economy in a country depends upon the
efficiency of the telecommunications system" (Chavula, 2013:6). As the
telecommunications cross-border information flow accelerates and enables easy
access to knowledge and resources, it becomes a key element of African state’s social,
economic, and technological development (Cissé, 2012; McCormick, 2003).
The willingness of African governments to modernize their
telecommunication sectors has created a favorable environment for international
investors to invest in Africa’s telecommunication industry. Over the past decade,
African telecommunication markets have attracted an increasing number of foreign
investors (Berg & Hamilton, 2002). Among them are two leading Chinese
telecommunication firms, Huawei Technologies, a private hi-technology company,
and Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Corporation (ZTE), a State-Owned
Enterprises (SOEs). Huawei, a leading telecommunication equipment manufacturer in
China, has achieved great success in internationalization in the past decade. (A.
Wong, 2015).
Over the past years, Chinese telecommunications companies have gained
overwhelming popularity in Africa through low price strategy, responsive customer
service, and the support from the Chinese government. In order to succeed in African
telecommunications markets, Chinese telecommunication companies employ a lower-
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pricing strategy to compete with other competitors in Africa. For instance, Huawei's
price is 5-15 percent lower than its Western rivals. When ZTE later entered, it cut the
price 30-40 percent lower (A. Wong, 2015). According to Caixin Century Weekly,
"price remains Chinese companies' biggest competitive advantage" (Zhao & Zhang,
2012). Although Huawei's price is cheaper, it still manages to generate more profit
margins than in China. However, the low-pricing strategy has negative effects on
company's reputation; Chinese products are generally perceived as being of poorer
quality (Chang et al, 2009).
Another important business strategy of Chinese telecommunication firms is
their outstanding customer service; they concentrated on customers’ needs. Both
Huawei and ZTE are taking their customer service seriously. Huawei’s customer
service is available “24 hours a day, seven days a week” (Chang et al, 2009). This
highly responsive customer service earned Huawei a reputation for reliability that
helps its operations in Africa. This customer-oriented strategy is one of the major
advantages of both Huawei and ZTE’s success in Africa (Cissé, 2012).
The Chinese government has played an important role in its
telecommunications companies' expansion in Africa (Berg & Hamilton, 2001). The
primary source of government support is through credits that are offered by the
Export-Import Bank (China Exim) and the China Development Bank (CDB). The
loans are designed to provide financial assistance to Chinese exporters to obtain
foreign business deals and to assist foreign companies to import goods and services
from China (Brautigam, 2011:206). The credit provided by China's national banks are
loans, not subsidies. The loans from either CDB or China Exim to African states can
only use to purchase equipment from Chinese companies (Zhao & Zhang, 2012).
These loans led to guarantee business deals for Chinese telecommunication

83

companies. Since 2004, CDB and China Exim and other Chinese national banks have
continued to offer huge credit to Huawei, ZTE, and other Chinese
telecommunications companies. Chinese national banks' strong financial support has
facilitated Chinese telecommunications companies to speedily extend to most of the
African states (Marshall, 2011).
In addition to its strong financial support, the Chinese government also offers
diplomatic assistance to its telecoms companies. When the top Chinese officials
visited African states, Huawei and ZTE executives often accompanied them. Such
diplomatic meetings bring opportunities for both Huawei and ZTE executives to build
a close relationship with African governments and provided an advantage for both
Huawei and ZTE in winning the contracts in African states (Cissé, 2012; F. Cooke,
2011).
The presence of Chinese telecom companies in Africa benefits African
consumers, businesses, and governments. For ordinary African consumers, the
affordable consumer goods and services are the most important benefits of Chinese
telecommunication’s presence on the continent. For business users, Huawei and ZTE
offer training courses to train local staff and local network providers. The other
positive contribution of Chinese telecommunication firms is their partnership with
local telecommunications operators, such cooperation helped to improve
telecommunications technologies in African states.
The lack of telecommunication infrastructure has always been a hurdle for
African states' socioeconomic development. While Africa’s Western allies hesitated
to support its telecommunication development, China offered aid and loans to African
countries with no-strings-attached. China's investment in the African
telecommunication sector has an important impact on the rapid growth of the African
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telecommunication market. To counter China's growing presence in Africa; many
Western countries increased their investments in Africa's ICT infrastructure. The most
important contribution of Chinese telecoms companies’ engagement in Africa has
narrowed the digital gap between haves and have-nots (Cissé, 2012).
Like other Chinese engagement in Africa, Huawei and ZTE's presence
provoked criticism from both the international community and Africa. Critics claim
China's engagement in African telecommunications markets pose a cybersecurity
threat, fearing that Chinese telecommunications companies might engage in
espionage. Michael Chertoff, the former US Secretary of Homeland Security, told
Foreign Policy that " There are a lot of concerns about Huawei acting to advance the
interest of the Chinese government in a strategic sense, which includes not only
traditional espionage but as a vehicle for economic espionage" (Reed, 2013). By
building telecommunication infrastructure for African states, Huawei has a great
opportunity to spy on African information system via technological "backdoor". Thus,
there is a possibility that each time African customers upgrading their service, there
are installing spyware on their devices. Critics also fear that the Chinese government
is using African information networks to spy other nations (Ibid).
China’s officials and Chinese telecommunication companies have denied the
spying charges; they claimed the criticisms over spying are baseless allegations. An
18-month investigation commissioned by the White House found no evidence of
Huawei involves in espionage (Kauri, 2012). Although there is no evidence of
Chinese telecommunication company surveillance other nation, evidence shows that
many African governments like to use Chinese-made telecommunications equipment
to control communication system for political reasons. For example, China helped the
Zambian government install Internet surveillance and censorship equipment to
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monitor its citizens' online behaviors (Reed, 2013).
Overall, these cultural interactions have fostered cross-cultural understanding,
as both Chinese and Africans are receiving more Sino-African stories from Chinese
media. These initiatives enabled the Chinese government to promote its own agenda
in Africa (Gagliardone et al., 2010; York, 2013). The factors that motivated both
Chinese media and telecommunications sectors' international expansion, its mode of
engagement, and the impact on the continent has been briefly discussed in the
previous sections. The following chapter will detail China’s current cultural and
media expansion in Kenya.
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CHAPTER 4
CHINA’s GROWING CULTURAL INFLUENCE IN KENYA

Over the past decade, China has increased its engagement in African countries
to pursue its political and economic interests. As a result, Kenya has become an
important hub for China’s operations in East and Central African countries (Patroba,
2012). For China, the importance of Kenya is not its natural resources; instead, it is
the geostrategic importance of the country. Kenyan ports, such as Kilindini Harbor,
have become an important trading and resources transition hub for the Chinese
government and Chinese companies’ operations in Africa. Chinese companies depend
on these ports to transfer manufactured goods to East and Central African markets.
Kenya’s political stability is another important factor behind the Chinese
government's decision to pour huge resources into Kenya. In comparison to other
African states, Kenya’s political stability helps China and its companies to safely
import and export goods and natural resources from Africa (Bergeron-Oliver, 2012;
Onjala, 2008).
Over five decades of China’s engagement in Kenya, the relationship between
China and Kenya has had its ups and downs. Under the leadership of President Jomo
Kenyatta, Kenya was inclined more towards the West, while his Vice President
Odinga was in favor of building bilateral relations with the East. Both President Mwai
Kibaki and his successor Uhuru Kenyatta, especially President Uhuru Kenyatta,
wanted to maintain the strong diplomatic relations with China and to further
strengthen and expand the friendly cooperation between the two nations. Both
Presidents Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta looked for partners in developing countries
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that could strengthen Kenya’s economic and political position in the international
community. Political and economic interests pursued by the two countries led to
cooperation. In other words, the cooperation was largely based on the common
political and economic interests.
China’s economic and trade relations with Kenya dated back to the Ming
Dynasty when Chinese explorer and fleet admiral Zheng He commanded seven
expeditions to visit many places in Eastern Africa, including Mombasa in Kenya.
Even though the economic systems in two countries were different, China practices
communism and Kenya embraces a capitalist system, Sino-Kenya economic relations
have remained friendly. Bilateral economic and trade relations have been developing
smoothly. Over the past decades, numerous collaborative agreements in the areas of
technology, energy, education, media, and tourism were signed to boost cooperation
between the two countries. The Chinese government has been aggressively
implementing these signed collaborative agreements by encouraging Chinese
companies, both private and state-owned, to expand their investments and cooperation
with the Kenyan government and companies (Onjala, 2008).
China and Kenya also cooperate in the field of politics. For instance, the
Kenyan government supports China’s “One-China Policy” to diminish Taiwan’s
diplomatic presence worldwide; in return, the Chinese government supports the
Kenyan government position on the International Criminal Court (ICC) trials of
Uhuru Kenyatta and other Kenyan political leaders. In November 2013, “China voted
in favor of a draft resolution in the United Nations Security Council, calling for
deferral of Kenyan cases” (Ongiri, 2014). In order to advance its economic and
political interests in Kenya, the Chinese government also expands the bilateral
cooperation to the fields of culture and media for the purpose of cultivating mutual
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understanding and friendship between both nations and people.
Nairobi, the capital of the Kenya, is the base of many international news
outlets’ African operations. Because of its relatively relaxed media environment and a
growing economy; Nairobi became an ideal place for transnational news media bases
in the region (Bergeron-Oliver, 2012). A strong economy means more money to
spend on advertising, which is what a media organization needs to maintain their
operations. The Kenyan media industry has experienced a rapid growth in advertising
between 2006 and 2010. The Kenya media industry is expected to grow 16.3 percent
annually from 2013 through 2017 and expand to the size of $3.1 billion by 2017
(PwC, 2013).
The global financial crisis of 2007- 2008 provided excellent opportunities for
the Chinese government to expand its state-owned media into the global media
market. Western countries’ economy slowed down by the financial crisis. Faced with
such financial difficulties, Western media was forced to cut their operating cost and
reduced the size of international operation, and in Africa in particular. While Western
media’s operations in Africa were limited, the Chinese government took the
opportunity and aggressively expanded its media operations in Africa (Farah &
Mosher, 2010; Grass, 2014).
China believes the national image of the country presented by foreign media,
especially Western media, is biased and misleading and that it is comprised of an
intensive effort to demonize China. Chinese leaders understood that national image is
a result of “a combination of objective facts about a country, image projection by that
country, and interpretations and even contractions of facts about that country by the
mass media and other actors in foreign countries” (Tao & Page, 2013: 855). After it
lost its national image management battle over the Tibet riot in early 2008, the
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Chinese government realized that on the international battlefield of image projection,
winners successfully present a national image that is favored among the foreign
public, while a loser’s image is defined by others. To be a winner, the Chinese
government determined to improve its national image. One huge step China took was
to invest US$8.7 billion in 2009-2010 to improve its international communication
ability, including international expansion of its state-owned media (Shambaugh,
2013).
China acknowledges that there is a connection between culture, politic, and
economy; the growing cultural influence will help China and its companies to pursue
their political and economic interests in Africa. This chapter examines the evolution
of China’s presence in Kenya’s media and cultural sectors, and how the internal and
external economic and political forces in both China and Kenya helped to establish
the current pattern of China’s media presence and other cultural engagements in
Kenya. The first section will briefly review the Sino-Kenyan relations and the internal
and external political and economic factors, both in China and Kenya that influenced
the relationship between the two countries in each period. The second section
examines China’s investments in Kenya’s infrastructure projects and focuses on the
link between these projects and China’s national rebranding agenda. The third section
focuses on the penetration of Chinese media and other cultural productions in Kenya.
The fourth and final section explores the development of Confucius Institutes in
Kenya.

Brief History of Sino-Kenyan Relations
China and Kenya relationship dated back to the 15th century when Chinese
admiral Zhang He reached Mombasa and Lamu, the coastal cities of Kenya, during
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his seven voyages to the western seas. Modern Sino-Kenyan relations began in 1949.
China’s African policy during this initial stage was influenced by the ideology of antiimperialism and anti-colonialism. In order to battle the hegemony of colonial and
imperialist powers, China established diplomatic relationships with other Asian and
African colonies to demand independence from oppressive regimes in 1957. China
supported these liberation movements because it believed that independence struggle
across Africa were connected to the socialist movements in East Asia, therefore, they
could joint forces to fight against imperialism (King, 2010; Snow, 1988).

President Jomo Kenyatta Era: 1963-1978
Kenya was formally colonized by Great Britain in 1895. After a long struggle
against the British for independence, Kenya gained independence on December 12,
1963. Two days after its independence, its diplomatic relations with China, as
opposed to Taiwan, were established. China became the fourth country to recognize
Kenya’s independence (Onjala, 2008). In the early years of President Jomo
Kenyatta’s era, China’s relations with Kenya evolved smoothly and trade was in
Kenya’s favor. After 1965, the relationships between the two countries were cold with
allegations and counter allegations of undermining sovereignty (Enock et al, 2015).
Jomo Kenyatta, president of Kenya African National Union (KANU), led
Kenya's delegation in the negotiation for independence. When Kenya gained its
independence in 1963, Kenyatta was elected as prime minister and became the first
President of the Republic of Kenya in 1964. When the official diplomatic relation was
established in 1963, the leaders of KANU were uncertain about building close
relations with China because the Chinese government closes ties with Vice-President
Oginga Odinga, who had been a friend to China during the struggle for independence.
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Because of their ideological differences, Odinga did not agree with the Kenyatta
government and Kenyatta perceived Odinga as a threat to his leadership. Therefore,
when Odinga proposed for a close relationship with China, Kenyatta was in favor of
approaching the Western powers (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012).
The tension between Kenyatta and Odinga led to a cold period in Sino-Kenya
relation filled with bad blood. The Kenyatta government accused China of funding
opposing parties and plotting a revolution in Kenya. A Chinese third secretary and a
journalist affiliated with the Xinhua News Agency were expelled in 1965. China
denied the accusations and accused the Kenyatta government of defamation (Chege,
2008; Larkin, 1971; Patroba, 2012). In response to the Kenyatta government’s
accusations, Chinese people protested outside Kenya's Beijing embassy. In retaliation,
Kenya recalled its ambassador to China and initiated a counter-demonstration outside
the Chinese embassy in Nairobi. Both countries expelled the other’s chargé d’affaires
in 1967 (Chege, 2008; Enock et al, 2015).
In addition to the above-mentioned bad blood between the two countries,
Kenyan media criticized China’s Cultural Revolution. They called for the Chinese
government trained African diplomats in Beijing to carry out similar revolutions in
their home countries, resulting in negative impacts on Sino-Kenyan relations (Larkin,
1971). China denied its involvement, but its reputation in Africa suffered as a result of
the Kenyan government and its people’s suspicion that China supported an opposing
party to overthrow the existing government. The Cultural Revolution changed the
focus and behavior of China’s foreign policy; China’s relationship with Kenya was
put on hold until Kenya’s second president Daniel Moi assumed power (Chege,
2008).
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President Daniel Moi Era: 1978-2002
During China's Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Sino-Kenyan relations went
through a dark period. Relations between two countries were revived after Daniel
Arap Moi came to power as the successor of Jomo Kenyatta as the second President
of the Republic of Kenya in 1978. Under the leadership of President Moi, SinoKenyan relations were good politically, socially, and economically and the
collaboration between the two countries reached outstanding achievements in many
fields. During the 1970s, Kenya experienced a period of domestic, political, and
economic obstacles that resulted in radical structural changes. On the political front, a
political divide among the principal members of government led to a period of
political uncertainty. Kenya's economy performed relatively well in the first decade of
independence (1964-1973). Then came the oil crisis in 1973 and the economic crisis
of the 1970s. As a result, the country's GDP dropped, the standard of living declined,
and there were widespread food shortages. Such circumstance had a negative impact
on Kenya's economy, and its economic decline forced the Kenyan government to
depend on China's development support to meet its demands (Rono, 2002).
Around the same time, China’s national priority also began to change. After
the death of Chairman Mao, his successor Deng Xiaoping and other leaders of the
CCP initiated economic reforms in 1978, two years after Mao's death. The economic
reforms opened China up to the world for the purpose of seeking and receiving
foreign investment, technology, and know-how, as well as expanding domestic
markets into global ones (Brandt, 2008). In order to achieve its objectives, the CCP
leaders established an outward policy to improve China’s relations with other
countries (Onjala, 2008). Within this context, the two countries started to rebuild
relations when President Moi came to power in 1978. Soon after he was in power,
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President Moi visited China to sign the first bilateral cooperation agreement between
the two countries since the 1960s. Although this agreement covered a number of
fields, the main focus of the new bilateral agreement was culture (Masta, 2009).
During President Moi ear (1972-2002), great efforts were taken to promote the
bilateral relations between the two countries. Frequent high-level state visits between
Kenyan leaders and prominent Chinese leaders and officials resulted in a number of
economic and technical cooperation initiatives include projects such as Moi
International Sports Center, the expansion of Eldoret hospital, Gambogi-Serem
Highway and Nairobi-Thika Highway. Cultural exchange agreements were also
signed that included the annual scholarships, provided by the Chinese government for
African students to study in China, and Xinhua News Agency set up a regional office
in Nairobi in 1985 (King, 2010; Masta, 2009).
During this period, China and Kenya also singed many economic cooperation
agreements. By the mid-1990s the bilateral trade volume had increased significantly,
though it was mostly imports from China. When President Moi left office in 2002,
relations between the two countries were better than they had ever been. Both
President Moi's attitude towards China and China's interested of Kenya as an
important regional hub were the key factors for this success (Chege, 2008).

President Mwai Kibaki Era, 2002-2013
In December 2002, the ruling party KANU lost the general election to the
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), a reform coalition. Mwai Kibaki, the candidate
of NARC, won the election, took over government leadership, and ended Moi
regime's influence. Sino-Kenyan relations strengthened and deepened after President
Kibaki took office (Sheen & Eisenman, 2012). After Kibaki came to power, his
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administration initiated a comprehensive economic and governance reform program
that resulted in speedy economic recovery and accelerated growth subsequently.
Those reform programs also led to the longest period of sustained growth since the
prosperous Kenyatta era (2003-2007). GDP growth increased from 2.9 percent in
2003 to 7.1 percent in 2007; poverty level also dropped from 56 percent in 1997 to 46
percent in 2006. Economic growth was the result of the growth of all sectors
including agriculture, tourism, trade, manufacturing, telecommunications,
construction, and financial sectors (Chege, 2008).
President Kibaki embraced the Chinese partnership approach and was willing
to strengthen Sino-Kenyan relations (Patroba, 2010). Trade and investment are two
major areas of the relationship. The relations between the two countries started with
high-level state visits followed by a series of agreements (Onjalla, 2008). In 2005,
President Kibaki visited Beijing accompanied by a group of Kenyan trade and
investment delegations looking for business opportunities between the two nations.
During his visit, President Kibaki met with Chinese President Hu Jintao and other
Chinese government officials to discuss economic cooperation. During the meetings,
China promised to increase its assistance to help the Kenyan government’s
modernization and development projects (Sheen & Eisenman, 2012). China signed
five agreements with Kenya that included “official development assistance in grants
(for infrastructure and energy), extended air services between the two countries,
technical assistance for assessment and classification of standards in industrial
products, and modernization of equipment and training at the state-owned Kenya
Broadcasting Corporation” (Chege, 2008:26).
The following year, the Chinese president Hu Jintao visited Kenya to
strengthen the relations between the two states. During the trip, the two countries
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signed a billion-dollar offshore oil exploration deal that granted Chinese National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) a permission to drill in Kenya’s north and south
coasts. In return, China donated half a billion shillings to Kenya’s malaria prevention
programs. President Hu also agreed to help Kenya repair and maintain the Moi
International Sports Complex and repair Nairobi’s road network from Jomo Kenyatta
International Airport to the UN Complex in Gagarin (Barber & England, 2006).
Although China had economic cooperation with Kenya before 2006, it was the
agreements Hu signed with Kibaki during Hu's trip that strengthened China’s status as
one of Kenya's key economic partners (Enock et al., 2015).
Since Kenya gained its independence, the Kenyan government held a close
relationship with the West, especially the US and the European Union. However, after
President Kibaki settled into power, he introduced a "Look East" policy to reduce its
dependence on traditional Western markets and donors. Unlike traditional Western
donors constantly lecturing Kenya on corruption, good governance, and human rights,
China practices a non-interference policy. It is a policy that is derived from the Five
Principle of Peaceful Coexistence, and it does not interfere with the recipient
countries’ domestic affairs. China’s “non-interference” policy was fully embraced by
the Kibaki government. China’s aid and assistance, including road construction
projects and cultural exchange programs, to Kenya were increased (Sheen &
Eisenman, 2012).
After engaging in intense battles for powerful positions, the incumbent Mwai
Kibaki was declared the winner of the Presidential election by a narrow margin over
the opposition candidate Raila Odinga, on December 27, 2007. After the election
results were declared, Odinga and his supporters refused to accept the results. They
insisted the elections had been rigged, a claim that had been confirmed by the
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international election observers (Gettleman, 2007). Foreign election observers also
claimed both parties manipulated the elections (Kanina, 2008). The election disputes
led to a huge violent protest, over 1,500 people were killed, and 600,000 Kenyans
were forced to escape their homes (Branch & Cheeseman, 2008). Major economic
activities were disrupted by the post-election violence. Before the elections violence,
Kenya’s economic growth stood at about 7 percent at the end of 2007; it was suddenly
dropped to under 2 percent in the first quarter of 2008 (Kanyinga & Long, 2012).
Given the great impact of the election crisis, both domestic and international,
former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan arrived Kenya one month after the
election to lead the mediation between the two parties. After weeks of negotiation,
Kibaki and Odinga signed a power-sharing agreement called the National Accord and
Reconciliation Act 2008 on February 28, 2008. Under this power-sharing agreement,
an official position of the Prime Minister was created, Odinga as Prime Minister, and
founded a coalition government. This agreement terminated the state of emergency
and foreign investors began to recommence their commitment in late 2009 (Romero,
Kimenyi & Dercon, 2008).
Under Moi administration, the country's economic growth had slowed down
from 4.5% between 1978 and 2001 to 0.6 % in December 2002 when Moi handed
over power to his successor Mwai Kibaki. When President Kibaki come to power,
economic recovery became the top priority of his national agenda. During President
Kibaki tenure (2003-2007), Kenya experienced the longest period of economic
growth in its modern history. It was also a period that attracted many foreign
investors, such as China, to take advantage of this promising economy. President
Kibaki also made the significant improvement in other areas, for instance, by the end
of his first term in office, many infrastructure plans were being executed, poverty
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levels dropped, and HIV rate declined (Chege, 2008). However, this growth rate
dropped in 2008 because of the global financial crisis, and post-election unrest and
deterred foreign investment (Wallis & Manson 2011).
In 2008, the Kenyan government launched Vision 2030 development plans to
achieve Kenya’s Millennium Development Goals to “transform Kenya into a newly
industrialized middle-income country” by 2030. Vision 2030 called for political,
economic and social reforms so Kenya could reach an annual growth rate of 10% over
twenty years and become an industrialized nation with a high living standard.
Attracting foreign investments from other developing countries, such as China, were
an important part of President Kibaki’s development strategy. The expansion of
infrastructure in transportation and telecommunications are two important
components for Kenya to achieve the goal of Vision 2030 (Government of Kenya,
2008).
In order to improve its economic productivity, the Kenyan government
recognizes the need to build and upgrade its infrastructures. Since 2004, the Kenyan
government began to rebuild its road system, with a focus on the important trade
routes from the coast to inland. Because of its financial difficulty, Kenya turned to
international donors and institutions for its road construction and infrastructure
projects. China became a major donor of such projects (Chege, 2008; Onjala, 2008).
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, China has contributed
significantly to assisting Kenya's large infrastructure projects such as upgrading the
national airport, construction railways, roads, building new seaports, etc. These
projects were completed quickly and cheaply with minimum bureaucracy (Chege,
2008; Onjala, 2008). These infrastructure projects not only created more employment
opportunities for Kenyans, they also improve Kenya’s economic performance,
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therefore, making Kenya a strong competitor (Chege, 2008).
In addition to the positive contributions of Chinese investment in Kenya’s
infrastructure projects, its companies’ operation in the country’s infrastructure sector
generated controversy in the Kenyan media. One controversial infrastructure project
is Mombasa-Kampala Railway Project; a railway project that runs from the busy port
city of Mombasa, Kenya, inland to the capital Nairobi and extends onwards to
Kampala, the capital of Uganda. This is an important railway network that will better
integrate East African markets. The Kenyan government and Uganda signed an
agreement to build a high capacity standard gauge railway within their territories.
Under the agreement, each state is responsible for the cost of the construction; each
government can seek joint financing from different investors. The deal was signed on
October 2, 2009.
During the first two years, both Kenya and Uganda tried to find a consultant
firm to conduct a feasibility study for the project. The research process was delayed
by bidders' objections. Initially the Kenyan Railway Corporation (KRC) planned to
reward the project to an Italian firm, Italferr SPA, however, the Ministry of Transport
dismissed the process. In the end the China Road and Bridge Corporation replaced the
Italian firm because the Chinese construction company convinced the Kenyan
Ministry of Transport to undertake a new proposal for the railway, and to accept
Chinese concessional loans (Kisero, 2011). When the Kenyan Minister of
Transportation changed their plans, it did not inform its Ugandan counterparts; the
Ugandan government accused both Kenya and China of making side deals. This
incident shows how both the Chinese government and its companies use their power
to further their own economic interests (Randall, 2010).
In addition to its heavy investment in the railway sector, the Chinese
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government also financed two major road projects in Kenya, the Nairobi Eastern and
Northern Bypasses (Bonyo, 2010). Exim Bank, a Chinese state-owned bank, also
signed a deal of Sh 16.9 billion loans to build the southern bypass road project
(Mugwe, 2011). Chinese companies’ involvement in Kenya’s infrastructure projects
has attracted criticism from local construction companies. They have expressed their
anger over the increasing number of construction projects awarded to Chinese and
other foreign companies. In response to this resentment, the Ministry of Transport
arranged a meeting to discuss strategies to increase local construction company’s
chances to win more infrastructure contracts. At this meeting, Kenya’s Prime Minister
Raila Odinga demanded local construction companies to improve the quality of their
work saying, “You have to be more competitive vis a vis the Chinese in terms of
costs, quality and speed” (Reuter, 2010). Local contractors did not agree with
Odinga’s comment. Instead, they argued that the reason they cannot compete with
foreign construction companies is because of the Kenyan government’s
underinvestment in the construction industry over the past years (Ibid).
Another issue that concerned the Kenyan public was the labor issue. Among
them are Chinese prisoners working on Kenya’s construction sites and Chinese
companies bring their own workers from China. Chinese companies have been
criticized for not honoring their promise to create jobs for local people. Many
Western scholars have dismissed the assertion as false and proposed it is part of
“China threat” narrative created by the competitors. Two of the leading scholars on
this issue, Barry Sautman of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
and Yan Hairong of Hong Kong Polytechnic University conducted an extensive
research project to uncover these misunderstandings. After they conducted research in
10 African countries that claimed to be affected by Chinese worker imports, the
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researchers did not find any evidence to support such claims. They believed rumors of
Chinese companies importing convicted labors to work on construction sites are due
to "cultural difference in work and living habits" (2010).
Another study conducted by Sautman & Yan on localizing Chinese initiative
in Africa, learned that most of the Chinese company’s operations in Africa have a
high percentage of local employee rates. In the study, they surveyed 75 Chinese
companies in Kenya; local employees do 78% of work. The study indicates that the
major dissatisfaction is in management positions, and the media's stereotypical
discourse plays an important role (Sautman & Yan, 2015). The success of Chinese
construction companies operating in Kenya help China to enhance its image and
influence in Kenya.
Another public relations nightmare the Chinese government facing in Kenya is
ivory smuggling, the poaching problem continues to damage China’s image in Africa,
where Chinese consumption of elephant tusks and rhino horns has driven two species
ever closer to extinction. Chinese nationals smuggling ivory out of Kenya has been
regularly reported in the Kenyan media (Kuo, 2017). As one of the largest illegal
ivory markets of the world, China is under extreme pressure from conservation groups
to shut down the illegal ivory trade. To highlight its determination to stop poaching,
the Chinese government announced its “commitment to phase out legal, domestic
manufacture, and sale of ivory products” to support international action against
elephant poaching and illegal ivory trade in 2015 (Mathiesen, 2015). China also
signed an agreement with the US government to fight poaching in Africa, the
agreement “almost completely” banning ivory trade in China (Mutambo, 2016).
Facing such criticism from the Kenyan media and public regarding their
presence in Kenya, the Chinese government feels the need to improve its national
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image in Kenya to achieve its economic and political interests in the country. To do
so, China has invested heavily in its state-owned media and telecommunication
companies’ international expansion, the establishment of Confucius Institutes and
cultural exchange programs in Kenya to articulate a favorable environment in the
country. The reason that China chosen culture was as its instrument to create a
favorable environment and influence the Kenyan public, was based on a belief that
culture “lays a foundation of respect and tolerance by foreign actors, who, over time,
may help to shape an international environment conducive to China’s growth” (Li &
Worm, 2011: 75). The rest of this chapter will examine the presences of Chinese
media, telecommunication companies and the construction of Confucius Institutes in
Kenya; how these sectors have been used by China as a means to improve its national
image and enhance its influence in Kenya.

Penetration of Chinese Media and Cultural Productions in Kenya
As China's economic and trade relations with Kenya evolved, so had the
Chinese media engagement in Kenya. The Chinese government's interest in
expanding its media oversee is a response to the painful experience of the 2008
Beijing Olympics torch relay. Initially, China was intended to use the Olympic games
as a platform to showcase its rise in a positive light (Budabin, 2011). It turned out
foreign activists used the media focus on Beijing Olympic Games to condemn
China’s connection with Sudan and its passive stance on the Darfur crisis. Within this
context, the Chinese government recognized the need to consolidate different
perceptions, both domestic and global, of the country (Sun, 2010).
One specific concern that motivated China’s media expansion in Africa is the
narrative of China’s engagement in Africa told by third-party media. Especially
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concerning the Western media that often depicts China’s engagement as “grabbing
land, extracting resources and neo-colonialism [force] in Africa” (W. Chen, 2013).
The Chinese government acknowledged that its involvement in Africa is
misrepresented by the third-party voices. Such misrepresentations have created a gap
between public perceptions and the realities of the events. In order to narrow this gap,
China should utilize its own media platforms to engage with audiences in strategically
important countries. China expanding its media operations in Kenya is an example of
how China uses its own media as strategic communication tools to serve multiple
goals, from advancing its influence in the international community to the profitseeking enterprise (Ibid).
Since 2009, Africa has been one of the main target destinations for Chinese
media’s ambitious “going out” campaign. Since the campaign launched in 2009,
Chinese media engagement in Africa, especially in Kenya, has covered all media
sectors and platforms. For instance, Xinhua News Agency relocated its Regional
Editorial Office from Paris to Nairobi in 2006. It was the first symbolic step of
Chinese state-owned media’s expansion in Africa to break “the Western media
monopoly” (Shambaugh, 2015).
In addition to its function as China’s mouthpiece overseas, Xinhua's global
expansion was also motivated by economic interest. Xinhua believes that expanding
its operations in Africa would strengthen its ability to compete with the major
Western news agencies, such as the Associated Press, United Press International,
Reuters, and Bloomberg. The aim is to become a "real world international news
agency" (Shambaugh, 2015) and a multimedia conglomerate, competing with other
media conglomerate such as News Corporation.
As for its economic interest, Xinhua targeted emerging markets, such as
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Africa, where there is no domestic competition for international news, and where
there is a limited presence of Western media. In Africa, one of the effective business
strategies Xinhua employs is to offer African media outlets free or extremely low-cost
news wires and photos when compared to Western news agencies (Jacob, 2012; Wu,
2012; Xin, 2009). While other African media outlets did not use of Xinhua’s news
wires frequently, due to those outlets standards and editorial policies, Kenyan media
adopted more news images and wires from Xinhua and CNC (China Xinhua News
Network Corporation World) (Jacobs, 2012). The lower cost of Xinhua news wires fit
the budget of Kenyan media outlets as the news wires and photos from Western news
agencies were nearly prohibitively expensive (Xin, 2009). Although Xinhua delivered
an ever-increasing number of stories enhancing its public presence, African media
markets were still dominated by Western news agencies (Wekesa, 2013).
Even though Kenyan media embraces Xinhua's news wires and photos,
Xinhua staff’s constant phones call, emails, and visits to Kenyan media newsrooms
have been perceived as "overbearing". As editors at the Daily Nation noted, since its
organization signed the news-sharing agreement with Xinhua, Xinhua’s officials are
constantly contacting the Daily Nation office to push them to publish articles and
photos (Jacobs, 2012). Woka Nyagwoka, a managing editor of The Standard, also
complains about the editorially bias of Xinhua’s news wires. According to Nyagwoka,
“Kenyans are skeptical of a free lunch, especially when it’s made in China” (Ibid).
In 2011, Kenya's leading newspaper signed a partnership agreement with
Xinhua. According to Eric Shimoli, a senior editor at the Daily Nation, “You would
have to be blind not to notice the Chinese media’s arrival in Kenya,” it is an
overpowering charm offensive (Jacobs, 2012). Some China experts suggest that
Chinese media expansion to the East African media markets is mainly motivated by
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the economic incentives such as advertising revenue potential (Bergeron-Oliver 2012;
Rhodes 2012). On top of pursuing a "charm offensive" agenda, the Chinese media
inroad has been viewed as an investment; it is no different than other Chinese
investments in Africa (Rhodes 2012).
The launch of CCTV Africa has been considered an important move in
China’s state-owned media’s international expansion. CCTV Africa was launched in
January 2012 and became the first broadcast production center outside China and the
biggest “non-African TV initiative in Africa” (Gagliardone & Geall, 2014:2). The
mission of CCTV Africa is to compete with other international media channels in
African media markets and to expand “English and Chinese broadcasts with footage
from the continent to China, Africa and the rest of the world” (Burning Spring, 2011).
The focus of CCTV Africa is mainly on news and interviews with leading
newsmakers and documentaries. CCTV Africa also launched a mobile application "I
Love Africa" six months after test broadcast (P. Zhang, 2012). Currently three major
programs are broadcasting on CCTV Africa channel. The first is "Africa Live", a onehour daily news program that focuses on current affairs, business, and sports. Second
is "Talk Africa", a weekly half an hour talk show discussing important events of the
week. Third is “Faces of Africa", a half an hour weekly program devoted to
extraordinary people in African history and to everyday African who has
accomplished the extraordinary (Gagliardone, 2013).
CCTV Africa is planning to extend its coverage to establishing a 24 hours
African news channel concentrating on the African affairs similar to other
international news channels such as France 24. CCTV Africa aims to broadcast a
combination of special features programs and the routine newscast with a clear
African identity. The fundamental goal of CCTV Africa is to become a great
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competitor to the international news channels such as CNN, BBC and Al Jazeera
(Rönning, 2014).
According to Helge Rönning, professor of media and communications at the
University of Oslo, CCTV Africa's approach needs to be viewed within the context of
the Chinese government's media strategy for Africa that contains three major
components. First, it is related to China's growing presence in Africa and the way it
has been portrayed and analyzed by the Western media over the past decades. China's
business and political engagement on the continent have been critically reported and
analyzed in both international and African media. Often, there is negative media
coverage about Chinese companies' business practices and labor relations in African
states. Within this context, the Chinese government felt the need to establish the
alternative image of its engagement in Africa to advance its investments and other
interests (Rönning, 2014).
The second aspect is the Chinese government's attempt to offer an alternative
style of journalism to counter Western-dominant international media's negative
coverage of the continent that often focused on famine, poverty, conflicts, and war.
Although it is impossible to avoid conflicts in journalism, the studies conducted by
Western media scholars uncovered that coverage of Africa has been tilted towards the
negative and with clear Western perceptive (Rönning, 2014). CCTV applies a
different approach to journalism. Chinese media are trying to provide a “positive
reporting,” a style of journalism that “focuses on collective achievements rather than
divisive issues like political crisis or sensational negative news like famines” to
Africa to prevent critical political investigation (Verhoeven & Gagliardone, 2012).
Even though Chinese media’s method may be understood as a new method of
reporting African stories, it also raises concerns regarding Chinese style of
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journalism. It has been seen as holding journalists back from reporting the real issues
and problems (Rönning, 2014).
The third perspective is about the journalism practiced by CCTV Africa as a
way of testing different journalistic standards and practices than those traditional ones
coming out of Beijing (Gagliardone, 2013). CCTV Africa has been used as a
journalistic laboratory for trying out new methods of news dissemination with a
Chinese viewpoint. If this is the case, Rönning notes, “it also represents a challenge in
the struggle over how to understand not only Chinese but also other countries’
interests in African markets and economies” (2014:32).
Unlike other western media organizations downsizing their operations and not
employing many foreign correspondents on the African ground, Chinese media,
CCTV in particular, receive vast financial support from its central government (Shek,
2013). The Chinese government’s funding allows CCTV Africa to commission Africa
24 Media and many other local Kenyan media houses, to produce segments for the
“Faces of Africa” (Wekesa, 2013). Moreover, there was enthusiasm within Kenyan
journalistic circles when CCTV Africa announced its recruitment plans to employ
highly competent African journalists and reporters. In its inception, CCTV Africa
recruited more than 100 employees working for its Nairobi office. The majority of
those employees were African journalists and news anchors from local television, and
about 30 to 40 Chinese journalists and technicians. Losing talented journalists,
anchors, and media professionals caused negative effects on local television station’s
rating and advertising revenue. In order to complete with CCTV Africa, local
broadcasters began a process of reform to enhance their position in a highly
competitive media market (Bergeron-Oliver 2012).
Although CCTV's African expansion has caused some negative consequences

107

to the Kenyan media outlets, its entry had a positive impact on local media
professionals. On one hand, it offers alternative job opportunities for well-trained and
talented native broadcast journalists. On the other hand, television stations that lose
talented journalists to the Chinese need to recruit talent from other radio or television
stations or hire unemployed media professionals, as a result, it creates more job
opportunities (Rönning, 2014). Many media scholars agreed that localization of news
production, such as hiring African reporters and anchors, is an effective way to win
the hearts and minds of the African people (Wekesa 2013; Gagliardone 2013).
Perhaps it is too early to assess CCTV penetration in the African news market
because it takes a time to build a stable audience base. Some studies conducted by the
Kenyan research institutes indicate that from April to June 2013, CCTV Africa had
not reached any significant audience in Kenya. CCTV Africa was not among the top
ten most popular channels list, indeed, its lowest rating commanded only 1 percent
viewer base. However, there may be a sense of relief for CCTV Africa because none
of the other international news channels are on the list (Rönning, 2014). Furthermore,
only a few studies have been conducted that focused the issue of Kenyans' perception
of CCTV in Africa. One of the studies indicated that only a small group of audiences
who have access to the channel found it attractive (Gorfinkel, Joffe, Van Staden, &
Wu, 2014). Again, it may be too early to determine whether African audiences view
CCTV Africa as a critical news source for the understanding of Sino-African relations
or global affairs. One thing is for sure, the competition for viewership and for cultural
and ideological influence in the area of a broadcaster is intense in the Kenyan media
market (Rönning, 2014).
CCTV Africa is an important example of Chinese media penetration in Africa.
Its major task is to enter the African media landscape to offer and disseminate a
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Chinese perspective of Africa and international politics. The key challenge of Chinese
media’s African operation is the practice of censorship by the Chinese government
and media’s self-censorship. The successes of CCTV penetration in the Kenyan news
media will depend on its capacity to provide Africans with objective and reliable
content (Rönning, 2014).
China Daily, the largest English-language in China, is another Chinese stateowned media company that expanded its operation in the African countries. In
December 2012, China Daily opened new news bureaus in Johannesburg, South
Africa, and Nairobi, Kenya and chose to locate its lead editorial office in Nairobi. It
also launched an Africa Weekly edition at the same time, with the goal of enhancing
China’s influence over local power elites, opinion leaders, and the urban middle-class
across the African continent (Shi, 2015). The function of the China Daily in Africa,
like other Chinese state media operations in Africa, is to promote China’s interests in
Africa. In order to achieve this agenda, it is necessary to build the favorable national
image of China and to improve the African readers understanding of China because
China's presence in Africa has created tensions between Chinese investors and local
citizens. Therefore, the Chinese government and companies need the channel to tell
their side of the story. Indeed, they have already used the China Daily to
communicate with the African public; a weekly publication gives them a regular
presence on the street corners (Green, 2012).
African Weekly is available in print and digital format, and as an application
with video content. China Daily partners with the Kenyan’s private media group,
Nation Media Group, the largest media group in East and Central Africa, to print and
distribute the weekly China Daily Africa Daily. This deal helps NMG to boost its
profits (Wekesa, 2013). The hard copies of the China Daily are available on
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newsstands in Nairobi area together with other Kenyan major newspapers such as the
Daily Nation and The Standard.
China Radio International (CRI), China’s major state-owned radio station, was
established in 1941 with an objective to function as an international broadcaster with
programming that simply broadcasted the CCP leaders’ announcements (Kurlantzick,
2007). It is the only Chinese state-owned radio station authorized to broadcast to the
overseas audience. CRI's first English broadcast was in 1947 to target overseas
listeners (Kenichi, 2011). The transformation of CRI began when Deng introduced the
economic reforms and Open-door policy in the late 1970s. Like other state-owned
media in China, the economic reforms and open-door policy shifted CRI's priority
from an ideological struggle to economic development (Sun, 2010). After China
joined the WTO, its communication strategy has changed from pure propaganda
towards a public relation strategy. A key component of this strategy is the global
expansion of Chinese state-owned media under the "going out" policy that aims to
enhance China's cultural influence globally. The main objective of Chinese media's
international expansion is to win international public opinion and build a favorable
environment for China's rise, especially after the public relations disaster of the
Beijing Olympic Games (Chen, Colapinto, & Luo, 2010).
In March 2006 CRI officially launched its first international FM station in
Nairobi. CRI Nairobi FM station offers 19 hours programming daily in English,
Mandarin, and Kiswahili. It estimated that it had about two million listeners in the
capitals of the East African countries. CRI programs cover topics on China's
economic, social and cultural development, China's cooperation with African states,
and major events around the world. The mission of CRI’s FM station in Nairobi is “to
promote mutual understanding and friendship between the Chinese and Kenyan
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people”, and to offer “the best programs to meet Kenyan listeners’ needs”, CRI
director Wang Gengnian stated during the launching ceremony (China Daily, 2006).
In 2009, CRI formed a partnership with the Kenyan Broadcasting Corporation
and other local stations and added six new languages to its broadcasts. Eastern
African governments, especially the Kenyan government, offered their airwaves to
Chinese media such as CRI to air their programs. Critics criticized local governments
for indirectly providing a platform for the Chinese government to an extend its
cultural influence (Jacobs, 2012). The cooperation with local radio stations and the
governments not only helped CRI gain a larger listenership in the region, but also
promoted understanding between China and African countries because African people
have more access to China-related stories (Banda, 2009).
StarTimes is a privately owned enterprise founded in Beijing in 1988. It
represents one of the most successful stories of Chinese media’s expansion in Africa.
In the beginning, StarTimes was focused on domestic broadcasting; however, it soon
became “the largest digital television integrator, technology provider and network
operator in China” (Rönning, 2014:24). StarTimes began its African operation in
2002 with an attempt to establish the company as a key international player. In 2007,
StarTimes founded a company called Star Africa Media Co. Ltd. in Rwanda that
specialized in digital terrestrial television (DTT).
The company benefited greatly from the television signal migration from
analog to digital. During the digital migration process, StarTimes employed different
business strategies, such as offering cheaper set-boxes, and signed agreements with
African governments and public broadcasters to obtain digital migration contracts.
Currently, StarTimes is doing business with 23 African countries and has network
operations in 12 of these states. In the case of Kenya, StarTimes has succeeded to
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place itself in the leading position by offering cheaper subscription fees; cutting deals
with the Kenyan government, and partnered with Kenyan public broadcasters
(Rönning, 2016).
The International Telecommunication Union’s digital migration agreement has
changed the Kenyan media landscape dramatically. At an international conference
convinced in Geneva, Switzerland in 2006, the ITU members signed an agreement to
switch from analog to digital broadcasting signals by June 17, 2015. The purpose for
changing broadcasting signals from analog to digital is to bridge the gap of the
“digital divide”. The “digital divide” is the gap that exists between privileged people
who have access to information and digital technology, and those who have limited to
no access to information and digital technology. By converting to digital signals, it is
believed that the quality of life will advance for citizens, not only of Kenya, but also
other parts of the world. Many believe that an informed public is more likely to
contribute to the economic development in any society than an uninformed public.
Other benefits of the digitalization of broadcasting include advancements in
technology that make it possible to integrate with various types of network
communications, enriching audience’s experience, and improving the quantity and
quality of programs (Ochieng, 2015).
Even though the deadline the ITU sets for digital migration is 2015, there is no
guarantee that all the nations can complete the transition before the agreed date.
Kenya commenced its digital migration in December 2009 and set to switch off
analog signals and complete migration process by June 2012. The migration project
was incorporated into the Vision 2030 program. The migration process led to great
changes and has resulted in significant challenges to the government, local media
houses, and the ordinary media consumers (Biwott, 2015).
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The process of migration from analog broadcasting to digital broadcasting is
quite comprehensive. It requires a substantial amount of capital in its preparation and
operation. This process brought various challenges for all the players involved. One
of the challenges for Kenyan government is the citizens’ understanding of digital
migration program and the associated benefits. In other words, to educate the public
on the meaning and technical issues of digital broadcasting, and to convince the
public that it is necessary for them to invest in digital equipment in order to enjoy the
benefits of digitalization (Biwott, 2015). According to a Daily Nation report, many
citizens were not aware of the necessities of a digital platform and the benefits of
digitalization of broadcasting (Musa, 2014). Despite the lack of knowledge of digital
migration, affordability is another major obstacle for the transition. In Kenya, huge
numbers of people are living below the poverty line. Indeed, the majority of Kenyan
citizens cannot afford to purchase the necessary digital broadcasting equipment
(Agwata, 2015; Nyabuga, et al., 2013). This is one of the reasons local media houses
used to protest against the government's decision to switch off the analog signals
(Agwata, 2015).
Kenyan media houses also faced critical challenges during the migration
process. They faced unfair distribution or allocation of broadcast signal distribution
licenses. Most of the Kenyan media houses supported digital migration program until
they learned that only limited Broadcast Signal Distribution licenses (BSD) were
offered. The first signal distribution license was granted to Signet, a subsidiary of the
Kenyan Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), in 2009. Since Communications
Commission of Kenya (CCK) gave Signet, owned by the Kenyan government, the
first BSD license, it received harsh criticism from local media houses because they
believed Signet received preferential treatment from the government (Sihanya, 2012).
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On the same note, critics also argue that this unfair BSD bidding process negatively
affected the media market because it compromised the principle of private
competition (Ochieng, 2015). Based on their study of the Kenyan media, Peter Oriare,
Rosemary Okello, and Wilson Uganda found that the Kenyan government has granted
many broadcast licenses to individuals and organizations whose identity remained a
secret (2010).
After what Kenyan media houses indicated as biased procurement processes,
the Communication Authority of Kenya (CA) issued second BSD license to Pan
Africa Network Group-Kenya (PANG) and the African Digital Network Consortium
(ADN) made up of local broadcasters, the Nation Media Group, Royal Media the
owner of NTV and Citizen TV, and QTV (Asuelaa, 2016). ADN’s BSD license was
granted after local media houses challenged the legitimacy of the result of BSD
license bidding in the high court. Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK)
granted a BSD license to local broadcasters, under a condition that requires them to
form a consortium. ADN rewarded a BSD license on November 26, 2014. However,
the license was suspended on January 21, 2015, on grounds of misleading
advertisements broadcasted by three media houses against customers purchasing
GOtv and StarTimes Set Top Boxes (STBs) (Wahito, 2015). The suspension was
lifted on February 13, 2014, the same day the Communications Authority of Kenya
(CAK) ordered that all analog signals must be terminated by midnight (Ochieng,
2015).
In Kenya, the process of digital migration sparked controversy and a series of
high-profile court battles. The Chinese company, PANG, owns StarTimes TV and is
the only company that has a license to distribute media content. This is the center of
Kenya’s digital broadcasting signal distribution controversy. The Kenyan
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government’s decision to give a Chinese company a sole license to distribute media
content in Kenya has led to a bitter war in court between the Kenyan government, the
Communications Authority of Kenya (CAK), and the three leading media houses
(National Media Group, the Standard Group, and the Royal Media Service). These
three leading media houses “were eventually shut out of the Broadcast Signal
Distributors (BSD) procurement process. They then lost the appeal to the Public
Procurement Administrative Review Board (PPARB) and to their chagrin, the
Communications Authority of Kenya authorized their rivals to carry their content
without their consent” (Wachira, 2015). After several lost court battles at Kenya’s
Supreme Court, the three leading broadcasters (Nation TV, Kenya Television
Network, and Citizen) were forced the off air on February 14, 2015 by the CAK after
the digital migration deadline passed. The only local news choice for Kenyans was
the Kenyan Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) and President Kenyatta family's K24TV
(Ibid).
After they lost their BSD license bids, the media houses challenged the
Kenyan government and argued the CCK should not grant media content distribution
rights to a foreign company, especially a company from a country that does not have
the free press and has a long history of suppressing media freedom and freedom of
expression. What is troubling these media houses is that the Chinese companies have
been granted too much space in the local media market, especially in the process of
the digital migration. Critics worry that the dominance of Chinese companies in
Kenya’s digital migration process could be utilized to suppress freedom of press.
They argued that it is not a common practice to allow foreigners to have such a huge
share in media ownership in other nations. PANG was awarded 120 frequencies out
of the existing 211 frequencies that are close to 60 percent of national digital
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spectrum. For perspective, the KBC's affiliate Signer was allocated 54 frequencies,
and the AND consortium was granted only 21 frequencies (Ohito, 2015). The AND
consortium frequencies were withdrawn after they ran "misleading and illegal
infomercials" that alleged StarTimes and GOtv illegally broadcasted their content,
therefore, violating copyright (Mwenesi, 2015).
The local broadcasters also challenged the credibility of PANG. They argued
that PANG has no experience in Kenya and only registered in Kenya a week before
the BSD license bidding was opened. They claimed the government should have
issued the second license to local companies to promote local businesses instead of
issuing lucrative media contracts to Chinese companies. Most importantly, the local
media houses argued that unlike the Chinese company who needed to build new
infrastructure, they already have the infrastructure. In response, the Communications
Commission of Kenya (CCK) stated that the three local broadcasters ignored the fact
that digital broadcasting infrastructure will soon replace the existing analog
broadcasting infrastructure, thus, anyone who won the bid will need to build new
infrastructure to distribute digital signals (Wanjiku, 2011).
What concerns the Kenyan critics is that Chinese who have never been known
for supporting freedom of press at home, is now gaining the opportunity to control
Kenya's television channels. They argued, air frequencies are national resources and
should remain in the hands of Kenyans, not controlled by the foreign company. They
viewed the tendering processes, in which local broadcaster lost due to poor technical
details, as biased, unfair and lacked transparency and accountability. Like SK
Macharia, chairman of Royal Media Services recalled how the local media houses lost
in the digital distribution tendering in the process, “As it stands, only StarTimes will
be able to broadcast to all parts of Kenya with the preferential allocation of many
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frequencies. It is not comprehensible why the government would want to give
Chinese this chance and deny Kenyan investors or even KBC such as reach”
Macharia said. “This is a scheme that reflects the frustration of locals as the
government converts Kenya into a compulsory pay TV society dominated by Chinese
profiteers targeting the middle-class who are able to pay and watch and black out the
rest of the people who are poor and cannot afford monthly subscription costs”
(Macharia, cited in Ohito, 2015).
As discussed above, StarTimes, the newest player in the Kenya television
market, has benefited greatly from Kenya's migration from analog to digital television
broadcasting. It emerged as one of the leading companies in the market by providing
affordable services and cheap set-top boxes. During the launch of StarTimes in Kenya
Leo Lee, the chief executive officer of StarTimes Media Kenya, stressed that the aim
of the company is "to meet the needs of varied subscribers who have not been able to
access pay television in Kenyan and handle competition, we are going to offer low
monthly subscription fees for our content" (cited in Itosno, 2012).
Despite employing a lower price marketing strategy, other factors also helped
StarTimes’ penetration in the Kenyan media market. StarTimes’ ability to negotiate
deals with ministers of communications, telecommunication regulators, and powerful
political brokers in Africa helped the company to become an important power player
in the digital migration process in most African countries. StarTimes are often
criticized for making opaque deals with local governments and taking over the local
broadcasters in African countries (Kisero, 2015).
Though StarTimes is a private company, its African operations are also
supported by the Chinese government as a "Cultural Exports Key Enterprise," and are
authorized by the Minister of Commerce to participate international media projects.

117

The most important advantage that StarTimes has is the significant financial
assistance from the institutions such as the Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim
Bank) and the China-Africa Development Fund, the second largest stockholders in the
StarTimes, to help the company expand its operations in Africa. While many African
state broadcasters are facing financial troubles and struggle to compete with other
international players, China Exim Bank and China-Africa Development Fund are
offering huge of loans for StarTimes' African operations. Thus far, China-Africa
Development Fund has offered $220 million to StarTimes' African operations
(Olingo, 2014; Rönning, 2016).
As part of localization plans, StarTimes announced on July 14, 2014, that the
company plans to build a Sh6.9 billion new Kenyan headquarters and broadcasting
center in the Nairobi suburb of Karen. This broadcasting center will produce both
television and film programs and increase the airing of Chinese soap operas in Kenya
and other African countries. This 20,000 square meter center serves as production
studios and distribution center in African countries. It will also employ local talent to
produce cultural materials and to construct the building. StarTimes' extension plan
was a response to the Kenyan government's plan to increase the local content share
for broadcasters from 40 percent to 60 percent. One of the major tasks of the center
would be to dub its content in African languages. It would also set up a digital
television research center, development unit, and a training facility. The ultimate goal
of the center is to increase local content and meet the demands of the African
audiences (Ochieng, 2014), as well as to introduce more Chinese programs to African
audiences, an objective also emphasized at the launch of the Beijing Television Series
Exhibition the same year in Nairobi. The goals of the exhibition were to enhance
cultural exchange between China and African states and to promote Chinese
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television drama, films and documentaries to African media and audiences. The
selected programs were expected to air in Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, and Nigeria
from July to the end of 2014 on StarTimes’ channels dubbed in English. In order to
meet African audiences’ demands of Chinese television programs and films,
StarTimes has set up a professional dubbing team in 2011. By 2013, StarTimes had
dubbed over 900 episodes of Chinese television series and over 40 Chinese films and
documentaries (Mutegi, 2014).
According to Rönning, the marketing strategies of StarTimes in Africa can be
analyzed by the following method. First, when StarTimes entries an African media
market, the company will partner with local broadcasters and often in minority
situation. The business started by offering cheap subscriptions and set-top-boxes to
enable more African consumer to access higher-quality digital television and more
channels than the existing analog broadcasting providers. While the company
executes its lower price marketing strategy, StarTimes also negotiates with local
public broadcasters and governments with an attempt to acquire the BSD license
before the deadline of the switching off of analog signals. Thus far, this business
model has produced profitable results for the company's African operations (2014).
StarTimes represents an example of how economic power can be used to
achieve China’s economic interests and national agenda in Africa. Financial support
from the China Exim Bank and China-Africa Development Fund enabled StarTimes
to set up a national infrastructure for digital transmission and offer lower service fees
to attract more subscribers. The digital migration process provided an opportunity for
Chinese companies to foster strong partnerships with local broadcasters to introduce
Chinese media content to Kenyan audiences. StarTimes’ African operations have
been viewed as an important component of Chinese media international expansion.
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Serving as a channel for Chinese media, StarTimes has great ideological and symbolic
power to help its government to enhance its cultural influence in Kenya.
An important objective of China’s “Going out” campaign is to enhance the
competitiveness of Chinese companies through their investments and operations
overseas and to explore overseas markets for their products and services (Dumbaugh,
2008). The telecommunications sector is one of the important parts of “Going out"
campaign. Along with the Chinese media's huge investment in Africa, Chinese
telecommunications companies are heavily engaged both "in the production of
content meaning and in the infrastructure on which African information is being built"
(Gagliardone & Geall, 2014: 3). The Chinese government believes that "social and
mobile media development will pave the way for increased interaction and
engagement between Chinese media outlets and local communities in Africa" (Shi,
2015:138). The success of Chinese telecom companies’ operations will also enhance
China’s international status and counter Western influence in Africa (Executive
Research Associates, 2009).
Since the 1990s, many African governments recognized that the
telecommunication industry is an important sector for economic development because
the industry is closely linked to services trade, the most vibrant component of the
international trading system. In order to modernize and boost their economy, many
African countries, including Kenya, began a process to loosen the telecom policies to
develop and modernize their telecom sector. The liberation of telecommunication has
made the African telecom industry attractive to overseas investors, like Huawei and
ZTE (Berg & Hamilton, 2001).
Huawei, the leading Chinese telecommunication company, has successfully
operated in the African telecommunication market, the world’s fastest-growing
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telecommunication markets for telecom investors (Thussu, 2016). Since Huawei
started its African operations in 1997 in Kenya, the company has invested billions in
the African telecommunications sector and heavily involved in building towers, fiber
optics and cell phone networks (Gagliardone & Geall, 2014: 3). In 2012, it has
become the biggest telecommunications equipment provider in African (The
Economist, 2012). Currently, China is the biggest provider of telecom equipment and
service in the African continent (Wekesa, 2016) and Huawei is one of the powerful
players dominating the African telecommunication markets (A. Li, 2016).
Huawei is one of the Chinese private companies that have been successfully
expanding its operations in Africa, including Kenya. According to Anshan Li,
Director of Center for African Studies at Peking University, Huawei’s global
corporate social responsibility programs played an important role in its success in
Africa (A. Li, 2016). Since the beginning of its African operations in the 1990s,
Huawei has paid special attention to inform the African public that the company is
operating in a socially responsible manner on the continent (Lu & Li, 2011).
Huawei is proud of its contributions to the ICT development of the African
community. In Kenya and other African countries, its mission is to accelerate ICT
development in the host country (Xinhua, 2016). In order to achieve this objective,
Huawei employed different business strategies, such as offering technical training to
local engineers, to its African customers and donated educational communication
equipment to local schools. Huawei’s training programs not only help improve the
local economy by creating more jobs and localized management, but also contribute
to local communities’ sustainable development. Huawei also contributes to the
development of ICT education in African countries by donating computers and
funding to schools and offering college scholarships to local engineering students.
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The underlying principle of Huawei’s engagement in the local community is the
notion that these programs will help economic development in African nations.
Apparently, Huawei’s corporate philosophy on social responsibility in Africa reflects
China’s vision of co-development that strengthens Sino-African relations. Huawei’s
success and its contributions to technological development in Africa built a favorable
corporate image in local communities and potential partners. The company’s positive
contribution also enhanced China’s image and influence in African countries (C.
Chang et al, 2009; Lu & Li, 2011).
To help African countries to enhance their ICT skills and development,
Huawei developed a program called the “Telecom Seeds for the Future” to help train
local ICT engineers to, “transfer knowledge, promote a greater understanding of, and
interest in, the telecommunications sector and encourage regional building and
participation on the digital community” (Huawei, 2013). In Kenya, the “Telecom
Seeds for the Future” initiative was launched in June 2011 through a partnership with
three leading Kenyan universities, Moi University, Jomo Kenyatta University of
Agriculture and Technology, and the University of Nairobi, and Safaricom Ltd. Under
the agreement, Huawei provided modern ICT skills to the engineering students from
these universities to meet the current industry standard. Huawei also provided the
latest ICT technologies training at its Nairobi training center (Marks, 2011).
In 2013, Huawei signed an agreement with Kenya's SlumCode Group, a nonprofit organization founded by local young people. The objectives of SlumCode
Group is to encourage technological innovation, to develop tech capabilities among
Kenya’s youth, and to bridge the digital divide gap between disadvantaged groups in
the country. Under an agreement, Huawei provided training programs for Kenya’s
youth who are “underprivileged but innovative and creative” (Nalika, 2013). In 2014,
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Huawei signed a three-year partnership agreement with Kenya’s ICT Authority to
promote ICT literacy and awareness and enhance ICT skill development in Kenya. In
this partnership agreement, Huawei promised to offer a total 100 internship
opportunities to top engineering students from Kenyan universities between 2014 and
2016. The top 10 students were given an opportunity to travel to China to further
develop their professional and practical skills in technology. In addition, regular
workshops were set up in an effort to teach different local groups about modern
technology and how can benefit them (Buba, 2014). Huawei’s Nairobi training center
also provided training courses for their clients. At this training facility, Kenyan
engineers did the majority of the training, the Chinese specialist taught very few
training courses. Over the years, Huawei contributed over Kshs160 million to
programs such as the “Telecom Seeds for the future” in Kenya (PC Tech, 2014).
Thus far, Chinese telecom companies’ investments in Kenya have contributed
to Kenya’s ICT development at various levels, such as technology and skills transfer.
They have a positive influence on job creation, human capital development, and
corporate social responsibility in Kenya by creating employment, training facilities,
and offering low-cost equipment and products to Kenya's telecom market. Moreover,
with the presence of Chinese telecom companies in Kenya, its citizens are benefiting
from up-to-date technologies and faster customer services at affordable prices. The
skills and technologies transfer from Huawei’s training center benefit from local
network providers and staff members. The collaborations and partnerships with
Kenya’s telecom companies and ICT authority have contributed to Kenya’s
development in many ways. The establishment of telecom networks and equipment
by Chinese companies has assisted Kenya in modernizing its telecom technology.
Additionally, the widespread telecom network coverage contributed to the country’s
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transmission technology innovations. Thus, Chinese telecom companies are playing
an important role in expanding the telecom infrastructure in Kenya.
Although Chinese telecom companies have brought opportunities to Kenya
and helped its ICT development, the Chinese companies’ presence in Kenya raised
many concerns. Chinese investments in Kenya have always lacked transparency. For
instance, state-owned Telkom Kenya awarded a wireless network contract to expand
its CDMA wireless network to Huawei without public tender. By law, this project
needed to be put out for public tender because of Telkom Kenya’s state-owned status.
Instead, the Kenyan government quietly and exclusively awarded the contract to
Huawei (Malakata, 2011). Another problem that concerns the Kenyan critics is that
the Chinese telecom companies are buying politicians to achieve their agenda. In
2010, Safaricom purchased equipment from Huawei, and Huawei only delivered half
of the equipment promised in the contract. This situation forced Safaricom to cancel
the contract. After the contract had been canceled, Michael Joseph the CEO of
Safaricom, received multiple phone calls from different Kenyan ministers and
members of parliament lobbying on behalf of Huawei (Marshall, 2011).
All of Chinese telecom companies’ engagements with the Kenyan
communities are based on the notion that those corporate engagements will help
Kenya speed up its economic development and sustain China’s long-term economic
and political interests in the country. In other words, Huawei and other Chinese
telecom companies’ success and their contributions to ICT development in Africa,
and Kenya in particular, not only help the companies establish a favorable corporate
image in the eyes of local consumers and partners, but also help to promote China’s
international image and enhance its influence in Africa (C. Chang et al, 2009; Lu &
Li, 2011).
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The Confucius Institutes in Kenya
The Confucius Institutes are another key component in Sino-Kenyan cultural
cooperation. The objectives of the Confucius Institutes are to promote Chinese
language and culture to help Kenyans gain a better understanding of China. They are
important platforms for the Chinese government to “present a kinder and gentler
image of China to the outside world” to counter the Western media’s negative
representation of the country (Gill & Huang, 2006:18). In other words, Confucius
Institutes play an important role in enhancing China’s cultural influence and are
designed to foster international cooperation and to advance China’s relations with
other countries (Wheeler, 2014).
In Africa, the first Confucius Institute was established in Kenya at the
University of Nairobi in 2005. Because of the success of the first Confucius Institute
in Kenya, the Confucius Institute has been greatly welcomed by its host country.
Since then, the number of the Confucius Institute grew rapidly around the Africa. By
the end of 2015, there were 46 Confucius Institutes and 23 Confucius Classrooms
across the continent, including four Confucius Institutes in four universities in Kenya
(Hanban, 2017).
As China’s economic and political engagement in Kenya increases so does its
ability to shape the images and perceptions of China (Starr, 2009). Over the past
years, both China and Kenya are keenly engaging in cultural collaboration to promote
a mutual understanding between Chinese and Kenyans. The Chinese leaders believe
that language and other forms of Chinese cultures are the effective tools to win the
hearts and minds of Kenyan people and cultivate a favorable image among the
Kenyan public. The Kenyan government sees the Chinese language as a professional
tool, by learning to speak Mandarin and learning Chinese culture, Kenyan students
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will obtain a certain professional skill in order to get jobs and participate in a
competitive market. In other words, Kenyan leaders assume that there is a direct
connection between the having the skill to speak Mandarin and opportunities for
social and economic development. Moreover, learning Mandarin will help Kenyan
students engage with Chinese people and companies in Kenya, and give their students
a competitive edge in the job market and will ultimately lead to the growth of the
country’s economy (Hartig, 2011; M.W. Lai, 2012).
Against this background, China and Kenya signed an MOU agreement in June
2004 to set up a Confucius Institute at the University of Nairobi. The Confucius
Institute at the University of Nairobi officially launched in December 2005. It was a
collaboration between China’s Tianjin Normal University and College of Humanities
and Social Science of the University of Nairobi. Since its inception in 2005, with
strong financial support from the Chinese government, Confucius Institute at the
University of Nairobi has the capacity to build the finest Chinese language laboratory
with high-quality equipment, a library, and can offer different levels of Chinese
language and culture programs. As one of the most developed Confucius Institutes in
Africa, the Confucius Institute at the University of Nairobi not only offers language
and culture programs, but it also functions as teaching resources for other local
Chinese schools. Due to increasingly close economic relations and personal
exchanges between the two nations, the number of students and the size of classes at
Confucius Institute at the University of Nairobi grew. More and more Kenyans
wanted to learn the Chinese language so that they could seek development
opportunities in the future (Wheeler, 2014). In June 2016, China invested $20 million
in the University of Nairobi’s Confucius Institute to construct a complex to host
lecture halls, offices, and a student dormitory. This project is one of the largest
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Chinese education investments in Africa and the biggest in any Kenyan university
(Business Daily, 2016).
Due to the increase in bilateral trade and an increase in Chinese companies’
presence in Kenya, the demand and interest in Chinese language and culture merited a
second Confucius Institute that was launched at Kenyatta University, through a
jointed collaboration between China’s Shandong Normal University and Kenyatta
University in 2010. The institute provides free one-year certificate courses to any
students who are interested in learning the Chinese. The programs have been
welcomed by students, local businesspersons, and tour operators who took the
opportunity to enhance their professional skills (Xinhua, 2010). The Kenyan leaders
hope that learning Chinese will open opportunities for Kenya’s tourism industry. If
many Kenyans can speak Chinese, then they can provide travel services for tourists
from China. Thus, the language courses offered by the Confucius Institutes are an
incentive for a boost in tourism from China. In order to boost the country’s tourism
industry, the Kenyan government asked the Chinese government to encourage its
citizens to visit Kenya to help boost Kenya’s tourism industry (Wheeler, 2014).
In 2014, the Chinese government partnered with Egerton University to launch
its third Confucius in Nakuru, Kenya. The establishment of the Confucius Institute at
Egerton University was also part of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the
founding of diplomatic relations between the two countries (Damary, 2013). Unlike
the Confucius Institutes at the University of Nairobi and Kenyatta University, the
Confucius Institute at Egerton University not only offered language and culture
lessons and scholarship opportunities, it also offered agricultural training and research
to local students and community members (Mwangi, 2014).
In March 2015, China launched fourth Confucius Institute in Kenya’s western
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region at the Moi University. The Institute is the Shanghai-based Donghua
University’s collaboration with Moi University. It was the first Confucius Institute
featuring the textile and fashion design course, as Donghua University is famous for
its expertise in textile and costume design. Moreover, the Confucius Institute at the
Moi University to help train students and local professionals skilled in textile design
and trade. As Zhu Min, the chairman of the Donghua University Council said at the
launching ceremony, “The institute will help the local textile and costume design
industries to learn about China’s textile technologies and experience. Donghua
University will organize professors specializing in textile and costume to give lessons
at the Confucius Institute” (N. Wu, 2015). Chinese counselor Yao Ming attended the
ceremony, saying that he hoped that this institute would be an example for future
Sino-Kenya industrial collaboration, to provide a platform to promote cultural and
people-to-people exchange between China and Kenya (Mo, 2015).
Since the launch of the first Confucius Institute in Nairobi, the Confucius
Institutes in Kenya have made an important contribution to strengthen cultural and
economic connections between China and Kenya. Through the special courses they
offered, Kenya's Confucius Institutes accelerated educational and cultural exchanges,
smoothed trade cooperation, and strengthened the friendship between the two
countries. However, there are concerns of some university faculty and administrators
about the study of Chinese language and culture in Kenya. One of the concerns is that
the teaching of foreign language, including English and Chinese, received from the
Kenyan government is places the indigenous language speakers at a disadvantage.
The Chinese government subsidized Institutions operating in Kenya public
universities without the critical oversight of the host university administrators is
another issue they was concerned with (Wheeler, 2014).
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CHAPTER 5
MEDIA REPRESENTATION OF CHINA IN KENYAN MEDIA

China has ascended as a major power player in the international community.
However, its rises to power in the twenty-first century surprised and provoked
significant media attention around the world. The emergence of China as a great
power is under the scrutiny of both the Western nations and their media (Ding, 2011).
Some commentators portrayed China’s rise in a positive light, while others painted
the same stories in the cynical ways, and perceived China as “harmful” and a threat to
global stability (Deng, 2006). A similar situation occurred when Sino-African
relations intensified, the international community began to be concerned about
China's growing interests and presence on in Africa. Proponents view China's
investment in Africa as a partnership both parties are benefiting from. Critics have
accused the Chinese of pursuing a neo-colonialist policy in the continent (Large,
2008).
Since the 1990s, The Chinese government acknowledged the importance of
building up a favorable image in its foreign relations. Over the past years, the Chinese
government has invested a huge amount of resources to improve its international
communication capacity. The previous chapter reviewed China’s tremendous efforts
to enhance its influence in Kenya by intensifying its media and cultural cooperation in
the country. The Chinese media’s global expansion was the Chinese government’s
effort to dismiss neocolonialist criticism, to improve its international image and to
enhance its influence in Africa. Although these initiatives might lay a solid foundation
for China to enhance its image in Africa, they do not automatically translate into
favorable perceptions. The aim of this chapter is to examine the Kenyan media’s
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coverage on China’s engagement in the country and to gain an understanding of how
China has been perceived in the Kenyan media. Whether that perception is that
China’s involvement has been depicted in a positive light and that both parties benefit
from its partnership, or in negative lens that portrays China as a neo-colonialist whose
presence is to exploit Kenya’s resources.
Regardless of the introduction of modern technology, the majority of people in
the world have limited personal contact or information with other countries and
people. Therefore, individuals depend on the media to provide them with information
about foreign countries (Potter & Baum, 2016). The social and political reality of a
society is often constructed by the mass media, especially in a setting that is “out of
reach, out of sight, out of mind” (Lippmann, 1922:21). In other words, “it is based
largely on journalism that we make up our national mind” (Zelizer & Allen, 2002:1).
The mass media can contribute to people’s perception or misperception of each
other’s nations and have a significant impact on the relations between countries. Mass
media also can be viewed as "society centric" that reflects the economic and political
forces of a society (McQuail, 2010). The way the media frames issues and events
certainly can influence or change the meaning people received (McQuail, 2010). It is
within this context that the Kenyan news media's coverage of China’s engagement in
the Kenya is analyzed. To put the analysis of the Kenyan media coverage of Chinese
presence in the country into perspective, this chapter starts with a summary of China’s
image both globally and in Africa. Followed a brief review of the media development
in Kenya.
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The Images of China
China’s engagement with Africa has been under scrutiny from African media
over the past years. Stories reported by the African media about the Chinese
involvement in African countries have created a mixture of positive and negative
perceptions of China. Proponents view China’s engagement with Africa as a “winwin” relationship, where China acquires natural resources for its growing economy
and finds new markets for its manufactured goods, while African countries need
China’s assistance for their socio-economic development (Carmody, 2011; Fergus,
2013; Kofi, 2014). Other observers suggested that China offers an alternative to
Western hegemony in Africa. Traditional Western power players are being challenged
by China because most of the African governments found China’s non-interference
approach to be more appealing than Western countries’ “good governance” agenda
(Alden & Davies, 2006).
Sino-African relations do not hold a favorable, positive image in most of the
Western media. China’s increasing interest in importing natural resources from Africa
has been depicted by Western media and critics as “the new scramble for Africa”
(Carmody, 2011). Critics are skeptical about China’s motivation. One accusation is
that the Chinese government uses aid to receive special treatments from corrupt
African leaders (Power & Mohan, 2008). Their concern is that China’s engagement in
Africa is motivated primarily by economic interests (Carmody & Taylor, 2009; Infed,
2014).

Perceptions of China in Africa
Several studies indicated that the majority of Africans perceived China in a
positive light unlike Western media’s depiction of the Chinese presence in Africa
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(Rebol, 2010; Rossouw et al., 2014). Based on the findings of his study on South
African media’s coverage of China, Herman Wasserman dismissed binary notions of
China's presence in Africa, either an exploitative, predatory force or a benevolent
development partner. Wasserman found that the coverage of South African media
presented a more balanced perception of the Chinese presence. It was neither plainly
positive nor plainly negative but cautiously optimistic. The findings of Wasserman’s
study showed a balanced representation among positive, negative and neutral
(Wasserman, 2012).
Kitta Hirvensaloor in a comparative research of media coverage of Chinese
aid and cooperation with Africa found a similar pattern. The study identified a pattern
of increasing bias in both the Chinese and Western news coverage. The tone of the
Chinese media was overwhelmingly positive, while the Western media news coverage
portrayed a negative bias in Sino-African cooperation, and African media’s coverage
was neutral (Hirvensaloor, 2012).
In his study “The Role of China in the Portuguese Speaking African
Countries: The Case of Mozambique”, Fernanda Ilhéu argues that even though there
are problems, such as the illegal cutting and exporting timber, that arose from in
China’s engagement Mozambique, both the people and government welcomed the
Chinese presence. Ilheu’s findings indicated that these illegal activities did not alter
the positive perceptions of China’s engagement and the mutual collaboration between
the two nations was viewed as mutually beneficial (2010).
A study conducted by Fei-Ling Wang and Esi A. Elliot analyzed the
perception of eight sub-Saharan African countries of China’s involvement in Africa,
including Kenya. The study found diverse African perceptions about China’s presence
and Chinese business activities (F. Wang & Elliot, 2014). According to the
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researchers, there is a contrasting perception about China’s presence in Africa. In a
positive light, China was perceived as a valuable business partner, investor, and donor
that contributed significantly to many host nations’ economic development. However,
there was an increasing number of Africans that criticize the opportunistic, even
predatory, conduct of the Chinese companies in Africa, whose actions damaged the
local business environment and weakened labor rights. Wang and Elliot concluded
that even though China had received considerable support in Africa, it is still facing
increasing number of obstacles. Amongst them was that some Chinese officials and
businesspersons tried to bribe the governments of the host countries to accept deals
(Wang & Elliot, 2014).
While most of the studies' findings showed positive perceptions of China in
Africa, a survey of three African countries (Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa)
perceptions of Chinese companies conducts in Africa uncovered that the perceptions
of African people were more negative than positive in 42.4 percent of responses. This
study shows that, although Africans recognize some positive contributions of Chinese
investments and trade in Africa, they still are concerned about the social,
environmental, and labor reliability of Chinese companies in Africa (Rossouw et al.,
2014). After a brief review of perceptions of Chinese presence in African countries,
the next section reviews the media development in Kenya.

Media Development in Kenya
To obtain a better understanding of the influence of the media in Kenya’s
society today, it is necessary to review the historical situations and the economic,
political and social environment in which the current Kenyan media developed.
Because of the capacity of the study, the evolution of print media will be the main
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focus of this review. The historical review of the print media development in Kenya
provided a better understanding of how the development of print media was shaped
by the political and socio-economic changes in Kenya (Kareithi, 1996). In Kenya, the
development of the print media can be divided into three periods: the colonial period
(1895-1962), the post-independence period (1963-1990), and the multiparty period
(1991-present) (Ireri, 2012).
The development of the print media has been influenced by the country’s
political and socio-economic changes since the first publication of the Taveta
Chronicle in 1895 (Ochilo, 1993). There were three systems in the Kenyan print
media during the colonial era, the European, the Indian, and the African print media.
The European print media was the most prestigious, followed by the Indian, and the
African print media at the bottom (Faringer, 1991). The objectives of the European
print media were to function as a vehicle for delivering government information to the
white settler communities. They served as an instrument for the colonial masters to
maintain their status quo, to rule, and to function as a platform for social
communication within the settler community in Kenya (Mshindi, 2008). In 1901,
Indian trader Alibhai Mulla Jeevanjee established The East African Standard. Later,
the paper would be sold to people who would use it to serve the settler community’s
interests. The Indian media made a huge contribution to end colonial rule in East
Africa after WWI (Abuoga & Mutere, 1988).
During the colonial period, the African print media was motivated by a
political cause and mostly focused on the issue of political independence (Ali, 2009).
From the mid-1920s to 1950s, the indigenous African people developed several
African language publications in Nairobi (Makali, 2003). With increasing discontent
among Africans and Indians, fueled by the “blatantly discriminative policies of the
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colonial regime,” almost all the nationalist leaders launched their own newspapers to
propagate their visions and express their fears (Karanja, 2000:33). These papers
became important instruments for disseminating liberation messages among African
communities. The key role the print media played during this period was to mobilize
people to pursue independence from the colonial powers (Oriare et al., 2010).
Worrying that a free press would advocate for independence, the colonial
government passed the Penal Code of 1930 to ban anti-colonial publication and
criminalized people who possessed the same material. In 1951, the government
initiated a Declaration of Emergency to respond to the Mau Mau revolution. Under
Declaration Emergency, all indigenous publications were banned and propaganda
against nationalist movement was intensified (Makali, 2004). In addition to the law
enacted to silence anti-colonial voices, the colonial government launched Habari
(News) in 1921 to stop the African press from gaining readership among literate
Africans and to boost loyalty to the colonial government (Abuoga & Mutere, 1988). A
weekly newspaper printed in Swahili, Baraza, was established in 1939 by the colonial
government (Ali, 2009).
The first newspaper owned by the African people was Mwigwithania (“work
and pray” in Kikuyu ethnic language), established in 1928 by the Kikuyu Central
Association. The editor of the newspaper Jomo Kenyatta, was Kenya’s first President
after independence. According to William Hachten, there were over 40 African
vernacular newspapers in the 1940. The colonial British authorities suppressed all the
newspapers when the liberation struggle began (1993). In 1952, the colonial
government founded the Kenyan vernacular press, another effort to minimize the
African press’s influence. This led to the closing of African vernacular newspapers
(Bourgault, 1995). There were fifty newspapers in Kenya in 1952, most of them
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closed after the country gained independence in 1963 because their mission to see
Kenya's independence was accomplished (Ainslie, 1966). During the colonial era, the
mass media was strictly controlled and censored by the government and were used as
anti-nationalist propaganda instruments (Mshindi, 2008).

Kenya's media development is closely connected to its political history. The
political transition from British colony to independent nation also transformed the
mass media in Kenya. Following independence in 1963, the newly independent
government faced difficult political, economic, and social challenges. Under such
harsh circumstance, the Kenyatta government constantly used state machinery to
alienate political rivals. Oftentimes, the media was employed to achieve this objective
(Ajulu, 2000). One important piece of influence the Kenyan government had was to
repress the freedom of expression. This was Kenyatta's "ideology of order" (AdienoOdhiambo, 1987). The media was expected to collaborate with the government and
honor national unity narrative (Ochilo, 1993). The mass media were controlled by the
Kenyatta administration for propaganda purposes and to mobilize the public to
participate in Kenyatta's nation-building project (Mbeke, 2008). Through this nationbuilding ideology, the Kenyatta administration was able to create a coercive nation,
where opposition was systematically crushed, normally by violent force (Hyden,
2006). By employing the institutions such as the media, the Kenyatta regime
guaranteed that any opinion challenged the Kenyatta’ rule was censored because this
kind of disagreement conflicted with national development. Therefore, the media was
transformed from liberation tools to propagandists to propagate the Kenyatta
government’s nation-building project (Ireri, 2012).
During the 1970s and the 1980s, a number of African governments adopted
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the concept of development journalism for the purpose of national development
(Bougalt, 1995; Nyamjoh, 2005). The concept of development journalism was first
introduced in Asia in the late 1960s. The term is used to refer to "journalism was
believed and excepted to play a key role in facilitating and fostering national
development" (Xu, 2009:357). In the case of Africa, development journalism means
close cooperation between the media and the states, rather than critical reporting on
development efforts. While it can be a powerful tool for nation building, it is also a
means suppressing information and restricting journalists. Oftentimes, the stateowned media and the government will work together to compete with private media
(Barton, 1979). In Kenya, the government that found development journalism was a
perfect match for its nation-building project (Ogola, 2011).
Most of Kenya’s alternative printed media was closed when the country
gained independence. Only two mainstream newspapers the Daily Nation and the East
African Standard (after this referred to as The Standard) survived. Both newspapers
took a different position on the country's self-determination. The Daily Nation was
opposed to Kenya's independence, however, its support of independence was a clever
move by the newspaper's principal shareholder, the Aga Khan, to safeguard his
business interests in the Islamic communities in Kenya (Winsbury, 2000). In contrast
with the Daily Nation, The Standard took a hostile position towards Kenya's selfdetermination. An Indian businessman, A.M. Jevanjee, as the African Standard in
Mombasa, established the newspaper the paper then relocated to Nairobi under new
owners who renamed it the East African Standard. Later, the East African Standard
became the voice of the white settler community; it was viciously against the
country’s independence. The reason the Standard supported the government was to
give the new government favor. When the new owners, Roland Rowland's Lonrho
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Plc., bought the newspaper in 1967, this support increased (Bougalt, 1995)
The newly independent government acknowledged that the control of
information flow was a necessary precondition for consolidating political power and
maintaining political stability (Amutabi, 2013; Hachten, 1993). The control was done
both directly and indirectly through its control of advertising revenue because the
government was the largest advertiser for these newspapers during this period. In
other words, the government used its advertising buying power to support the media
that followed its policies and censored the voices that were against it. The Kenyatta
government also indirectly supported major media houses to eliminate the alternative
media. Most of the regional and local-language media collapsed, only a few survived.
For those that survived, they increasingly expressed their discontent with the pace of
change. For the government, they are a threat to the nation-building project (Ndegwa,
1997).
During the Kenyatta era, both the Daily Nation and The Standard directly and
indirectly participated in fostering the government's nation-building project. In order
to help the government to achieve its agenda, both newspapers intentionally framed
the president, Jomo Kenyatta, as the father of the country and the whole country as a
family. These framed references were chosen by design and were part of a grand
strategy designed to help Kenyatta deliver his message and executed his power. In
Kenya, "Father of the Nation" represents a hierarchy of relations. The title was used
to enhance Kenyatta's political legitimacy. Both newspapers employed references to
deliver their messages and to make sure their implications were greatly observed.
Under this circumstance, the Daily Nation and The Standard became an informal
publicity instrument of the government (Ogola, 2011).
After the death of Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi became second President
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in 1978 (Ogola, 2011). When he took over the presidency, Moi inherited the worst
economy and a major political challenge; a challenge that came from the leader of the
ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KAUN). This group of leaders became
known as the “Kiamba Mafia” that had organized themselves into the Change of the
Constitution Movement (W. Ochieng, 1995). The goal of the movement was to
prevent Moi becoming the President. The movement failed, primarily because of the
resistance it encountered from President Moi’s supporter, Attorney General Charles
Njonjo. In order to overcome the political challenges and reconstruct the stumbling
nation-building project, Moi was forced to consolidate his political positions. In doing
so, Moi began to centralize power and to institute “an authoritarian and oppressive
one-man state rule” (Adar & Munyae, 2001:2). When the Moi government started to
institutionalize, centralize, and personalize the presidency, the government used state
machinery to restrict and limit political freedom, especially the freedom of press and
expression. Independent and critical publications were banned completely, and
journalists and editors were constantly intimidated and detained by the Moi regime
(Ogola, 2011). Foreign news media also restricted, foreign wire services were
forbidden, and many foreign correspondents were deported (Mshindi, 2008).
The history of the media during the Moi era was filled with stories of
government intervention, arrest and imprisonment of journalists because the
government viewed alternative voices as a threat to its status quo. Instead of using the
mass media for the national development agenda, President Moi employed the media
to obtain and sustain his power. Under the Moi dictatorship, the oppositional voices
were eliminated from media discourse and only those in power had a chance to
broadcast their opinions on national television and radio. Gradually, the state-owned
media were transformed into propaganda tools for the ruling party. Such media
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function was totally departed from the development objective that was supposed to be
a channel to fight against poverty and disease (Mbeke, 2010). In order to avoid
government's abuses, media workers began to self-censure where journalists gave
certain stories a pass if they felt the stories would upset the government or officials.
During this period, the government tightly controlled media ownership. There were
only a few media companies that were privately owned, and these private investors
knew how to survive under such harsh circumstance (Oriare et al., 2010).
The media practice during the Moi regime was an authoritarian model that
assumed the mass media are influential forces of persuasion (Ellul, 1965). Like other
authoritarian regimes, the media was employed by President Moi as an important tool
to achieve his political agenda. During the Moi era, the media environment was harsh,
and the media restricted from performing any democratic role. There was no
breathing space for the media to criticize the ruling parties. For instance, the Daily
Nation was suspended in 1989 from reporting parliamentary proceeding because the
newspaper was viewed "disloyal" to the country. During the end of Kenyatta's era and
beginning of Moi's era, the media gained some autonomy, and several newspapers
were established, unfortunately, the poor market made it difficult to sustain. During
the Moi presidency, the Kenyan media operated in a very harsh environment. It was a
very dark period for the Kenyan media, the media was suppressed, censored,
intimidated, and journalists were prosecuted and detained (Mbeke, 2010). The
Kenyatta government (1963-1978) was marked as having less rigorous controls over
the media (Obonyo, 2003), media freedom during the Moi era remained
incomprehensible (Ireri, 2012).
President Moi recognized the impact of the media on the society. Therefore,
he tried to take control of the Daily Nation and The Standard. He acquired a huge
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amount of The Standard’s shares with an attempt to control the newspaper. His also
planned to gain direct control of the Daily Nation but failed. Although Moi failed to
gain the direct control of the Daily Nation, his relationship with the newspaper was
enhanced through his business connections with the Nation Media Group's principal
shareholder, the Aga Khan. The government's relationship with big media houses has
always been friendly during the Mio era. A significant amount of both the Daily
Nation and The Standard shares are held by the country's ruling elites. This affiliation
accelerated both newspapers' progress, with minimum state intimidation (Ogola,
2011). The Aga Khan also benefited greatly from these relations. Similarly, the
Standard Group also had good relations with President Kenyatta and Moi. Such close
connections also benefited The Standard. Powerful members of Moi’s and KANU’s
regime acquired significant shareholding and became major shareholders before the
general elections in 2002. As the major shareholders of The Standard, the Moi and
KANU regime openly interfered with the newspaper’s editorial view. Additionally,
the newspaper’s dependence on government advertisements made it vulnerable to
government control. In order to survive, the newspaper was deeply compromised. The
Standard’s campaign for Moi in the 1997 presidential elections was an example of the
government’s involvement in the newspaper’s editorial choice. The Standard
published an infamous headline on the eve of the elections that requested its readers
to vote for the incumbent. The paper’s endorsement was unprecedented in Kenya’s
political and media traditions (Ogola, 2011).
The lack of direct control of major newspapers forced Moi to establish a new
newspaper, the Kenya Times, to function as a government propaganda instrument and
to counter the influence of established newspapers such as the Daily Nation and The
Standard. The Moi administration's awareness of the increased influence of the media
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on the political process made control of the media even more important (Iraki, 2010).
According to Ben Bagdikian, the majority of political leaders and parties understand
the importance of news media control because how they are portrayed to the public
will have great impact on people's perception of them and the agenda they want to
achieve, therefore, the news media need to be influenced or controlled (Bagdikian,
2004).
During the Moi's ear, the government exercised a tight control of political
expression in the media until the late 1990s. Moi regime also criminalized important
journalists and the media outlets through sedition trials (Kalyongo, 2011). To make
sure that the privately owned newspapers always promoted the government's agenda,
the Moi regime demanded the private newspapers select their news sources,
especially regional news, from the government, owned news agency, Kenya News
Agency (KNA) (Ogola, 2011). In fact, on a daily basis, both The Standard and the
Daily Nation carried several news stories from KNA, even when they could obtain the
same news stories from their regional networks located in different provinces of the
nation. The Moi regime also had great influence over the editorial agenda of Kenya
Broadcasting Corporate (KBC) and expanded its role in the Kenyan society. As public
media, the main function of KBC was to propagate the interests of the ruling elites not
the interest of the Kenyan public. The government employed the KBC Act to control
broadcasted content and other interrelated concerns because this law clearly indicated
that no broadcasting license could be issued without KBC's authorization (Heath,
1997).
While Kenya attained its independence in 1963, the independence constitution
offered a multiparty political system with democratic structures. However, this system
only lasted a very short period of time. Soon after independence, the government was
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determined to make Kenya a one-party nation. In 1982, President Moi forced the
parliament to pass a law to make establishing another political party other than the
ruling party (KANU) illegal. This law was done due to fears that some Kenyans were
planning to organize an opposition party. By law, Kenya became a one-party nation in
1982 (Wanyande, 1995).
Between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the Kenyan media continued to
report the socio-political issues that concerned the public. These reports were mainly
focused on the pursuit of multi-party politics. The objective was reached in 1991 after
the reintroduction of multiparty politics. Since then, the media plays an important role
in Kenya's multiparty politics. In fact, the media, especially the press, has been
playing the role of political educator. To educate the Kenyan public on the concept of
democracy, on what it means to belong to different parties in one nation and the
importance of the individual's right to vote. Furthermore, after the birth of multi-party
politics, the print media became a platform for vigorous political debates. These
debates often took place in harsh environments for the journalists and were often
unstructured (Mbeke, 2008).
Better freedom of expression led to the liberation of the media sector,
ownership of media expanded, and a number of new publications and broadcast
programs were launched in an attempt to provide more diversified media content to
the public. Prior to the multi-party politics introduced in 1991, the Moi regime
controlled both the political environment and the airwaves. Under the Moi
government, the television and radio functioned as mouthpiece and propagandists for
the government. The media was forced to report on any events Moi and his ministers
participated in, even the events were not newsworthy. The circumstance changed after
the media liberation process took place in the early 1990s. Many new television and
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radio stations emerged and began to compete with the state-controlled media, the
KBC. For the first time, the public opinion was not only shaped by the ruling elites,
but also by the independent media as well (Wasserman, 2013).
For a long time, Kenya's television and radio market were monopolized by
KBC. As state-owned media, KBC enjoyed monopoly status for over six decades. The
liberation of airwaves in the 1990s introduced competition in the media industry by
allowing the licensing of more broadcasting stations. The liberation of media led to
intense competition in the media sector and diversified the content of the media.
When the Moi regime ended in 2002, the media were allowed to openly criticize the
government and became the major information providers on the current political,
economic and social development in the country (Somerville, 2011).
Under the Moi regime, the media silenced general public's opinion on the
current events. Since the 1990s media liberation, the newly emerged television and
radio stations became a platform that citizens could communicate with each other via
interviews and they called into the news programs to talk about their views. Under
such circumstances, the media helped the Kenyan citizens understand and appreciate
the concepts of freedom and democracy by giving them a voice and platform to
express themselves. Not only the ordinary people used media to discuss current events
with others, the Kenyan politicians and officials also began to call in to comment on
the issues posted by media, defend their positions and safeguard reputations. The
content of news became more diversified from the 1990s onwards as a result of the
market competition (Amutabi, 2013). However, many obstructions to media freedom
continued with the criminal libel laws and the Official Secrets Act, in particular. Also
distressing was the Kenyan media’s tendency to lobby on behalf of political parties
and being a mouthpiece for government and opposite parties instead of a watchdog to

144

keep an eye on the government’s wrongdoings (Ogola, 2011).
In 2002, opposition leader Mwai Kibaki unseated President Moi and became
the third President since the independence in 1963. After Kibaki succeeded Moi, he
guaranteed the Kenyan public a new constitution within the first hundred days of his
presidency. However, the new constitution was approved eight years later in 2010.
The media were given more autonomy and allowed full freedom of expression during
President Kibaki’s first term (2002-2007). The print media continued to have great
influence over the Kenyan elites. In 2007, three other dailies were established,
increasing the total number to eight. Nation Media Group launched The Business
Daily that focused on economic affairs and finance. Soon after the establishment of
The Business Daily, The Daily Metro developed. The owner of numerous commercial
radio stations Patrick Quarco also launched The Nairobi Star, like The Daily Metro,
The Nairobi Star is a tabloid that provided the young Kenyans a less political and
more lifestyle, music, sport and brief news content (Rambaud, 2008).
Since the liberation of the airwaves began in 1996 and with the Kibaki
government giving many radio and television frequencies to private investors, the
number of television and radio stations grew rapidly. There were fifty new privately
owned radio stations that emerged between 2003 and 2007. The television market also
crowded with new players during the same period. The growth in both television and
radio sectors created a new dimension to the Kenyan political environment. Even
though KBC still enjoyed the majority share of the market, the Kenyan public seemed
to prefer the privately owned Kenya Television Network (KNT) and Nation TV
(NTV). Kenyans can now acquire the information from different media sources,
unlike previous period the print media was their only source of information
(Somerville, 2011).
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With the highest degree of independence, the media has uncovered
government misconduct, political corruption, and accountability. The media now can
challenge the government publicly and safeguard a degree of public responsibility
unlike the media environment before, which was previously manipulated by elites and
could not be the voice of the general public. Thus, this new constitution that ensured
media’s independence is no doubt the greatest achievement in the Kenyan's media
development since the independence in 1963 (Allen & Gagliardone, 2011).
There were number incidents of press repression that occurred under the
leadership of Kibaki (Ibelema & Bosch, 2009). In May 2002, a new unpopular media
law, The Book Newspaper Act, was passed that requires publishers to post a costly
bond to be deposited prior to publication. This bill frightened a number of publishers,
particularly in the magazine sector because they could not afford the security bond
(Amutabi, 2013; Okoth, 2009). Attacks on the media continued during the Kibaki era.
Two isolated incidents occurred that had a great impact on press freedom. In 2005,
First Lady Lucy Kibaki, accompanied by her security detail, stormed the Daily Nation
production center to protest at the paper’s depiction of a quarrel she had with a
neighbor. Lucy Kibaki stayed in the newsroom for five hours, confiscating notebooks,
mobile phones, tape recorders, cameras, and other equipment. The first lady was
enraged over the reports of how she had disrupted a farewell party for the outgoing
World Bank Kenya director, who lives next door to the president’s private home. She
said the Daily Nation’s reports were unkind to her and her family. She destroyed
equipment and assaulted some journalists. The Kenyan government offered no
comment on this incident and no charges were offered against her (Vasagar, 2005).
The tension between the government and the media reached its peak on March
2, 2006, when the government authorized the raid on The Standard and the KTN for
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“publishing and broadcasting news stories that undermined the legitimacy of
President Kibaki’s regime” (Kalyongo, 2011: 99). Groups of masked police raided
The Standard printing plant in the industrial area and the KTN television. Ten of
thousands of newspapers were burnt and production equipment confiscated. The
damage was so severe KTN had to suspend broadcasting for 13 hours until the
following day (Lacey, 2006). In addition, the Kibaki government asked all public
organizations to boycott the Standard Media Group and channeled their advertisement
to the media companies that were supportive of the government (Rambaud, 2008).
This raid was the first time in Kenya's history the government has shut down a major
media outlet. It was the most aggressive assault on a mainstream media outlet since
Kenya's independence in 1963 (Nguyen, 2006).
The Kenyan media play a critical role in multi-party politics. Indeed, the
media, especially the print media, have played an increasingly significant role in the
political, cultural, and economic transformation in the country. They have done this
by educating and informing the public about various important issues as well as
offering a platform for collective discussion and evaluation of choices to allow the
public to reach thoughtful decisions (Ogenga, 2008). The Kenyan media played an
instrumental role both during the campaigns to the nation’s general election in 2007
and the aftermath. In both circumstances, the media performed dual missions: to keep
the public informed of the current political events and to condemn the elites’
wrongdoings. The media also functioned as a civic educator to provide a platform for
debate, where politicians and the general public engaged each other in discussing
major political issues (Rambaud, 2008).
During the election campaign, Kenya’s mainstream newspapers, the Daily
Nation and The Standard demonstrated professionalism. These papers continued to
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inform the public on the election’s progress after disputed results of the presidential
election were announced. When the post-election violence began, two leading
newspapers continued performed their role to inform Kenyans of progress. They
wanted to help the public understand the reasons behind the violence. They
condemned both Party of National Unity (PNU), the Kibaki government, and Orange
Democratic Movement (ODM) led by Raila Odinga for their involvement in the
campaigns and urged Kenyans to stay peaceful and be united for the welfare of the
nation (Ojwang, 2009).
When the post-election violence broke out in Kenya because of a delayed
announcement of results. The government used Kenya Broadcasting Corporation
(KBC), a state-owned media to declared Kibaki as the winner of the presidential
election on December 30, 2007, three days after the vote took place. Only KBC was
allowed to run the footage of the announcement, the rest of media could only
retransmit the KBC signals to broadcast the announcement (Rambaud, 2008).
Moreover, the Ministry of Internal Security decided to suspend live broadcast of all
news bulletins in “the interest of security and public tranquility” (Rambaud, 2008:94).
This move sparked outrage and led to protests across the country. The government
justified the decision in a statement “in the present atmosphere, some people are using
the media in inciting violence" (Reporters without Borders cited in Rambaud,
2008:94). A ban on live news broadcasting imposed by the government was designed
to defuse public anger. Any media organization violating this rule would be shut
down indefinitely. Despite the public outrage, the chairman of the Media Council also
strongly resisted government's action and announced that the media owners had
decided to disregard the government's ban on live coverage (The Standard, 2008).
The media's coverage of the 2007 elections has become an intense debate in
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Kenya’s media industry. It was the first time the media witnessed police brutality and
was shocked by the unexpected violence and domestic conflict. The media was
terrified, and newsrooms were filled with the tension. Under this circumstance, they
chose to censor themselves. The media intentionally censored certain news and didn't
investigate much about the truth of the voting results to not to feed hatred and to calm
the situation. During the entire month of January 2008, the media tried to bring the
message of peace to the nation.
In the aftermath of the crisis, the Kenyan journalists and the editors of
mainstream media sensed they had failed in their watchdog role to defend the public
interest. As Frank Ojiambo, an editor of the Editor's Guild of Kenya expressed in a
report, “I wish we could have done a better job…had we played our role as media,
perhaps hundreds of people would not have died” (Ojiambo, 2008:4). David Makali,
director of the Media Institute criticized the Kenya media houses for not challenging
the government's live reporting ban because of media practiced self-censorship.
Moreover, Makali argued that the reason why journalists did not report the truth was
that they were afraid both the government and the public might turn their outrages
against them (2008, cited from Reporters Without Borders).

The Political Economy of the Kenyan Media
In the past decades, the ownership of the Kenyan media has been
concentrating on a few corporations and individuals. Media owners are profiting from
the concentration of ownership. These powerful media houses have successfully
rejected government plans to regulate cross-ownership (Mbeke, Ugangu, & OkelloOriale, 2010). Although Kenya has more than seven daily newspapers, over 100 radio
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stations, 17 television stations, and 13 weekly and monthly papers, the media market
is dominated by four groups: The Nation Media Group, the Standard Group, the
Royal Media and Radio Africa. Each media group owns print and broadcasting media
station and has their own platform to distribute and publish their content. A few
powerful players shape the media ownership structure. In order to monopolize the
market, they employed of different methods to block new players from entering the
market. The methods they use ranged from interfering with licensing processes and
monopolizing advertising and distribution networks (Allen & Gagliardone, 2011).
Even though major media houses have been reinforcing barriers for media
entry nationally, their efforts to control media ownership in the region have been
ineffective to date. Powerful media players used their political power to influence the
government’s registration process and the Kenya Communications (Amendment) Act
of 2008. President Kibaki issued an order to review elements that major media houses
thought were restrictive. This was a result of an aggressive lobbying campaign carried
out by the Kenya Media Owners Association (Allen & Gagliardone, 2011).
In spite of progress in media freedom and development, the Kenyan media is
still influenced by institutional, economic, and political forces. As discussed above,
Kenya's unique history of colonialism, political competitions, and political and
economic liberalization has had a great impact on the pace of media development.
Kenya's political history raises barriers to its media independence. For instance, print
media continues to switch their support from one party to the other. The quality and
credibility of their reports are also compromised. Kenya's economic liberalization
encouraged and promoted by the international donor community has helped the
Kenyan media grow to an extent. Through following a neoliberal economic
liberalization model, Kenya is facing potential crises of media ownership
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concentration because there have been no ownership regulations imposed or proposed
on corporate interests (Allen & Gagliardone, 2011).
Unlike many of Kenya’s neighboring countries, widespread violence and
governmental repression are not major concerns to the country’s independent media.
Instead, Kenya faces its own unique political, cultural, and economic challenges such
as the political corruption that remains a critical socio-cultural issue in Kenyan
society. Despite the issue of political corruption, the concentration of media
ownership also restricts the voices of the Kenyan media and the choices of the
Kenyan public (Allen & Gagliardone, 2011).

News Framing of China in Africa
According to Herman Wasserman, “China's presence in Africa is usually
viewed as a controversial one and often portrayed as a Manichean binary – either
‘predator or partner’” (cf. Le Pere, 2006), “friend or foe’, ‘comrade or colonizer’”
(Nullis, quoted in Zeleza 2008: 173). Questions are frequently asked in terms of
"either-or". China’s engagement in Africa is often framed in the questions such as: “Is
China just the latest in a line of exploiters of Africa's rich natural resources who put
their own economic interests above humanitarian, environmental or human rights
concerns, or is China's engagement an extension of ‘South-South solidarity’?” (Manji,
2012).
Olorunnisola & Ma's study examined newspaper's framing of China's presence
in Nigeria, South Africa, China, and the United States found that China's engagement
with Africa was framed as “controversy”, “partner”, and “new power” by South
Africa and Nigeria newspapers, “partnership” and “refutation” by Chinese newspaper,
and “competitor” and “watchfulness” by the US newspaper. The controversy frame
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presented China’s engagement with Africa as complicated, including both positive
and negative consequences of Chinese presence in Africa. One of key controversy
frames was the negative portrayal of China’s no-strings approach. The partnership
frame depicted China’s engagement with Africa as a cooperation and collaboration
relationship and China as an investor in Africa’s railways and infrastructure
development. The new power frame presented China as a new economic power and a
model for Africa’s development (2013).
Two major frames in China Daily’s coverage of Sino-Africa relations were
partnership and refutation. The partnership was the frame China's state newspaper
employed to promote and strengthen Sino-Africa relations. China Daily also
employed refutation frame to explain its presence in Africa and refuted the Western
allegation of neocolonialism. The competitor frames in the Wall Street Journal
emphasized China’s contest with Western powers for Africa’s natural resources and
markets. Another frame frequently used in the Wall Street Journal was the
watchfulness frame. The watchfulness frame highlighted the need to be cautious of
China’s engagement with Africa and the concern that China might surpass Western
influence in the Africa (Olorunnisola & Ma, 2013). The findings in Olorunnisola and
Ma’s study mirror the popular narratives of Chinese presence in Africa. On the one
hand, China is framed positively as a partner. On the other hand, China’s motives are
questioned. Olorunnisola and Ma note that there is an important element missing from
the media frames, which is African countries’ counter approach to the Chinese
involvement.

Methodology
Like other countries, where media outlets depend on elite media to set their
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news agenda (Castell, 2009), in Kenya, most of the media houses get their news
agendas from the daily newspapers report of the major events and issues. Therefore,
the two most influential dailies—the Daily Nation and The Standard are the suitable
representations of the Kenyan media and the general public’s perception of Chinese
presence.

Sample Collection
News articles that published by the Daily Nation and The Standard between
January 1, 2016, and December 31, 2016, were retrieved from the LexisNexis
Academic database and The Standard website for the current study. While the
LexisNexis Academic database included articles for The Daily Nation, The
Standard’s articles were obtained from the publication’s official website. The
timeframe selected was based on the accessibility of the news articles in the library
database. The units of analysis were the individual newspaper articles and the
sampled articles were read in their sums.
Kenyan news media plays a key role in shaping the Kenyan people’s
perception of China’s engagement in the country. Although there are seven daily
newspapers in Kenya, the press was dominated by two powerful media houses, the
Nation Media Group (NMG) and the Standard Group (SG). There were no ideological
preferences that could clearly distinguish these two newspapers (Obonyo, 2003).
Instead, the key factors that influenced these two newspapers’ political preferences
are the issues of ownership, ethnic considerations, and business interests (Esipisu &
Khaguli, 2009).
The Daily Nation was first published in 1960 in Nairobi on the verge of
independence. It was founded by the NMG with Aga Khan as the principal
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shareholder. The Daily Nation was established after the founder Aga Khan purchased
the Kiswahili paper Taifa (now Taifa Leo) in 1958 and decided to launch an Englishlanguage newspaper called the Nation to support Kenyan independence and protect
the owner’s interests (Loughran, 2010). According to an Open Society Foundation
report, the Daily Nation is the most widely read and influential newspaper in Kenya
(Nyabuga & Booker, 2013). It is also “arguably The New York Times of Kenya’s
newspaper industry” (Onyebadi, 2008: 20).
The Standard is the oldest newspaper in Kenya, established in 1902 as The
African Standard by Alibhai Mulla Jeevanjee. The Standard Group Limited whose
primary shareholder is SNG Holding Limited owns the newspaper. Over the past 100
years, The Standard’s circulation was mainly focused on the Kenyan market. In 1905,
British businessmen Rudolf Mayer and A.G.W. Anderson purchased the newspaper
from Jeevanjee and renamed it into the East African Standard. The objective of the
new owners was to make the newspaper the “most influential and widely read
publication in colonial East Africa” (Karanja, 2000: 29). When The East African
Standard dominated the Kenyan press, it continued to represent the “voice of the
largely conservative white settlers and opposed African nationalist aspirations”
(Faringer, 1991: 11). Because of its status as the voice of conservative white settlers,
The Standard’s shift to “identify with the aspirations of Africans was painstakingly
slow even after independence” (Obonyo, 2003: 530).
Keywords used in this data search were “China”, “Chinese” and “Chinese
media”. Only articles that directly related to China's engagement in Kenya were
included in the analysis. The results of the search were screened in order to eliminate
duplicate and irrelevant results. The initial keyword search of articles found 127
articles of the Daily Nation and 50 news articles of The Standard. After removing

154

duplicated and not relevant articles, 85 articles were identified and focused on the
topic of China’s engagement in Kenya. Among them, 45 articles published by the
Daily Nation and 40 articles appeared in The Standard.
The specific data analytic steps employed conducted the framing analysis are
as follows: first, retrieved the most relevant news articles used the combination of
search words mentioned above. Then, each news article was read carefully to
underline aspects of the texts that were relevant to China’s current engagement in
Kenya. Next, a second immersive reading was conducted to take notes of recurrent
themes of China’s presence in Kenya that were selected and narrated by the
newspapers. Finally, a repeated reading of each text was done where frames were
clarified, and important meanings were distinguished. News texts from both
newspapers were constantly compared to distinguish the similarities and differences
between their coverage.

News Framing of the Chinese Presence in Kenya
This analysis seeks to answer two key questions: How China's engagement in
Kenya was framed and represented in the Kenyan newspapers and how was China
being represented in their reports? After a close reading of all retrieved articles
focused on China’s engagement in Kenya from the Daily Nation and The Standard,
this study finds that the focus of both newspaper’s coverage falls into three categories:
diplomatic visits and meetings, business deals, and cultural cooperation. Business
investments were an essential feature of Kenyan newspapers’ coverage of Chinese
presence in the country during the study period.
China’s growing engagement with Kenya has drawn extensive attention and
triggered heated debates about the impact of its presence in Kenya. This study was
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particularly interested in determining how China’s engagement with the country was
framed in Kenya’s two leading newspapers. The findings indicated China’s
involvement in Kenya was framed as “development partner”, “economic competitor”,
and “controversy” by Kenyan newspapers. The findings show that the main focus of
85 articles in the two newspapers was on economic engagement between two
countries. Among them, 52 articles focused on economic engagement, 17 focused on
culture and media, and 16 focused on diplomatic involvement. The findings also
indicated that there was a similar tendency in the key focus of both newspapers. The
majority of the reports focused on China’s economic engagement in Kenya. The Daily
Nation had 27 articles and The Standard had 25 articles. The focus of both
newspapers’ coverage of China’s economic involvement was on Chinese investment
in large infrastructure projects such as the construction of the Standard Gauge
Railway.
The majority news articles framed China’s involvement as a development
partner highlighted the positive aspects of China and Chinese companies’
contributions to the country’s industrialization. The frame focused on the potential
benefits of Chinese engagement to boost Kenya’s economic development. The Daily
Nation and The Standard used recurring words such as “spurring”, “progressive”, and
“beneficial” to frame Chinese presence as an important solution to the country’s
current economic condition. The majority of the sources quoted under the partner
frame were the Kenyan officials who strongly praised China’s involvement,
presenting Chinese presence as a means to help Kenya improve its social and
economic standing.
Statistical evidence was frequently used to illustrate China’s positive
contributions to the country’s economic development. For instance, a news article
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from the Daily Nation cited statistical evidence from a policy research paper
published by the World Bank to indicate Chinese companies' contribution to
increasing employment opportunities in Kenya. The World Bank report found that,
unlike the popular belief that Chinese companies bring their own workers to work in
their Kenya sites, “93 percent of companies report hiring Kenyan employees" (Okoth,
2016). The Daily Nation published another article that also used statistical evidence to
indicate a positive impact of China's loans on Kenya's social and economic
development. China’s engagement with the country was framed as the strategic
partnership.
When the Kenyan media framed Chinese presence as the country’s
development partner, not as an exploitative foe, the narratives focused on China’s
solid economic contribution and assistance to infrastructural development in Kenya.
By framing China as a “development partner,” the readers were encouraged to view
the engagement from a mutual benefits perspective and downplayed the potential
negative impact of China's involvement in Kenya's industrialization process. Even
though readers can still exercise their own judgment to make sense of China's
involvement in the country, there is still a strong possibility the dominant news
frames still have a great impact on readers' perceptions of the events and issues.
While China’s engagement with Kenya has been framed in favorable
narratives as a “development partner”, the Kenyan media also expressed their
concerns regarding the economic consequences of the increasing Chinese
involvement. For instance, in the Daily Nation’s commentaries on China’s economic
engagement with the country, the economic competitor frame was represented in a
cautious manner such as “cheap Chinese imports may hurt Kenya’s bid to
industrialize" (Okoth, 2016) and "if we are not careful, the idea of Chinese
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engagement with us could lead to deindustrialization may not be far-fetched" (Otuki,
2016). The focus of the coverage on the Chinese manufactured goods import is
concentrated on the competition aspect of China's involvement in the country. It is
clearly perceived in the newspaper that local industries have lost business and are
facing serious business competition from China in both domestic and foreign markets.
The concern expressed in these news commentaries is the fear that Chinese
competitions might have a negative impact on Kenya's economy because if the
manufacturing sector stagnates, Kenyan workers might lose their jobs. Under such
circumstances, it is difficult to move people out of poverty and to improve Kenyan's
living standard (Sanghi & Johnson, 2016).
In addition to the concerns over the impact of cheap Chinese imports on local
manufacture sector, Chinese construction companies won Kenya’s infrastructure bids
is another key feature that was frequently reported and commented in both
newspapers’ coverage of China’s involvement in the country. A variety of concerns
about China and Chinese companies’ involvement in Kenya’s infrastructure projects
have been raised.
The need for infrastructure development in Kenya has forced Kenyan
government to open its infrastructure sector to foreign investments. It made easy for
China and Chinese companies to invest in Kenya's infrastructure projects. Since the
FOCAC summit in 2000, China has become a major player in Kenya’s infrastructure
sector. The majority of current Kenyan construction projects were done by Chinese
companies (Enock et al, 2015).
Economic competitor frame depicted China’s investment as potentially
harmful to local business sectors. The negative representation of Chinese engagement
with Kenya’s infrastructure is often associated with corrupt practices by Chinese
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construction companies, as an editorial in the Daily Nation states, “it is a statement of
growing power and influence of a certain group of Chinese constructors, who have
learnt the art of patronage politics and how to play different factions in government
against one another” (Kisero, 2016). Similarly, The Standard reports, after a local
construction company SS Mehta & Sons Limited won a construction tender, "the
tender committee is unable to execute the award after instructions from high-ranking
officials in Government demanded that the tender be awarded to Chinese firm China
Wu Yi Construction Company Limited, giving a glimpse into Chinese influence in
major infrastructure projects in Kenya” (Omondi, 2016).
The main sources quoted under this frame where local business operators. In
the Daily Nation and The Standard, the articles that framed Chinese presence from
the competitor perspective indicated China’s involvement is hurting local business,
for instance, "Chinese constructors rule the roost in Kenya" (Kisero, 2016) and
"Chinese firms' dominance in major projects jolts Kenyan constructors" (Omondi,
2016). The words and phrases used to emphasize this perspective are " jolt" "edge
out" "pushed out" and "gobbled up" to frame Chinese companies as strong
competitors to local enterprise.
The surge in Chinese investment and China’s growing influence in Kenya has
sparked controversy, mainly through questions about cheap Chinese imports, Chinese
companies' misconducts and Chinese loans. Over the past two years, China's loans
have attracted a heated debate, concerns of China's loans intensified after the World
Bank warned the Kenyan government that it's "appetite for Chinese loans risks
choking the economy on the huge repayment burden" (Ngugi, 2016).
News articles used the controversy frame depicted China's involvement in
terms of disagreements with Kenya's practices. For example, there are multiple
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articles about the debate over the impact of the Chinese loans. In an opinion piece, the
Daily Nation columnist criticized loans the Kenyan government borrowed from China
are expensive and “poorly-negotiated,” and these loans would pose risks to Kenya’s
future generations (Kisero, 2016). On April 6th, 2016, the Daily Nation opinion piece
warned “China’s loans can bring debt to unsustainable levels. Some of China’s loans
are non-concessional, which can raise debt-to-gross domestic product levels quickly”
(Ngugi, 2016). On May 25, 2016, the Daily Nation article headlined “In looking at
‘friendly’ Chinese loans, the devil is in the detail” also questioned the intention of
these Chinese loans. In this article, the Daily Nation's columnist Jaindi Kisero
highlighted the terms of the loan agreement and explained why the Chinese loans are
controversial. A few months later, the Daily Nation published another article
headlined, "Why Chinese Loans are a recipe for huge debt burden on Kenya" (Okoth,
2016). In this article, a Kenyan economist Gitau Githogo warned that "Kenya risks
choking in the heavy loans whose ‘no strings attached’ outlooks are deceiving given
the way the country gives into various economic benefits during the implementation
of the projects done by the Chinese" (ibid). Githogo said that the Chinese government
is using its financial leverage to win Kenya's infrastructure projects and successfully
deny local companies’ opportunities to contribute to local economy. The biggest
controversy of China's loans is that Chinese companies performed the projects'
feasibility research, won the tenders, and were financed by China Exim Bank.
Apparently, it is contradictory. This article ended with a quote from another economic
analyst Robert Shaw indicating that Chinese loans are very expensive. Undoubtedly,
Chinese loans would burden Kenyans for generations and the situation can be avoided
if the Kenyan government borrows from other alternatives (ibid).
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Articles with controversy frames related to China’s involvement often
revolved around unfairness or secrecy over contracts. On July 4th, 2016, The Standard
published an article headlined “Chinese fish floods Kisumu markets” reports about
controversial sentiments between the Chinese company and Kenyan fish farmers over
Kenyan fish markets. It showed how cheap Chinese fish retailing in local markets and
“killed the fishing industry” around Lake Vitoria regions (Ogutu, 2016). This news
report has opened a debate and led to local “leaders protest over fish imports from
China" (Ayaga, 2016). According to the PMs from affected regions, China fish
imports have caused serious economic damage on local fish production. As a result,
"hundreds of local fishmongers have been pushed out of business”. These leaders also
argued, "lack of guarantees on the safety of the fish has exposed consumers to lead
posting and cholera, among other health effects" (Ibid). They demanded the Kenyan
government "to protect local fish farmers and these communities that stand to lose out
in any competition with large Chinese fish imports" (The Standard, 2016).

Representation of China in the Kenyan Newspapers
Another objective of this news analysis is to uncover how China has been
represented in two leading Kenyan newspapers. The articles were grouped into three
broad categories: positive, negative, and neutral. The majority of articles portrayed
China in neutral terms, 8 articles portrayed China positively, and 14 articles portrayed
China negatively. There were 32 articles in the Daily Nation that portrayed China in
neutral terms, 5 portrayed China positively, and 8 articles with a negative portrayal.
For The Standard, there were 31 articles that portrayed China in neutral terms, 3
articles depicted China positively, and 6 articles represented China in a negative light.
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Most of the articles that gave positive portrayals were about China's financial
assistance and Chinese projects to Kenya. Other articles focused on cultural
collaboration between the two countries. China's benevolence in giving economic
assistance to Kenya was reflected by several stories. The story, "Future is bright for
China-Kenya cooperation" highlighted the positive results of mutual and pragmatic
cooperation between the two countries (Liu, 2016). Another article framed China
provided the loans with its successful experience in which Kenya could benefit. In an
opinion piece headlined "Chinese loans useful for Kenya's progress", the writer noted
that the Chinese loans and projects would boost Kenya's economic and social
development significantly if the Kenyan government deployed them properly. Three
decades ago, China experienced a similar economic situation. China was in need of
capital to support its social and economic development, just like Kenya's current
circumstance (Guo, 2016).
In addition to China’s economic assistance, another positive presentation of
Chinese presence in Kenya is that the Chinese increased employment opportunities
for ordinary Kenyans. For instance, a story headlined “Chinese firms hire more locals
than foreigners” reports that Chinese companies running in Kenya employ more
locals than other foreign countries, contrary to popular belief that Chinese firms are
importing workers from China and hire less local workers as they promised (Okoth,
2016). Other articles focused on the cultural aspects of Chinese support to Kenya. In
an article headline, “Chinese experts train farmers on modern farming methods”,
indicated that the Kenyans have benefited from China’s advanced agricultural
technology (The Standard, 2016).
The negative portrayal of China was mostly related to the controversy
surrounding the standard gauge railway (SGR) and the cheap Chinese manufactured
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goods. The SGR projects are one of many of Kenya’s infrastructure projects financed
by China. China’s state-owned Export-Import Bank loaned Kenya $3.6 billion for the
project. Kenya is expected to use its revenues to repay the debt. However, some
analysts are raising concerns that the SGR will be a huge financial burden for
generations of Kenyans. Some of the media coverage depicted China in a negative
light and criticized the Chinese government using its economic assets to advance its
geostrategic interests. Critics condemning Chinese loans have left Kenya stuck in a
debt trap that makes Kenya vulnerable to its influence. In the articles headline “In
looking at ‘friendly’ Chinese loans, the devil is in the detail” the columnist wrote that
“the Chinese are worse than the merchants of Venice—overloading us with highpriced loans and viciously promoting their exports by giving us more and more
expensive export credit financing” (Kisero, 2016).
In another article headline, “Why Chinese loans are a recipe for huge debt
burden on Kenya”, the reporter quoted Nairobi-based economic analyst Gitau Githogo
indicates that China "attaches the financing to its participation in the projects and
effectively denies Kenyan firms a chance to bring about more economic impact
locally" (Okoth, 2016). In the same article, Okoth interviewed another economic
analyst Robert Shaw. According to Shaw, "Unlike the conditions are given by the
IMF and other multinational lenders, China is simply looking for business and the
more projects they get, the easier they lend Kenya. They are very costly loans through
and Kenya is definitely connecting its feature generations in heavy indebtedness that
could have been avoided by taking other options" (Shaw cited in Okoth, 2016b).
The impact of cheap manufactured goods imported from China raised great
concern in Kenya. Even though cheap Chinese imports have helped improve the
standing living for many poor Kenyans who could not afford costly Kenyan-made
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products, China has been blamed for the decline of the local manufacturing sector.
For instance, an article headlined “Cheap Chinese goods threaten to dim Vision
2030", reported that Chinese manufactured goods are edging out local businesses.
China was portrayed negatively as a threat to local manufacturing sectors (Okoth,
2016a). The article warns that increasing flow of cheap Chinese manufactured goods
will undermine “Kenya's status as an exporter of products to the East African market”
and weaken the country’s industrial growth (Ibid).
The analysis of portrayals of China's engagement in Kenya in the selected
newspaper articles found that most of the news articles portrayed China neutrally,
rather than positive or negative. The perceptions were not at the positive end or
negative end but fell between the two extremes. Despite the perceived smooth
relationship, voices of individuals critical of China have raised concerns about cheap
imported Chinese goods undercutting local traders and are driving the local
companies out of business, and that controversial Chinese loans might burden future
generations.
This chapter uses Kenya media’s response to China’s increasing engagement
with the country as a case study to gain a better understanding of how China’s
engagement with the country was perceived by the Kenyan media after it invested
huge amount of resources in its media’s international expansion. The literature review
shows that the general perception of China’s involvement in Africa in the West is
predominantly negative and that China is depicted as a neocolonialist, therefore SinoAfrican relations are exploitative. Unlike Western media’s representation of Chinese
presence in Africa, the present study found that the Kenyan media’s perceptions of
China’s involvement in the country are generally neutral rather than negative or
positive. However, China’s growing influence in the country should not be viewed as
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stagnant because there are many factors at play, including Kenya’s relations with
traditional Western donors and other countries like Japan and India.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

Over the past three decades, China has gradually ascendant as an important
power player and its rise has attracted considerable attention from scholars and media
around the world. In just few decades, China has transformed itself from a massively
impoverished agricultural country into an impressive economic powerhouse. The
economic reforms had lifted half of its population out of poverty and became the
world’s second-biggest economy. Along the way, China’s economic rapid growth
also stimulated other countries’ development, due to the country’s demand for raw
materials, energy and capital flows. As China’s economic power strengthened, the
Chinese government gained the resources to create and enhance its cultural influence
over other nations (Zhang, 2010).
China’s rise has become a hot topic in international media narratives,
especially its relationship with African countries. Many conflicting views that have
emerged to interpret China’s increasing engagement with African countries, some of
them see China’s engagement as win-win cooperation that benefit the parties
involved. Others view China as a new colonial power, whose purpose is to exploit
Africa’s natural resources and new consumer markets. Sino-Africa relations are far
from mutual, Chinese presences are to exploit African countries’ wealth for their own
interests (Chin, 2014). Such criticism damages China’s national image and has the
negative impact on Chinese companies’ operations in Africa (Large, 2008). Against
this background, the Chinese government initiated a “going out” campaign to
encourage its state-owned media to expand their operations overseas (Xin, 2009;
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Gagliardone, 2013; Zhang, 2010).
The concept of a political economic of communication is applied in this study
to uncover the impacts of political and economic forces on the transformation of the
Chinese media. This concept connects the media to a broader political economy; it
examines the influences of both economic and political forces on media and how
social power is exercised in shaping media (McChesney, 2008). For the political
economy of communication, the changes in media are often caused by changes in the
country’s economy and politics. The transformation that occurs in media is both a
cause and result of societal changes. In the current study, the theory of political
economy of communication was used to understand how internal and external
economic forces and political power in both China and Kenya influence the media
system.
An analysis of the transformation of media in China from the perspective of
the political economy of communication explains how the internal and external
economic and political forces have transformed Chinese media from a pure
propagandist to media conglomerates that serve two masters: the Party and the
market. The notion of political economy of communication also helps to unpack the
current development of the Kenyan media, how the economic and political forces in
Kenya shifted its media landscape. A historical review of the transformation of the
media in both China and Kenya is conducted to offer essential background
information and to show some of the major changes that have occurred in the process
of the media transformation.
Before the introduction of the economic reforms and Open-door policy in
1978, most of the Chinese media companies were owned and fully subsidized by the
state. Party organ such as the People’s Daily did not need to worry about circulation
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because they were supported by compulsory subscriptions from public office. News
media and media professionals were perceived as mouthpieces of the Party and the
news media was tightly controlled by the state (He, 2006). After the death of
Chairman Mao in 1976, his successor Deng Xiaoping adopted an Open-door policy to
modernize the country and improve Chinese people’s living standard. Deng suggested
a change from a planned economy to a market economy and modernization. In doing
so, he launched the economic reforms and partly privatized its state-owned companies
and encouraged them to initiate joint ventures with foreign capital (Wei & Pan, 1999).
During the reforms, market principles were introduced and adopted by the
Chinese media. The media began to practice multi-channel financing methods such as
advertising and sponsorship to make up for the loss of governmental subsidies. Such
multi-channel financing policy was designed to enhance and modernize China's media
without the need to increase the state's financial burdens (Lynch, 1999). Between the
different channels, advertising has become the major non-governmental method of
financing since its reintroduction in 1979 (Y. Zhao, 1998).
The economic reform in 1978 also expanded the role of the state in the media
system. The Chinese media system was moved from complete state regulation to
partially deregulated industry. This deregulation of the media industry was carried out
through four developments: commercialization, privatization, liberalization, and
internationalization. These actions are what political economists called the most
important examples of the "state's constitutive role" (Mosco, 2009).
Commercialization took place when the Chinese government replaced state
regulation with the market mechanism. The Party’s top leaders adopted a capitalistic
media reform experience to promote a greater market reform and mass media’s
serious financial obstacle (Winfield, 2005). As previously mentioned, the media in
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China was completely subsidized by the state before the economic reform. However,
after the introduction of economic reforms, the government gradually cut the media
companies’ subsidies and forced them to be financially independent. Under such
circumstances, media companies were forced to establish close connections with
advertisers. By the end of the 1980s, advertising revenues had become the major
source of income for China’s newspapers and broadcasting companies. In 2003, all
the newspaper's subsidies were terminated except three Party newspapers and a
journal (Moro & Aikat, 2010). As a result, advertising revenues became media’s
means of support. Chinese media’s functions and structure have become increasingly
diversified since the reforms (Y. Zhao, 1998, 2008).
The process of commercialization has depoliticized the media and made them
more responsive to their audiences’ need (He & Chen, 1998). Although media
commercialization has some positive impacts on the media sector, many studies
suggested the negative impacts of media commercialization on media content. They
criticized that the media has to give too much space to entertain and neglects public
welfare content, such as education. The pursuit of commercial interests may lead to
the vulgarization of media content. Too much advertising is another common
complaint of media consumers; some newspapers even sell their entire front page to
an advertiser for a day (Lian et al., 2010). As Y. Zhao claimed, “advertising is itself a
form of propaganda for the market system, and it reveals . . . political propaganda as
the dominant form of mobilization speech and subjective making” (2008:85). With
increasing market forces and deregulation, media transformed themselves into the
mouthpiece of market forces.
The media commercialization not only changed the relationship between
media and market, it also altered the relationship between state and media, even
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though the government still strictly controls media. The only difference is before the
launch of the economic reform; the media was controlled by ideological means for the
purpose of strengthening the political power and sustaining social stability (Q. He,
2008; Stockmann, 2012). After media commercialization, the Chinese government
perceived media control as the way to control public opinion that is extremely
important for social stability. Media control is an important element for the Chinese
government to increase China’s international influence and strengthen its global
status. A controlled media would faithfully deliver the Chinese government’s message
and to present China as a peaceful rising power to their international audience (Q. He,
2008). With intensifying economic reform, speedy market liberalization, increasing
commercialization, technological advancements and the influence of globalization,
media has become one of China's important social agents that help the country boost
its economic, political, cultural, and social development.
Since China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), it
has been recognized as an emerging superpower in the international community.
Foreign media tends to be extremely selective in their reporting of China by focusing
on human rights issues, environmental degradation, government corruption, or the
potential threat to international stability posed by China's growing economic and
military power. From China’s perspective, foreign media's coverage of the country,
especially Western media is biased and constitutes a concerted effort to “demonize”
China. In order to counter foreign media’s negative representations, promoting a
favorable national image on the global stage has been a top priority of the Chinese
government. Between 2009 and 2010, the Chinese government reportedly invested
US$ 8.7 billion to enhance its international communication capabilities (Xie, & Page,
2013).
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In the information age, people’s perceptions of other countries are
unquestionably influenced by the news stories they read and how these nations are
depicted in local and international media (Brewer, Graf & Willnat, 2003). The image
of a nation is important in the conduct of international relations because a favorable
image plays an important role in emphasizing a country’s international influence
(Benoit & Brinson, 1994). On the international battleground of image projection, the
winners effectively project images that are embraced by the foreign public, while
others define a loser’s images (Xie, & Page, 2013). This explains why the Chinese
government tries to use its economic power and cultural influences to improve its
national image in Africa.
China’s increasing presence in Africa has drawn enormous attention and
concern from around the world. Some scholars interpreted China’s engagement in
Africa as part of China’s new international approach for power and influence that may
benefit African countries’ economic development (Kitissou, 2007). Others view
China’s engagement in Africa as a neocolonial predator acting aggressively for
influence and wealth (Bangui, 2011). Those critics argue China has entered a new
“scramble for Africa” and started “new Chinese imperialism” that has great impacts
on the continent (van Dijk, 2011).
There is great dichotomy in African perceptions about China’s involvement in
Africa. Proponents perceive China as a non-confrontational economic partner,
contributing significantly to the economic development in many host African
countries. Many Africans perceive China as an alternative influence in Africa that is
different from the role the West played in the past, as resource-extractors and
political-nanny (Wang & Elliot, 2014). Despite the favorable perception of Chinese
presence, China’s involvement in Africa also receives criticism from Africans.
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Certain business practices by the Chinese companies have created resentment over the
issues such as labor rights and employment opportunities. For those critics, the
Chinese companies who invested in Africa are for quick-profits, resource-extraction,
and not treating Africans as their equal business partners, such perception lead to a
huge gap between Chinese approaches and African perspectives (Harneit-Sievers et
al., 2010; Shelton & Kabemba, 2012). Such resentment led to resistance and China is
depicted as an economic and cultural imperialist power. In order to narrow such a
perception gap and articulate a favorable image, the Chinese government invested
massive resources to enhance its media and cultural influence in African countries.
A nation’s outreach reflects the purposes and domestic situations of that
country. This is true in the case of China’s media and cultural engagement in Africa.
In China’s early media engagement with African countries, media was used to
achieve China’s desires to establish diplomatic relations with newly independent
African nations. During the 1980s and 1990s, media collaborations were used to
repair China’s international image, strengthen its political ties, and engage audiences
in the important regions (Wu, 2012). As Sino-African relations evolved, so has the
nature of China's media and cultural engagement in African countries. Currently,
Chinese media and cultural engagement in Africa is a component of China’s “going
out” campaign that is aimed at strengthening diplomatic and economic relations. Mass
media, the Confucius Institutes, scholarship programs, and exchange of academics
have been employed to engage audiences and shape their perceptions of China in
strategically important countries in Africa.
The expansion of China’s media operations in Africa is widely read as China’s
“charm offensive”, an attempt to use the media to make China more appealing to its
international audiences (Kurlantzick, 2007). However, Anbin Shi, professor of media
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and cultural studies at Tsinghua University, suggests that China’s “going out”
campaign to improve its image abroad should be viewed as “charm defensive” that is
a response to the negative representation of China in the international media and an
attempt to counter such misrepresentations (2015).
China’s current media expansion is intertwined with its heavy investment in
the growing African media markets. Today, African cable audiences have access to
CNC World, the English-language television channel of the Chinese state news
agency. CNC has reached 6.7 million subscribers to DStv, Africa’s biggest digital
satellite television platform. Xinhua News Agency relocated its editorial office from
Paris to Nairobi in 2006. The objectives of the relocation are to provide news
portfolios to African subscribers and compete with Western news agencies. Today,
Xinhua’s news wires are published by African leading newspapers (Jacobs, 2012).
Xinhua also launched a mobile application in 2011 to offer its news services to
millions of mobile phone users in Africa (Shi, 2015).
In the broadcasting sector, CCTV Africa was launched in Nairobi in 2012 to
cover news on the continent and offered daily news programs from a Chinese point of
view. As Iginio Gagliardone, who studies CCTV's Africa operations, suggests that the
Chinese government is using CCTV Africa to influence Africans' perceptions of
China. CCTV Africa's presence on the continent is not only to present positive images
of China, but also to develop new ways of looking at Africa. By showing a positive
image of Africa and framing a "Africa rising" narrative, CCTV Africa can position
China as a partner of African countries, a continent who is also a victim of Western
media’s negative representations (2013). Also, in 2006, China Radio International
(CRI) moved its African broadcasting headquarter from Paris to Nairobi and
partnered with Kenya Broadcasting Corporation. CRI broadcasts on various platforms
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from shortwave, to the Internet, and apps. It covers all kind of programs, news, and
entertainment, telling China and Africa stories in different ways (Rønning, 2014).
On the print media sector, China Daily, China’s leading English-language
newspaper, has extended its reach to English-language readers in major African
countries, as well as online. China Daily has been publishing its African edition plus a
special supplement of African Weekly and a magazine titled China Africa since
December 2012. China Daily can be purchased in the newsstands together with
Kenya’s leading newspapers such as The Daily Nation and The Standard in major
African cities (Shi, 2015).
StarTimes represents one of the most remarkable Chinese success stories in
Africa. It began its African operations in 2002 with a specialization in Digital
Terrestrial Television. The company has benefited greatly from the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) decision to switch television signals from analog to
digital television broadcasting by 2015. During the migration process, StarTimes
successfully placed itself in the lead by providing cheap subscriptions through set-top
boxes that provide access to digital broadcasting and negotiated digital provider
contracts with governments and public broadcasters (Rønning, 2014).
In addition to Chinese media’s expansion, the Chinese government also
invited African journalists and media professionals to China to attend workshops or
training programs. The topics of these workshops and training programs included
Chinese political, economic, social, technological and cultural development. The
participating Chinese media companies also provide internships to these African
participants. The African visitors and trainees were not limited to Marxist journalism,
but also given access to market-oriented media outlets and invited to join in debates
on topics such as objectivity, professionalism, citizen journalism, and media
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management (Shi, 2015).
Among African states, Kenya was selected as an important cultural and media
hub where China has established a strong media presence. For example, CRI
developed more partnerships with local radio stations and added six new languages to
its broadcasts since 2009. CNC World was established by Xinhua television in 2010,
later it partnered with Safaricom, Kenya’s leading mobile operator, to launch their
first mobile newspaper in Africa in 2011. The most recent move of Chinese media
engagement in Kenya was the launch of CCTV Africa and China Daily Africa
Weekly in 2012. Both media companies chose Nairobi as the headquarters of their
African operations (Zhang & Mwangi, 2016).
Currently, China’s media functions as alternative media in Africa and is
embraced by the Kenyans for the positive and constructive reports on African affairs.
Despite their positive contributions, Chinese media still faces numerous challenges in
Africa. The issues such as editorial independence, reliability, and freedom of
expressions are major concerns of both the Western and African scholars (Zhang &
Mwangi, 2016). Additionally, Kenyans might have difficulty to accept China's topdown media model due to their strong tradition of independent and critical media
power (Harber, 2013). Although the Chinese media's positive reporting will help
position China as an ally of Africa, it will take time for the Africans to accept this
approach and build trust. Thus, Chinese media needs to find more balanced strategies
for their operations in Africa to be favorable and sustainable. The influence of
Chinese media depends on how much they have been accepted by the African public
and media markets (Y.S. Wu, 2012).
Understanding African media’s responses on China’s engagement with their
homeland have become essential in comprehending China’s growing influence in

175

Africa. As the literature review shows, the general perceptions of China-Africa
connections discussed in the West are predominantly negative. China is often
portrayed as a neocolonialist, and Chinese presence in Africa is depicted as
exploitative. Unlike the Western media’s negative portrayal of the Chinese presence
in Africa, the present study found that the Kenyan media’s depiction of China’s
involvement in Kenya are generally neutral rather than negative or positive. In most
of the articles analyzed, China was portrayed in neutral terms. Although this media is
not determinative of how Kenyans think, however, the influence of the news framing
cannot be ignored because media forces often mobilize the public.
The Kenyan media’s framing of China’s engagement in the country should not
be viewed as stagnant because China-Kenya interactions are rapidly evolving. It
would be useful to take a wider range of media platforms to get a broader insight to
obtain a better understanding of China’s growing cultural influence in Africa.
Moreover, a large-scale survey might help to collect Kenyan people’s perceptions
about China’s state-driven cultural and media investment in Africa.
A case study of China’s increasing culture and media involvement in Kenya
can provide a general picture of China’s expanding cultural influence in the age of
globalization. However, this selection is less than perfect because Kenya is only a
small, if a highly influential nation of the African countries. Additional studies are
required to conceptualize how cultural, political, and economic forces, both at home
and aboard, contribute to China’s growing cultural influence in different countries.
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